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This DBA research investigates why Organisation A (Org. A), a specialised consultancy 
service provider of business processes and strategic Information Technology (IT), had 
experienced revenue losses from June 2014 onwards and continuously during 2015 and 
2016. In 2008, Org. A commenced its operations in Bahrain when oil prices were 
fluctuating between US$110–140. During this time, it secured two large government 
projects which ensured work for five to seven years. While the outlook for Org. A was 
positive, a drop in oil prices hit Bahrain’s economy in June 2014, which contributed to a 
long-term 75% profit loss. The revenue losses coincided when oil prices dropped to less 
than US$40 in June 2014, creating severe economic hardships on Bahrain’s small- and 
medium-sized organisations (macro-economic conditions). The drop in oil prices drove 
the government to stall large and new infrastructure projects worth over US$350–400 
million (assess outer-world influences). An additional cost-cutting step was to withdraw 
government-sponsored utility subsidies to the community. This environment compelled 
Org. A to presume that the drop in oil prices and the economic crisis (outside causes) 
were the reasons behind its revenue losses. Org. A also presumed that the government 
would favour locally owned organisations over foreign-owned organisations, and this 
perception hindered Org. A from seeking advice and financial help from the primary 
government funding organisation (meso-economic conditions).  
 
To explore the reasons behind Org. A’s revenue losses, this DBA research applied an 
Action Research (AR) strategy with a four-step AR cycle (constructing, planning action, 
taking action, and evaluating action). In addition to the core, underlying AR strategies, 
three other qualitative research strategies were employed to collect data. These efforts 
included the action research set with seven comparable, independent and diversified 
small and medium organisations and Org. A.  
 
At the beginning of this DBA research, a prevailing presumption within Org. A had been 
that ‘outside causes’ associated with the drop in oil prices and the economic crisis were 
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the primary causes of its revenue losses. However, as this DBA research discovered, 
such focus on the ‘outside causes’ was a barrier for Org. A to detect the ‘inside causes’ 
within the organisation that had been primarily responsible for its revenue losses.  
 
Findings suggest that ‘outside causes’ were conditions that imposed challenges to any of 
the investigated seven comparable, independent and diversified organisations and Org. 
A. Similarly, the findings do not show that Org. A’s revenue losses had been caused by 
the government’s discriminatory practices over foreign-owned organisations. The findings 
showed that, unlike the other seven comparable organisations, Org. A had experienced 
a lack of organisational knowledge, competencies, and self-efficacies, leaving it incapable 
of responding to the economic crisis.  
 
This understanding developed through this DBA research allowed taking jointly built 
strategies within Org. A to resolve the situation together with whom the problem relates 
to within Org. A, as shown through: (Table 43), (Table 44), (Table 45), (Table 46), (Table 
47) and (Table 48) to respond to similar future economic crises.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction  
This chapter is divided into six sections. (1.1) discusses the purpose of this DBA research, 
which involves uncovering the reasons for revenue losses at Org. A. (1.2) examines the 
economic crisis, Org. A’s revenue losses, and initial presumptions. (1.3) identifies the 
research questions presented at the macro level (1.3.1), the meso level (1.3.2), and the 
micro level (1.3.3). (1.4) discusses the research aim and goal. (1.5) discusses the 
research scope and the AR approach. This chapter closes with the research outline (1.6) 
and a rich picture showing the roadmap of this DBA research. 
 
 Uncovering the reasons for revenue losses at Org. A, a foreign-owned SME 
in Bahrain  
This DBA research was conducted to address two challenges facing Org. A. First, it 
investigated the problems that led to revenue losses at Org. A, which included a literature 
review. The second step, based on the outcomes of the first step, involved taking action 
to change and improve the situation within Org. A.  
 
Org. A is a specialised consultancy service provider of business processes and strategic 
Information Technology (IT) that commenced operations in Bahrain in 2008. During this 
year, Org. A secured two large government projects that ensured work for five to seven 
years when oil prices fluctuated between US$110-140 per barrel (pb). While the outlook 
for Org. A appeared positive, a drop in oil prices that hit Bahrain’s economy in June 2014 
contributed to a long-term 75% profit loss. At this point, it was necessary to investigate 
Org. A’s inside operations to uncover the reasons for revenue losses.  
 
The revenue losses coincided when oil prices dropped to less than US$40 in June 2014, 
creating severe economic hardships on Bahrain’s small-and medium-sized organisations. 
In this environment, the government decided to stall large and new infrastructure projects 
worth over US$350–400 million. An additional cost-cutting step was to withdraw 
government-sponsored utility subsidies to the community. Delaying these contracts 
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negatively impacted Org. A’s income, which was dependent on government-sponsored 
projects.  
 
The next section (1.2) examines the economic crisis, Org. A’s revenue losses, and initial 
presumptions. 
 
 An economic crisis, revenue losses, and initial presumptions 
Initially, Org. A presumed that the drop in oil prices and the government-imposed austerity 
steps caused its revenue losses from June 2014 onwards (1.2.1). Another presumption 
was that the government had ceased financial and advisory support to foreign-owned 
organisations (1.2.2). The macro-economic conditions outlined in (1.2.1) identify 
challenges encountered by any organisation operating under a disruptive economic 
setting. The meso-economic conditions outlined in (1.2.2) show challenges that contribute 
to operating costs but do not impact the organisation’s profit/loss. The next step was to 
investigate whether internal challenges hindered the organisation’s leadership from 
responding to the economic crisis (1.2.3).  
 
1.2.1. Bahrain’s economic crisis (macro-economic conditions) 
Initially, Org. A presumed its revenue losses since June 2014 were due to the drop in oil 
prices leading to an economic crisis, which generated a considerable budget deficit in the 
government coffers. As one step towards addressing the budget deficit, the government 
decided to withdraw government-sponsored utility subsidies to the community. According 
to Hamilton (1983) and Ederington and Guan (2010), oil price fluctuations negatively 
impact a country’s macro economy (4.1). Rising oil prices reduce a country’s GDP and 
disrupt the direct and indirect dependants’ earnings (4.1.1) whereas a drop in oil prices 
leads to reduced profits, thus reducing the actual value of an organisation’s assets and 
disrupting its balance sheets (Deloitte, 2019). Analysing the initial observations, as told 
by Deloitte (2019), except for the drop in oil prices, the rest of the causes could not be 
calculated from a macro-economic condition.  
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The following section (1.2.2) discusses whether the government prevented foreign-owned 
organisations from gaining support through discriminatory practices. 
 
1.2.2. Discriminatory practices impacting foreign-owned organisations (meso-
economic conditions) 
Org. A refrained from seeking external financial help to lower its operating costs until the 
economic situation improved. Initially, Org. A presumed the government would favour 
locally owned organisations over foreign-owned organisations. This perception hindered 
Org. A from seeking financial help from approaching Tamkeen, a semi-autonomous, 
primary government-funding organisation. Tamkeen’s objective is to provide loan and 
advisory support to all SMEs regardless of ownership and size. Tamkeen’s segment-
based packages are in line with the market needs of SMEs (Tamkeen, 2018). Tamkeen 
also provides coaching and mentoring to all organisations at different maturity levels. An 
additional hindrance was payback terms; limited collateral assets prevented Org. A from 
seeking required help. Org. A also neglected to benefit from Tamkeen’s coaching and 
mentoring support that would have guided loan applications.  
 
The World Bank flagship report 2006–2009 showed that 31% of SMEs found access to 
finance to be the most significant barrier to business growth (Wang, 2016). Compared to 
large organisations, government organisations hesitate to fund SMEs, with rejection rates 
as high as 75% (Bloovo, 2016). Younger organisations that lack credit, lack 
understanding of the SME environment, and have limited management and record-
keeping abilities rely on informal financing steps over banks (Oum, Harvie and Narjoka, 
2011). Similarly, SMEs with limited collateral also face credit challenges and pay higher-
than-average interest rates (Alrabeei and Kasi, 2014). Furthermore, a lack of experienced 
mentors to help SMEs develop business plans and financial reports also restricts access 
to funding (Bloovo, 2016).  
 
The following section (1.2.3) investigates whether internal challenges hindered the 
organisation’s leadership from responding to the economic crisis.  
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1.2.3. Detecting organisational particularities (micro-economic conditions)  
This section addresses Org. A’s negligence to respond to the drop in oil prices from the 
micro level. During Bahrain’s ‘golden era1’ from 2008 to 2011, Org. A managed to secure 
two large government projects2, which ensured work for five to seven years. However, in 
2015, the government decided to stall large and new infrastructure projects worth over 
US$350–400 million, which disrupted Org. A’s income pipeline. Unfortunately, winning 
these government projects interrupted Org. A’s business development efforts with the 
private sector. While Org. A sought business opportunities beyond Bahrain, this move 
neglected to generate satisfactory results.  
 
An additional observation was, since Org. A at its inception was hand-picked to receive 
two large government projects, it presumed that it was by default shortlisted to acquire 
similar future projects. Bahrain is a small country, and its business circle is well informed 
of government tenders and tender pricing practices. As Org. A was not within the business 
circle, this meant it missed guidance on tender culture. A further obstacle included the 
employees’ myopic view of the value offered by business networks. 
 
Developing a strong network offers advice, support, and information through multiple 
resources (2.6). Neglecting this important activity adversely impacted Org. A. At the 
outset, it was also observed that Org. A’s employees did not see the benefit of expanding 
their customer base through networking. For an organisation to succeed, maintaining a 
good network with the family or personal relationships is important (Osborne, 1993). New 
business leaders find it hard to develop their network strategically due to the 
entrepreneurial process’s uncertainty, as seen by Engel, Kaandorp and Elfring (2017). 
Due to their inability to link entrepreneurially in the early days of the organisation, as 
stated by Hite (2005), business leaders lose crucial resources that flow through the 
network. The leaders’ prior network experience plays an influential role during the early 
stage, giving the novice leader much-needed confidence to identify related challenges 
 
1 Budget surplus  
2 Closed contracts are awarded by some government organisations to hand-picked organisations. 
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(Zheng, Ahsan and DeNoble, 2019). To be productive, the leader must be proactive, and 
to grow, the leader must also reach a broader business circle (Ducker, 2014). 
 
Networking should not be limited to the start-up stage. Rather, organisations should 
continually rely on networks for advice, support, and information through multiple 
resources (Johannisson et al. 1994). Under uncertain economic conditions, to reduce the 
perceived risks, resource holders, both employees and investors, should seek information 
from well-regarded organisations or individuals (Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston, 2004). 
Org. A, by neglecting to identify this crucial requirement, closed its doors to an information 
flow from the business circle.  
 
The next section (1.3) identifies the research questions presented at the macro level 
(1.3.1), the meso level (1.3.2), and the micro level (1.3.3). 
 
 Primary research question: What were the causes of Org A’s revenue 
losses?  
This DBA research addressed the primary research question: “What were the causes of 
Org. A’s revenue losses?” This primary question generated a series of research questions 
that addressed the macro-, meso-, and micro-economic conditions. Research questions 
addressing the primary question at the macro level (1) (1.3.1) and the primary question 
at the meso level (2) (1.3.2) were from chapter (4)’s data. Similarly, the primary question 
at the micro level (3) (1.3.3) was from chapter (5)’s data. 
 
Many contributory factors helped to compile the research questions. Initially, the 
leadership at Org. A presumed its revenue losses were due to a drop in oil prices and the 
economic crisis. Through informal discussions with its actors, it was observed that Org. 
A’s leadership considered whether ‘inside causes’ contributed to its revenue losses. The 
literature review helped to identify contributing factors resulting from a drop in oil prices 
(macro-economy). The literature review also helped to identify challenges faced by other 
SMEs from a global perspective. Additionally, it was observed that Org. A had made poor 
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decisions based on emotion rather than logic, which is a similar scenario observed in the 
‘dot-com-bubble’ crash. These findings helped to formulate research question (1) (1.3.1).  
  
An additional presumption was that the government’s discriminatory practices hindered 
foreign-owned organisations from benefitting from its financial and advisory support. 
Meetings with several stakeholders showed there were no discriminatory practices from 
the government extended to foreign-owned organisations. These actions helped to 
formulate the research question (2) (1.3.2). Lastly, by aligning the workplace problem, 
research aim and goal, it was observed that macro- and meso-economic conditions 
contribute to operating costs but do not impact the organisation’s profit/loss. As a result, 
the third research question (1.3.3) focusing on the micro-economic conditions emerged 
through the research. Additionally, comparing Org. A’s operations with other comparable 
organisations helped identify questionable practices. This exploration stage helped 
formulate relevant sub-questions. 
 
Primary question at the macro level (1): 
1.3.1. What was the impact of Bahrain’s economic crisis on Org. A’s revenue 
losses? 
Sub-questions: 
✓ What impact did Bahrain’s economic crisis have on stakeholders experiencing sales 
and profit losses? 
✓ What impact did Bahrain’s economic crisis have on stakeholders experiencing 
increased utility charges? 
✓ What impact did Bahrain’s economic crisis have on stakeholders experiencing 
receiving late payments? 
✓ What impact did Bahrain’s economic crisis have on the local culture discouraging 
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Primary question at the meso-level (2): 
1.3.2. What was the influence of discriminatory practices impacting foreign-
owned organisations on Org. A’s revenue losses? 
Sub-questions: 
✓ How were foreign-owned organisations kept informed of Tamkeen’s loan and 
advisory support without being discriminated against based on ownership? 
✓ How were foreign-owned organisations provided with Tamkeen’s business 
development programme support without being discriminated against based on 
ownership? 
✓ How were foreign-owned organisations provided with Tamkeen’s training and wage 
support programme support to hire, train, or increase salaries of Bahraini employees 
without being discriminated against based on ownership? 
✓ How were foreign-owned organisations provided with Tamkeen’s coaching and 
mentoring without being discriminated against based on ownership? 
 
Primary question at the micro level (3): 
1.3.3. What was the impact of organisational particularities on Org. A’s revenue 
losses? 
Sub-questions: 
✓ What was the impact of the underlying organisational particularities on the role of 
failed or stalled government projects? 
✓ What was the impact of the underlying organisational particularities on the implied 
remedial steps towards survival and sustainability? 
✓ How did the underlying organisational particularities lead to experiencing challenges 
when obtaining Tamkeen’s financial assistance? 
✓ What were the underlying organisational particularities highlighting the Tender 
Board’s role towards allocating government tender quotas?  
 
This is followed by introducing the research aim (1.4.1) and goal (1.4.2) through section  
(1.4). 
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 Research aim and goal 
The aim and goal of this DBA research are introduced in this section. 
 
1.4.1. The research aim 
The aim of this DBA research was to answer the question “What were the causes of Org. 
A’s revenue losses?” This was accomplished by employing a series of research questions 
through macro-(1.3.1), meso-(1.3.2), and micro-(1.3.3) economic conditions, through 
data presented in chapters (4) and (5). 
 
1.4.2. The research goal 
The goal of this DBA research was to address the challenges Org. A’s team was facing  
through the following three phases: 
1. The first phase was to engage in dialogues with stakeholders to construct the problem 
(7.3.1). Step (1) involved building practical and theoretical foundations that were 
needed to identify the problem and formulate the primary research question. 
2. The second phase involved designing the action research plan. This phase involved 
fact-finding to evaluate learning gained from Step 1 (7.3.2). This phase created the 
foundation for the next level. 
3. Taking action as a scholar-practitioner included the implementation of the plan. Taking 
a collaborative approach with participants, strategies were executed to change and 
improve the situation within Org. A (7.3.3).  
 
The next section (1.5) discusses the research scope and the AR approach applicable to 
this DBA research.  
 
 Research scope and AR approach 
The scope was limited to investigate the causes for revenue losses at Org. A and 
collaborative knowledge development and action design that can be put into practice 
(Participatory Action Research-PAR). This was addressed by employing a series of 
research questions from macro-(1.3.1), meso-(1.3.2) and micro-(1.3.3) economic 
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aspects. The first phase was to build the problem through stakeholder dialogues with 
(7.3.2). This scope also addressed the role of the scholar-practitioner as a knowledge-
broker and the primary researcher with Org. A and other organisations. However, this 
scope only addressed strategy implementations and recommendations for Org. A rather 
than all the stakeholders involved in this DBA research. The rich picture shows the 
coordinated intervention strategies of the stakeholder engagement process to depict a 
clearer roadmap on how the data was gathered. The timeframe of the stakeholders 
approached and the knowledge it contributed and where the knowledge is documented 
is shown in (Figure 1). The research outcomes are addressed through organisational and 
leadership challenges.  
 
The next and the last section of this chapter (1.6) outlines the rich picture of the roadmap 
of this DBA research. 
 
 Research outline 
This DBA research is comprised of eight chapters, and the remaining sections are 
organised as follows: Chapter (2) assesses literature relating to SME challenges from 
macro-, meso- and micro-economic conditions, on a regional and global scale. Chapter 
(3) discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research methodology. Chapter (4) 
presents the causes of Org. A’s revenue losses and the process employed to collect and 
analyse data. Chapter (5) discusses organisational knowledge, competencies and self-
efficacies within Org. A. Chapter (6) discusses organisational knowledge, competencies, 
and self-efficacies within Org. A’s leadership team and their inability to respond to the 
economic crisis. Conclusions, recommendations and action implementations are 
presented in chapter (7), reflecting on actions and changes achieved from a first-, second-
, and third-person perspective. Finally, chapter (8) reflects on the learning journey.  
 
The next chapter assesses literature on SME challenges based on macro-, meso- and 
micro-economic conditions, and were evaluated from a regional and global aspect. 
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Figure 1: Overall process of the research undertaken 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
This chapter assesses the literature on SME challenges based on macro-, meso- and 
micro-economic conditions, evaluated from a regional and global perspective. (2.1) sees 
the current economic crisis from a similar economic crisis, the ‘dot-com bubble’ crash. 
(2.2) discusses Bahrain’s economic crisis (macro-economic conditions). (2.3) addresses 
discriminatory practices that impact foreign-owned organisations (meso-economic 
conditions). (2.4) identifies organisational knowledge within the leadership followed by 
(2.5) leadership competencies and self-efficacies from a leader’s perspective (micro-
economic conditions). (2.6) highlights the importance of social networking, and the 
chapter ends by incorporating SME behaviour and related approach (2.6.1).  
   
The UoL online library was the primary search engine for gathering credible resources. 
This library also directed the researcher to partnering online referencing sites such as 
Google Scholar, Emerald, Elsevier, ProQuest, and EBSCOhost. The study limited the 
search to current and credible literature that focused on relevant keywords. As shown in 
(Figure 2), this core literature provided a deep understanding of the existing research and 
presented the arguments relevant to the research topic, comparing, contrasting, and 
synthesising relevant scholars’ views to provide a theoretical foundation for this DBA 
research.  
 
Sources to examine the key literature included articles from leading academic journals, 
peer-reviewed articles, specialist journals, books and expert/practitioner material. These 
sources focused on past crises to indicate initial clues, a drop in oil prices contributing to 
an organisation’s revenue losses, SME challenges operating in foreign countries, and 
SME organisational and leadership challenges. From this exploration, the following core 
themes emerged: organisational and leadership challenges that hinder operating in an 
economic crisis, leadership competencies and self-efficacies within the leadership, 
leadership, networking and SME theories and strategies to resolve the evolving problems. 
(Figure 2) helped to understand the steps to be followed in organising this literature review 
chapter and what information these steps generated. Bastalich (2020) says effectively 
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managing and reading literature is critical and consists of several phases; searching, 
recording, prioritising, retrieving, reading and writing, critiquing and filing, and moving 
across these steps can be non-sequential.  
 
Figure 2: Organising and reading literature 
 
Source: Bastalich (2020, p.2) 
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 Past economic crises: ‘dot-com bubble’ crash 
The ‘dot-com bubble’ period generated a euphoric mindset inspiring hope among 
business leaders and entrepreneurs to launch ‘dot-com’ companies. These business 
leaders and entrepreneurs presumed that online companies would generate millions. 
However, history shows that these companies were unsuccessful, and those that were 
successful were overvalued, leaving investors with significant losses (US$ 5 trillion). The 
underlying causes behind the ‘dot-com bubble’ crash were related to problems occurring 
in the stock market while investors were mesmerised by new, unproven business ideas 
(Smith, 2012). During this period, market actors neglected to amend business plans to 
address market warnings and market pulling drives, and instead focused on unproven 
innovations. By solely focusing on numerical values and overlooking how to generate 
cash flow, these actors overlooked the numerous warning signals of a possible burst.  
 
Additionally, overvalued stocks of technology companies neglected to amend their 
business models to fit the market progression, leading to poor decision making (Smith, 
2012). During the ‘dot-com bubble’ period, market actors neglected to set long-term goals 
and understand how to invest their capital and expand their portfolio (Lewis, 2020). In 
addition, financial analysts began to consider not only the profitability of companies, but 
also inflation, interest rates and the growing value of intangible assets and brands that 
influence stock prices (Wheale and Amin, 2003).  
 
Concurrently, market actors had overlooked underlying rules of the market and signs that 
the bubble was going to rupture (Elliott, 2004). However, instead of relying on logical 
reasoning, these emotionally driven actors were following speculation and the wrong traits 
(Lewis, 2020). The primary causes behind the bubble’s burst included 1) ignoring how 
cash flow was being generated and focusing solely on numerical values; and 2) 
overvalued stocks, especially for technology companies (Smith, 2012). The market 
actor’s behaviour and how they acted in uncertain times like the ‘dot-com bubble’ were 
primarily based on psychological influences connected with heuristic bias, frame 
dependence and ineffective pricing (Wheale and Amin, 2003). 
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2.1.1. The unseen roots below wrong traits 
The ‘dot-com bubble’ period shows the risk of being emotionally driven by speculation 
and hopes instead of maintaining logical reasoning (Lewis, 2020). Additionally, market 
actors must set long-term, realistic goals in an economic crisis and learn to make capital 
investments that grow their portfolios (Lewis, 2020). This is achieved by understanding 
the investor’s risk and tolerance levels. Portfolio diversification reduces the investor’s 
potential risks and losses, which is essential while operating in an economic crisis.  
 
The following section (2.2) explains literature relating to the macro-economic conditions 
from four aspects. (2.2.1) explains the drop in oil prices contributing to an organisation’s 
sales and profit losses, followed by (2.2.2) analysing the increased utility charges on an 
organisation’s profit losses. The impact of oil prices leading to receiving late payments is 
addressed through (2.2.3) and is followed by analysis of the impact of local culture that 
discourages outsiders from the business circle (2.2.4). 
 
 Bahrain’s economic crisis (macro-economic conditions) 
In June 2014, the drop in oil prices caused the government to take two impactful cost-
cutting steps. First, the government decided to stall large and new infrastructure projects 
worth over US$350–400 million. Second, it withdrew government-sponsored utility 
subsidies for the community (EWA, 2018). With 99% of organisations in Bahrain being 
SMEs, these decisions resulted in direct dependants of government projects losing their 
primary income and customers (BNA, 2015; MEED, 2018).  
 
2.2.1. Drop in oil prices contributing to an organisation’s sales and profit losses 
A drop in oil prices negatively impacts an organisation’s performance (Basha, 2014). 
However, UlHaq (2017) argues that despite a drop in oil prices, an organisation’s revenue 
can grow, but profit margins will decrease due to the high operating costs. As the 
organisation’s performance decreases, investors become discouraged and consumers 
reduce consumption of durable goods, which increases challenges for the corporate 
sector (Pindyck, 1991; Kilian and Lee, 2014). While researchers agree that fluctuating oil 
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prices impact other factors, Berument, Ceylan and Dogan (2010) argue that the impact 
of the drop in oil prices varies across nations during an economic crisis. Arouri and 
Nguyen (2010) argue that the impact is across sectors.  
 
2.2.2. Increased utility charges 
Increased utility charges place excessive pressure on small businesses and undermines 
their long-term profitability. According to Energy Consumers Australia (2018), increased 
utility charges over the past 10 years have negatively impacted the competitiveness of 
Australian SMEs. Even with severe cost-cutting steps, Australian SMEs are challenged 
to curtail operating costs (Koehn, 2017). Likewise, 62% of small British companies are 
impacted by increased utility charges (LSI Energy, 2017). (Figure 3) shows that due to 
the early stages of the revised utility charges, SMEs in Bahrain may not have experienced 
the full impact. This hinders the ability to view the increased utility charges and analyses 
the full impact across Bahraini SMEs due to the lack of available studies.  
 
Figure 3: Bahrain’s predicted utility tariffs 
 
Source: Electricity and Water Authority (2018) 
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2.2.3. Impact of the drop in oil prices leading to receiving late payments  
For some cultures, late payment is a norm (Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick, 2011; 
Young, 2018). These norms shift the financial burdens throughout the supply chain, 
passing cash flow problems from one entity to another (Scholnick, Massoud and 
Saunders, 2013). Customers become more demanding and less willing to accept risks, 
shifting those risks of delayed payments further down the supply chain (Chung, 2013). 
Within the construction industry, late payment or non-payment is a common practice 
(Abdul-Rahman, Kho and Wang, 2013) that tends to result in a negative net cash flow 
(Ranyard and McHugh, 2012). However, sub-contractors and general contractors agree 
that late payments are acceptable, as long as they are paid (Arditi and Chotibhongs, 
2005).  
 
2.2.4. Local culture discourages outsiders from the business circle 
The cultural qualities addressed in this section are common across all Gulf Cooperation 
Countries (GCC)3 countries and are not limited to Bahrain. GCC business leaders restrict 
their network to GCC nationals who share religious and cultural beliefs and, therefore, 
shy away from forming business relations with foreigners (Ghauri and Fang, 2001; Ourfali, 
2015; Najm, 2015). Business relationships serve as an important vehicle when doing 
business in ‘high context’ cultures such as the Middle East4 (Weir, 2001; Hofstede, 2015; 
O’Dell, 2017). In high context cultures respect for family members and business partners 
rank highly (Al-Wugayan and Rao, 2004). Furthermore, Arabic cultures value 
relationships and exhibit an immense level of trust among the community (Najm, 2015). 
According to Ourfali (2015), cultural practices often impede local nationals from 
socialising with an ‘outsider’ to their circle.  
  
 
3 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman 
4 Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen 
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2.2.5. Concluding remarks associated with Bahrain’s economic crisis (macro-
economic conditions) 
Four challenges due to a drop in oil prices were identified from macro-economic 
conditions. First, despite a drop in oil prices, an organisation’s revenue can grow, but 
profit margins will decrease due to the high operating costs. Second, the government’s 
decision to withdraw government-sponsored utility subsidies for the community influences 
an organisation’s long-term profitability. The adjusted utility charges were expected to end 
in April 2019 but were still being applied during completion of this DBA research in 2019. 
Third, a lack of studies conducted on the region hindered measuring the total impact 
across the industry. In addition, poorly planned payment terms were often associated with 
certain cultural aspects that impact an organisation’s cash flow. Similarly, with customers 
being less accountable for accepting risks, they shifted the risks down the supply chain. 
Fourth, Gulf nationals tend to form close relationships with family and citizens who share 
mutual religious and cultural beliefs. They perceive foreigners as outsiders who have the 
potential to influence society.  
 
The following section (2.3) investigates the literature on discriminatory practices that 
hinder foreign-owned organisations benefitting from the government’s financial and 
advisory support. It starts by discussing the impact of complex regulatory systems (2.3.1) 
faced by organisations operating in foreign countries, followed by the government’s 
unethical practices and bureaucratic procedures (2.3.2) and (2.3.3), respectively. HR 
selection processes’ importance in organisational development is discussed through 
(2.3.4), followed by the inequality between localisation and import systems (2.3.5). This 
is then followed by discussing complex customs procedures (2.3.6). This section ends by 
discussing biased trade mechanisms (2.3.7) and technology practices (2.3.8). 
 
 Discriminatory practices impact foreign-owned organisations (meso-
economic conditions) 
This section reviews specific examples of discriminatory practices with foreign-owned 
organisations from a global perspective. Except for two studies with female entrepreneurs 
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(Al-Ghazali, Yusoff, and Sadi, 2013) and business support schemes (Alrabeei and Kasi, 
2014), finding similar studies from a Bahraini perspective was challenging. Also, a lack of 
sources from a GCC perspective on similar challenges required the researcher to 
investigate the problem from a global perspective. Furthermore, documenting the 
government’s use of discriminatory practices was prohibited.  
 
During the OECD global forum on international investment held in Paris, Von Moltke 
(2002) shows that the number of documented discriminatory cases involving foreign 
organisations is limited but do exist. Seeing ‘Russia’s business climate through the eyes 
of foreign firms’, Ershova (2017) identified the following obstacles faced by foreign 
organisations operating in Russia. This data was gathered through a survey launched by 
the National Research University in Russia (NRUR) from April to June 2015.  
 
2.3.1. Complex regulatory systems  
Over 33% of the NRUR’s survey respondents reported obstacles associated with 
registering a company, mainly in the construction industry. In Russia, obtaining building 
permits was a barrier, requiring an average of 540 days and 53 documents. This process 
was significantly higher compared to requirements imposed in other BRICS5 countries 
(Ershova, 2017). Other obstacles upon entering new and unfamiliar markets included 
complicated administrative procedures (Winch and Binachi, 2006; JETRO, 2015). 
According to Injaz (2013), the significant drawbacks were (1) the lack of transparency and 
bribes offered to obtain licences, and (2) funding favouring high-tech organisations rather 
than manufacturing.  
 
2.3.2. Government’s unethical practices  
According to NRUR’s survey respondents, 20% agreed that corruption in Russia is a 
major concern, 4% think it has worsened, over 33% felt corruption had remained at the 
same level, and 25% admitted that doing business in Russia was usually linked with 
 
5 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
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corruption. Informal payments made to regulatory bodies or officials cost 6–10% of total 
annual sales (Ershova, 2017). Due to their leadership and political influences, some 
organisations receive many privileges (i.e., tax holidays and access to credit facilities at 
nominal rates) not granted to foreign organisations (A’Ali, 2017).  
 
2.3.3. Government’s bureaucratic procedures  
According to Cook and Nixon (2000), foreign organisations cannot secure subcontracted 
offers due to the poor-quality market infrastructure, placing them in weaker positions than 
larger organisations. Unethical competitive practices damage a country’s investment 
climate (Ershova, 2017). Inconsistencies and shortcomings in the legislation lead to 
increased legal costs which further burden the investment budget. An additional 
hindrance includes inferior protection and contractual rights for foreign organisations 
(JETRO, 2015).  
 
2.3.4. HR selection processes considering organisational development  
According to NRUR’s survey, 63% of respondents said recruiting experienced personnel, 
especially in the region, was a significant challenge facing foreign organisations operating 
in Russia (Ershova, 2017). Employing specialist English-speaking engineers, particularly 
in the far eastern region of Russia, was problematic. High turnover was also a problem 
(Terentyev, 2014). Furthermore, a survey conducted by JETRO in 2012/13 showed 
46.8% of Japanese organisations operating in Russia encountered challenges hiring 
senior-level candidates. Other reported problems included (1) human resources’ lack of 
capability and consciousness (46.8%), (2) human resources’ poor language proficiency 
(30.8%), and (3) high executive-level turnover (30.8%) (JETRO, 2015).  
 
2.3.5. The inequality between localisation and import systems 
The JETRO (2015) survey reported that only 15-20% of Russia’s domestic manufacturing 
organisations trust the quality of locally made spare parts, which poses a challenge for 
foreign organisations operating in Russia. Deterred from producing component parts 
locally, foreign organisations are compelled to either import their components or purchase 
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materials and have them assembled locally to abide by government rules. JETRO’s 
(2015) survey further showed (1) 51.6% of respondents think that that there is a rise in 
competition in terms of cost. 30.8% reported sluggish consumption, and for the non-
manufacturing sector, attracting new customers was experienced by 40.8% respondents, 
compelling foreign organisations to reduce the product price (38.8%).  
 
2.3.6. Complex customs procedures 
The JETRO (2015) survey further showed that 79% of respondents said complex customs 
procedures was a significant challenge. 53.2% of respondents claim lack of notification 
and directives relating to regulatory contents posed challenges; 50% of respondents 
faced lengthy time frames during customs clearance, and this was applicable across both 
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.  
 
2.3.7. Biased trade mechanisms 
In a 2011 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) survey conducted across 598 European 
organisations in China, 43% of respondents claimed they experienced biased treatment 
compared to 33% in 2010, and 46% of respondents predicted that discriminatory 
practices would continue over the next years, compared to 36% in 2010. The main 
accusation was violation of free trade pledges and favouring Chinese organisations over 
foreign organisations (BBC, 2011). Additionally, pricing directly impacts the costs of 
imported goods and machinery (Cook and Nixson, 2000). These offset any advantages 
gained through price liberalisation.  
 
2.3.8. Biased technology practices 
China’s discriminatory technology licensing categories prevent foreign organisations and 
innovators from conducting business in China (The Economic Times, 2018). Denying 
foreign patent holders from using the technology once a licensing contract ends 
undermines the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) rules. Chinese policies and 
procedures also discriminate licensing requirements when transferring technology from a 
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foreign organisation to a Chinese organisation. These practices harm the intellectual 
property rights of foreign organisations and innovators, resulting in arbitration lawsuits.  
 
2.3.9. Concluding remarks associated with discriminatory practices impact 
foreign-owned organisations (meso-economic conditions) 
In summary, the literature showed that several obstacles associated with discriminatory 
practices impact foreign-owned organisations operating in foreign countries. First, 
registering a company at the initial stage was a significant obstacle, mainly relating to 
complex regulatory systems. Second, SMEs lack experience when handling regulatory 
steps compared to large organisations. Third, foreign organisations lack the influence and 
political connections often enjoyed by local organisations. 
 
Similarly, the high demand for locally made goods and services limited the success of 
foreign organisations operating in new markets. Likewise, foreign organisations in foreign 
countries experienced recruiting challenges, mainly at the executive level. The high costs 
of human resources impeded foreign organisations from accessing capital and 
knowledge. Additional challenges included structural changes, a lack of demand for 
foreign goods, and having to follow complex customs procedures. The primary accusation 
was foreign governments favouring local organisations while violating free trade 
agreements. An additional finding was that biased technology practices towards foreign 
organisations operating in China undermined WTO rules.  
 
The following section (2.4) identifies literature on organisational knowledge within the 
leadership (micro-economic conditions). An absence of a leader’s knowledge in strategic 
planning in business strategies is discussed through (2.4.1), followed by the leader’s lack 
of practical knowledge regarding external stakeholders (2.4.2). This section also 
discusses literature related to the leader’s lack of knowledge regarding subject domain 
information on government activities (2.4.3). 
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 Identifying organisational knowledge within the leadership (micro-
economic conditions) 
As shown through (Figure 4) and (Figure 5), this section discusses the characteristics of 
two frameworks relating to organisational knowledge within an organisation. Grant and 
Azadeh (2014) say a theoretical framework is the floor plan of research that contains 
theoretical principles, concepts, constructs, and tenants of an idea. Before embarking on 
a research design, to show how the research problem was addressed from a theoretical 
context by understanding, analysing, and designing steps to investigate the problem, the 
researcher first considered the underlying principles of the inquiry. This helped to define 
the research approach (3.2) by providing a rationale on ‘how’ and ‘why’ this DBA research 
was conducted. This competency permits the researcher to move from merely explaining 
a phenomenon observed to identifying multiple aspects. Lastly, having a theory specifies 
the primary variables that influence the event of interest. Additionally, Trochim (2010) 
says that a specific theory may be embedded in a theoretical framework, and this 
competence extends the ability to validate an existing theory in an event or a challenge. 
However, researchers are not all expected to test a specific theory but can incorporate 
previously developed frameworks from which the research problem is derived by 
answering: (1) What is the research problem or research questions? (2) What is the 
approach to a feasible solution?  
 
Organisational knowledge and its role in ensuring the competitiveness of the modern 
socio-economic systems framework shown in (Figure 4) identifies six knowledge 
categories: people, strategic, theoretical, practical, process and subject domain 
(Tumenova et al. 2018). This framework shows that a solution to a problem is connected 
not only with a timely adaptation to the changing environment but also implementing 
conditions to form and maintain a long-term competitive advantage. Additionally, the 
OECD competency framework as shown in (Figure 5) uncovers organisational knowledge 
within the organisation. This framework classifies jobs into families, where an organisation 
determines its capability to accomplish the highest impact and establish where those 
competencies are located. This framework also suggests that technical competencies are 
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needed to perform a job within the job family and are referred to as fields of expertise 
knowledge within a work category. Apart from technical competencies, the core 
competencies collectively contribute to an organisation’s success, but these vary with the 
job duties and requirements. (Figure 5) lists 15 core competencies grouped into three 
clusters. The blue cluster represents delivery-related competencies (Table 1). The purple 
cluster identifies interpersonal competencies (Table 2). The green cluster shows strategic 
competencies (Table 3). Competencies and behaviours expected at different levels reflect 
the variance in complexity, scope, and responsibility.  
 
Figure 4: Organisational knowledge and its role in ensuring competitiveness of modern socio-economic 
 systems framework 
 
Source: Tumenova, Kandrokova, Makhosheva, Batov and Galachieva (2018, p.4) 
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Figure 5: OECD competency framework 
 
Source: OECD (2014, p.4) 
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Table 1: Delivery-related competencies 
 






√ Is sought out by others for advice and solutions on how to best interpret and use information. 
√ Discerns the level of pressure or influence to apply in each aspect of the analysis in relation to the broader context.
2 Achievement Focus
√ Assesses group performance against goals and identifies areas for improvement.
√ Translates business opportunities into concrete measures that are beneficial for the organisation.
√ Dares to take calculated risks in order to let the business develop positively.
3 Drafting Skills
√ Handles creation of strategic written communication for the organisation.
√ Reviews complex and/or sensitive work carried out identifying the impact for the organisation.
4 Flexible Thinking
√ Is intellectually agile in response to challenges of internal and external environments.
√ Solicits ideas and responds positively to those of staff, committees and the Secretary-General.
5 Managing Resources
√ Sets and redefines priorities and reorganises staff to increase the group’s response capacity to internal and external 
demands.
√ Evaluates the financial impact of decisions and develops strategies to address financial resource issues.
6 Teamwork and Team Leadership
√ Makes team assignments within and outside of the Division/Directorate to facilitate horizontal work.
√ Delegates authority to match responsibility, and holds staff accountable for agreed upon commitments.
√ Appropriately involves others in decisions and plans that affect them.
√ Promotes group morale and productivity by being clear about output expectations.
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√ Builds client’s confidence using own personal reputation in the international community and expertise.
√ Knows when it is appropriate to push clients to consider difficult issues and acts accordingly.
√ Determines strategic direction and long-term opportunities to best meet clients' evolving needs.
√ Monitors, evaluates and, as needed, renews the client service model and service standards.
2 Diplomatic Sensitivity
√ Makes one’s case tactfully, especially when dealing with the highest level of government officials.
√ Knows when to stand firm and when to accommodate.
√ Accurately hears and understands the unspoken thoughts or feelings of others and acts purposefully.
3 Influencing
√ Handles strategic communication issues for the organisation in highly-exposed situations.
√ Handles difficult on-the-spot questions (e.g. from senior executives, public officials, interest groups, or the media).
√ Anticipates and builds on others' reactions to keep momentum and support for an approach.
√ Uses experts or other third parties to influence (e.g. takes multiple actions to make staged arguments, assembles political 
coalitions, builds "behind-the-scenes" support for ideas.





































√ Constructively works towards a win-win solution during negotiations.
√ Explores creative solutions with others to overcome antagonism and to develop partnerships. 
√ Successfully leads negotiations with strong impact on one’s unit. 
√ Demonstrates more than one preferred negotiating style (e.g. competing, cooperative, avoiding, compromise, 
accommodating) and adapts depending on the counterpart and context.
√ Demonstrates an ability to step back when necessary from the negotiation process while staying focused on the objective.
5 Organisational Knowledge
√ Uses knowledge of corporate politics to handle complex situations effectively and with discretion.
√ Understands the nature and limits of related organisations and government agencies, and uses that knowledge to 
influence and lead.
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Table 3: Strategic competencies 
 






√ Delegates authority and responsibility with the capacity to do a task in one’s own way and encourages others to take the 
lead
 and learn new skills.
√ Promotes sharing of expertise and supports learning opportunities across the Division/Directorate/Organisation.
√ Develops a common understanding and is transparent about staff potential to take over new responsibilities.
√ Sets an example for staff development in the Division/Directorate/Organisation.
√ Encourages others to develop their people through development dialogues and action plans.
2 Organisational Alignment
√ Uses a variety of means to communicate the organisation’s needs and strategic directions.
√ Develops a strategic direction for one’s unit that connects the role of the team to the success of the organisation. 
√ Ensures the initiatives and priorities in one’s area are integrated with one another and aligned with the strategic priorities
 of the broader organisation.
√ Aligns people, processes and structures with strategic direction and organisational needs.
3 Strategic Networking
√ Manages relationships among key outside organisations and government entities to create long-range opportunities.
√ Utilises established network of relationships to seek information of strategic importance and to seek a position of influence
 in key forums.
4 Strategic Thinking
√ Understands the position of the OECD in the larger world context; conveys a thorough understanding of the 
Organisation’s/Directorate’s/Division’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats; identifies competitive 
differentiators.
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2.4.1. Absence of leader’s knowledge in strategic planning in business strategies 
Doz and Kosonen (2010) claim many organisations collapse under disruptive economic 
crises, and under such circumstances, the leadership feels trapped and neglects to 
revolutionise their business model. During a challenging external environment, a robust 
business strategy is important to an organisation’s ability to cope. According to Blackburn, 
Hart and Wainwright (2013), planning is linked to growth after the start-up stage, and 
many business owners do not plan their organisation strategies unless required for 
financial reasons. (Table 4) shows three meta-competencies developed by Doz and 
Kosonen (2008) when it comes to the business model. This framework shows that 
increased strategic sensitivity and vision allows organisations to recognise opportunities 
to develop new business models and update existing models (Doz and Kosonen, 2010).  
 
Similarly, during a new product or service launch, a written business plan improves 
decision-making. With this guide ready to lead, practical experience is advantageous for 
success (Burke, Fraser and Green, 2010). Delmar and Shane (2003) explain that 
following a business plan at initial stages may be advantageous because it enriches 
managerial capabilities to respond to the challenges. Bhide (2000) agrees that having a 
context-specific business plan is likely to produce a positive impact in stable economies 
but is less crucial in uncertain markets.  
 
Table 4: Conceptualised strategic agility 
 
Source: Doz and Kosonen (2008, p.2) 
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Additionally, planning a strategy is challenging, but implementing the strategy throughout 
the organisation is even more so (Hrebiniak, 2008). Farsight Leadership Organisation 
(2007) reports that 80% of organisations have the right strategies, yet only 14% 
implement them. Al-Ghamdi (1998) discovered that 75% of organisations lack effective 
coordination during implementing activities. According to Raps (2005), the actual success 
rate of strategy implementation is between 10-30%. This concludes that organisations 
have strategies, but many neglect to see the benefit of executing them. Leader 
anticipation and sharp foresight lead to deliberate reforms, maintaining the strategic 
advantage (Doz and Kosonen, 2010) and generating value creation alongside the 
organisation’s business models. Leaders who have acquired experience by working in 
different working environments (Jabbar and Hussein, 2017) quickly identify and draw out 
a strategic plan for the organisation’s benefit. 
 
Giles (1991, pp.76-77) lists three key reasons of poor strategic planning. One challenge 
refers to the leader’s focus on “a mixture of budgets and management wish list” rather 
than identifying crucial strategic areas. An additional problem was a lack of an executable 
strategy because the executors of the strategy lacked involvement and neglected to take 
ownership. Initially, managers relied on planning and organising strategies but faced 
significant obstacles executing these strategies due to poor leadership and reluctance to 
share knowledge (Čater and Pučko, 2010). (Table 5) shows an overview of significant 
obstacles towards successful strategy implementation.  
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Table 5: Overview of significant obstacles towards successful strategy implementation 
 
Source: Adapted from Čater and Pučko (2010, p.10) 
 
2.4.2. Leader’s lack of practical knowledge regarding external stakeholders 
A 2009 McKinsey and Company survey sent to 1,167 business leaders shows the 
government’s role in an organisation (Figure 6). Additionally, (Figure 7) shows how 
government actions can impact an organisation’s economic value, which is not limited to 
enforcing laws. Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2010) argue government actions will not be as 
effective as other actions but are more likely to work towards an organisation’s finances. 




Activities as operationalised in this DBA research Relevant references
Strategic analysis is not properly conducted Pučko and Čater (2008) 


















Managers lack capabilities to implement change
management
Hrebiniak (2005); Hrebiniak (2008)
Managers do not trust information generated outside
their units
Hrebiniak (2005)
Employees are reluctant to share knowledge with
colleagues
Hrebiniak (2005)
Short-range orientation dominates the company Alexander (1985); Al-Ghamdi (1998)
Strategy conflicts with existing organisational
power structure
Hrebiniak (2005); Hrebiniak (2006)
Managers lack ideas how to persuade employees to
execute the strategy
Hrebiniak (2005); Gurkov (2009)
Top management is not actively engaged in
strategy implementation
Hrebiniak (2005); Brenes, Mena and Molina (2008)
Managers lack leadership skills for strategy
implementation
Hrebiniak (2005)
There are no guidelines or a model to guide
strategy execution efforts
Al-Ghamdi (1998); Hrebiniak (2005); Kaplan and Norton (2006)
Strategy is not properly communicated to lower
levels
Hambrick and Cannella (1989); Hrebiniak (2005); Kaplan and 
Norton (2005)
Reward systems do not stimulate strategy
implementation
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Figure 6: Government’s role in an organisation 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2010, p.2) 
 
Figure 7: Economic influence of government actions 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2010, p.3) 
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Figure 8: Where government matters count most 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2010, p.4) 
 
According to Blount (2015), the significant challenge facing business leaders is partnering 
with the local government where the business operates. To build a relationship with the 
government, an organisation should be aware of the government’s decisions on 
regulatory costs, as well as trade and tax policies that impact their business. Instead of 
blaming the government for interfering, business leaders should strive to reap the 
government’s benefits and incentives.  
 
The McKinsey and Company survey in 2009 also showed that an organisation’s process 
in managing government relationships was less forceful when compared with other 
stakeholders. This survey showed that 34% of participants claimed 10% of their operating 
income was at stake. However, organisations mitigate some of the negativity with the 
government’s help with infrastructure development and provision of capital. However, 
matters on setting policies and passing laws have created a negative impact on 
organisations’ economic value (Dua, Heil and Wilkins, 2010). Increasing returns is the 
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leader’s primary goal to execute that goal, leaders must regularly liaise with the 
government to seek support and advice (Reich, 2014).  
 
2.4.3. Leader’s lack of knowledge regarding subject domain information on 
government activities  
A 2011 McKinsey and Company survey sent to 1,396 business leaders as shown in 
(Figure 9) showed 53% of participants confirmed that the government played a significant 
role in organisations’ value (Figure 10) while 64% of participants expected to see an 
increase in the government’s involvement in their business. Executives from the financial, 
healthcare and energy sectors saw the government’s involvement lower their operating 
income for the next 3-5 years, which helped their organisation’s economic value (Figure 
11) (Dua, Hail and Wilkins, 2011). 
 
Figure 9: Income progress in emerging countries 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2011, p.3) 
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Figure 10: Involving the government in the future 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2011, p.2) 
 
Figure 11: Projected influence of external affairs concerns on operating income 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2011, p.4) 
 
The second survey sent to 1,396 business leaders defined five types of leaders: partners, 
opportunists, avoiders, reluctant engagers and adversaries. This survey showed that 
opportunists (25%) believe regulations and policy matters produce new business 
opportunities, whereas partners (23%) saw broader business gains along the line. 
Additionally, more than 50% of the participants were averse to the government’s 
involvement in their business ( 
Figure 12).  




Figure 12: Success for partners and opportunities 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2011, p.6) 
 
As shown through (Figure 6), the survey sent to 1,167 business leaders showed that new 
business leaders sought less information in unfamiliar markets while experienced leaders 
did not change the way they sought information. However, Cooper, Wolta and Woo (1995) 
said that highly confident business leaders were less active in seeking information. 
Additionally, Kirzner (1973) said that information seeking should be a continuous process 
even when the economy is stable.  
 
2.4.4. Concluding remarks associated with identifying organisational knowledge 
within the leadership (micro-economic conditions) 
In summary, the literature showing the leader’s absence of knowledge in strategic 
business planning revealed that business leaders with a strategic vision quickly identify 
and introduce suitable strategies to advance the organisation. Cross-functional leaders 
with their varied experiences quickly identify strategies to respond to an economic crisis. 
Additionally, corporate leaders must work cooperatively with the government and see the 
government’s role as a benefit.  
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The following section (2.5) examines the leadership competencies and self-efficacies 
from a leader’s perspective (micro-economic conditions) through relevant theoretical 
frameworks as shown through (Figure 13). The absence of leader competency skills 
dealing with external stakeholders is discussed through (2.5.1), followed by the absence 
of leader knowledge competencies dealing with employees (2.5.2). This section ends by 
discussing the absence of leader knowledge competencies dealing with employees 
(2.5.3). 
 
 Leadership competencies and self-efficacies from a leader’s perspective 
(micro-economic conditions)  
Competencies are "underlying characteristic[s] of an individual that [are] causally related 
to criterion-referenced effective and/or superior performance in a job or situation" 
(Spencer and Spencer 1993, p.9). The expected competencies by professional IT 
architects’ framework as shown in (Figure 13) maps 14 competency characteristics and 
describes organisational knowledge as a set of skills, knowledge, self-concept, traits, and 
motives and lists 14 competency characteristics (Table 6). This framework shows that 
organisations must evaluate long-term competitive advantages before proposing a 
solution in an economic crisis. 
 
Figure 13: Expected competencies by professional IT architects 




Source: Spencer and Spencer (1993, p.8) 
Table 6: Competency characteristics and expected competencies 
 
Source: Adapted from Spencer and Spencer (1993, pp.8-9) 
 
2.5.1. Absence of leader competency skills dealing with external stakeholders   
Bird (1995, p.51) “maintains that entrepreneurial competencies are defined as underlying 






Skills are the application of knowledge and know-how to perform a 
certain physical or mental task. Knowledge and skills are fundamentally 
different.
1. Critical analysis and problem solving skills
2. Communication skills
3. Conceptualisation and abstraction skills
4. Skills to manage situational politics
2 Knowledge
Knowledge is the body of facts, principles, practices and theories that 
form the basis for a given discipline. It is the acquired information in 
specific work domains.
1. Technical knowledge




Self-concept is how an individual positions him/herself. It is related to 
his/her values and self-concepts.
1. Walk the middle ground
2. Be visionary
4 Traits
Traits are an individual‘s dispositional characteristics, which lead to 




Motives are psychological features that arouse a person to action toward 
a desired goal. These internal drives lead to the need to seek 
achievement, power and affiliation.
1. Be passionate
2. Be resilient
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and/or growth”. Man, Lau and Chan (2002, p.124) identify these competencies as the 
“total ability of the entrepreneur to perform this role successfully.” Likewise, Sarwoko et 
al. (2013) argue that robust entrepreneurial characteristics increase the entrepreneur’s 
competency and improve business performance. Kiggundu (2002) outlines a combination 
of the leader’s beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, personality, abilities, skills, and behaviour 
that contributes towards an organisation’s success. Possessing all these characteristics 
does not guarantee the ability to successfully run a business. However, having one or 
more of these characteristics can predict the organisation’s success (Westerberg, Singh 
and Hackner, 1997; Markman, 2007; Ahmad et al. 2010). (Table 7) shows entrepreneurial 
competencies compiled by Man (2001) and Chandler and Jansen (1992). 
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Table 7: Entrepreneurial competencies  
 
Source: Adapted from Man (2001, pp.61-65); Chandler and Jansen (1992, pp.225-226) 
 
Business leaders undertake three primary roles as entrepreneurial, managerial and 
functional (Chandler and Jansen, 1992). Therefore, small business owners must possess 
S/No Competency Components
1 Strategy competency
Entrepreneur’s ability to develop a vision and strategy, set goals, 
plan and sell ideas. 
2 Commitment competency Demonstrating the motivation to compete and complete a task.
3 Conceptual competency
Demonstrating cognitive ability and decision-making skills. 
Possess the ability to weigh risks, lateral thinking, be innovative, 
creative, reasoning and have the capacity to reduce risks.
4 Opportunity competency The ability to recognise and capture an opportunity. 
5 Relationship competency
Ability to demonstrate possession of interpersonal and 
communication skills. Ability to influence external stakeholders 
for support. 
6 Organising competency
The ability to lead, coordinate, control, monitor and organise 
internal and external resources of the organisation.
7 Learning competency
Direct and utilise skills to recognise and adapt to the changing 
roles of the entrepreneur. 
8 Personal competency
Personal qualities and abilities to build personal strength to 
enhance individual effectiveness to perform in a challenging 
situation. Ability to identify strengths and weaknesses and match 
them with opportunities and strengths. 
9 Technical competency
The ability to use and adopt technical skills required for the 
business. This includes knowledge of instruments and 
machinery.  
10 Social responsibility competency
Contribution of positive activities undertaken towards its 
customers, employees and the general public. 
11 Familism competency
Display of affection and concern for the immediate family that 
plays an active role in the entrepreneur’s daily life. 
12 Ethical competency
The ability to understand and accept ethical problems and the 
capability to communicate and resolve them towards the benefit 
of the organisation. 
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a diverse range of skills across a mix of competencies to succeed. According to Sadler-
Smith et al. (2003), they must perform a ‘generalist role’ without being a specialist. A study 
by the Productivity Commission of Australia showed that many SMEs in Australia collapse 
due to a lack of organisation and management skills (Bickerdyke, Lattimore and Madge, 
2000). However, Osborne (1993) says leader competency plays a less critical role in an 
organisation’s success. A shift in a business leader’s personality underlying the business 
model and the ability to accumulate capital is significant. Additionally, business leaders 
must consider an organisation’s external factors; a hospitable environment and 
knowledge of customer access to products or services are essential. Furthermore, 
business leaders should avoid head-on competition and entering highly competitive 
markets. Finally, business leaders should address fundamental challenges, such as the 
underlying economic conditions where the organisation operates, and avoid starting a 
business that suppresses the operating costs (Watson, Hogarth-Scott and Wilson, 1998). 
 
While it is undeniable that external factors play an essential role in the organisation’s 
development, it is internal factors related to planning and managerial skills that influence 
business success (Gaskill, Van Auken and Manning, 1993). Business leaders who have 
worked under uncertain and turbulent business environments react well in an economic 
crisis (Westerberg, Singh and Hackner, 1997). They have the invaluable knowledge and 
deep insight to combine and apply internal resources creatively to successfully move the 
business forward (Ahmad et al. 2010). 
 
2.5.2. Absence of leader knowledge competencies dealing with employees  
Gaining new knowledge is a vital ingredient for developing successful strategies. A level 
of knowledge cultivated within the entire organisation and with constant tweaks leads to 
incremental improvements (Weick and Quinn, 1999). This leads to a critical competence 
towards the organisation’s success (Crawford and Nahmias, 2010). However, the 
problem occurs when managers undervalue the organisational, interpersonal, and 
individual views involved in the process. Organisations need leaders who can 
purposefully obtain knowledge from their workforce and reorganise accordingly (Bonner, 
2000). 
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Thought leaders identify strategic visions and communicate the organisation’s needs to 
support its values and future objectives (Debowski, 2006; Singh, 2008). If they only have 
a strategy and if it is poorly communicated, it will not generate the expected results in 
terms of creating engagement, commitment, and interest (Bertoldi et. al 2018). A well-
articulated strategy explains the organisation’s future and holds its workforce accountable 
towards a shared vision and growth (Schiemann, 1992). In the absence of clear 
objectives, it is impossible to drive the organisation toward a common vision (Oakland 
and Tanner, 2007). However, Macnamara, Amidon and Banff Executive Leadership Inc. 
(2010) say only 2% of a leader’s time is spent planning the organisation’s future.  
 
Additionally, a vision alone will not drive the organisation towards success if its leader 
lacks the talent to drive the required change (Taylor, 1999). Once the vision has been 
agreed upon and communicated, its leader must have the capability to drive the change 
across the organisation (Singh, 2008). Moreover, the capacity to analyse the speed of 
change, whether high or low, along its direction is critical. Speed is the rate of change 
towards its external environment (Darwin, 1859). When an organisation changes quickly 
to meet the requirements of its external environment, it withstands the capability to be 
competitive. However, the organisation’s risks being banished from the market when its 
leader has limited knowledge and cannot implement the required changes (Bertoldi et. al. 
2018). 
 
2.5.3. Absence of leader self-efficacy characteristics      
Leader self-efficacy (LSE) is the leader’s judgement to execute the necessary behaviours 
to effectively perform the leadership role (Murphy and Ensher, 1999). Flammer (2001) 
identifies LSE as the leader’s capability to identify what areas lead to which goals and 
executing these goals within a personal capacity. This determines the leader’s ability to 
set goals and guide the organisation toward success, ensuring that efficacy aligns with 
aims. (Table 8) shows LSE characteristics as self-confidence, accurate self-evaluation, 
willingness to take risks and sense of accomplishment (Bandura, 1977).  
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Table 8: LSE characteristics 
 
Source: Bandura (1977, p.3) 
 
A primary construct in social cognitive theory is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy highlights the 
intensity, initiation, behaviour, and persistence. This theory shows that business leaders 
high in self-efficacy undertake challenging tasks and exert efforts in completing them 
(Bandura 1977; Gist and Mitchell, 1992). These personalities are more persistent when 
encountering challenges. Paglis (2010) understands LSE as levers of change, working 
towards completing a task and achieving challenging objectives, showing the leader’s 
strategic and creative leadership. Machida and Schaubroeck (2011) identified two key 
self-efficacy characteristics as: (a) development experience (challenges, feedback, and 
support) and (b) learning orientation. Likewise, McCauley and Van Velsor (2004) see self-
efficacy as assessments, challenges, and support that contribute to a leader’s 
development whereas assessment encourages business leaders to minimise gaps 
through the feedback received from the business circle. This feedback helps these 
leaders develop in two ways. First, good feedback allows business leaders with low self-
efficacy to focus on self-doubts. Second, business leaders with high self-efficacy receive 
a warning signal to correct the style (Lindsley, Brass and Thomas, 1995).  
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2.5.4. Concluding remarks associated with leadership competencies and self-
efficacies from a leader’s perspective (micro-economic conditions) 
In summary, the literature showed that for organisations to succeed, business leaders 
must possess a diverse range of skills and competencies. Since business leaders play 
three primary roles at entrepreneurial, managerial and functional levels, they must have 
the right skills to perform a ‘generalist role’. However, a business leader having all these 
skills does not guarantee running a successful business, but possessing these 
characteristics help.  
 
Additionally, managers who undermine the organisational and individual perspectives 
limit their ability to benefit and grow from the knowledge, whereas knowledge leaders 
communicate strategic visions to guide the organisation towards fulfilling its values and 
objectives. However, having a vision is not going to lead the organisation forward if its 
leader lacks the talent to drive the change across the organisation. Similarly, the literature 
also showed the importance of LSE characteristics to gauge the critical components 
regarding an organisation’s sustainability. The absence of these characteristics hinders 
the leader’s ability to work towards change when completing a task.  
 
The following section (2.6) examines the importance of social networking, and (2.6.1) 
highlights characteristics of networking approach applicable to this DBA research.  
 
 The importance of social networking 
At the outset Org. A’s employees did not see the benefit of expanding their client base 
through networking. This section emphasises the importance of network-based literature 
to foretell the key learning of the findings. The findings indicate the challenge of 
conducting the needed critical reflection during what amounts to crisis conditions in the 
economic climate and confirm current thinking on the reliance of SMEs on their immediate 
network for strategic resources to resolve such situations. 
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Aldrich and Zimmer (1986, p.17) see networking as an approach that “views 
entrepreneurship as embedded in networks of continuing social relations.” Networks help 
business leaders develop and strengthen personal and professional relationships to gain 
access to capital investment (Bates, 1997; Slotte-Kock and Coviello, 2009). Similarly, 
Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) highlight the importance of networking for emotional 
support for entrepreneurial risk-taking. Additionally, Gimeno et al. (1997) views 
networking as essential to strengthen the organisation’s operations.  
 
Freeman (1999) says that networking with professional services and venture capitalists 
is an excellent way to tap into vital talent and market information. However, Johannisson 
et al. (1994) say networking should be a continuous effort and should not be limited to 
the start-up stage. Human and Provan (1997) relate that a relationship built between 
businesses is more robust than between comparable businesses that neglect to network 
actively. Additionally, Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) say the quality of the resource flow 
is enhanced by trust, a critical element of a business network. Das and Teng (1998) see 
trust shared among business partners acting on each other’s benefit to reduce transaction 
costs under an economic crisis, particularly relating to highly complex tasks.  
 
Similarly, Hoang and Antoncic (2003) say that network size and centrality step the volume 
and diversity of resources a business leader can access. Hansen and Witkowski (1995) 
agree that business leaders with previous networks beyond their comfort zone are likely 
to succeed in conducting business abroad. Interestingly, Singh et al. (1999) found that for 
business leaders that hail from the information technology sector with weak ties, 
networking helped them with better opportunities in the first 12 months. Additionally, 
Lechner, Dowling and Welpe (2006) argue that at the start-up stage, cooperative 
technology negatively impacts an organisation’s performance, showing that the business 
is not ready to develop opportunities. In contrast, the impact is positive for marketing 
information network sales. However, Zhao and Aram (1995) say that intense networking 
distinguishes high-growth from low-growth organisations. Aldrich and Reese (1993) 
argue that networking during the start-up stage has no impact on business performance.  
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Additionally, Uzzi (1996) recommends that a balanced network with strong and weak ties 
has a curvilinear relationship between the extent of the embedded relations within the 
broader network and an organisation’s survival; very weak or robust networks are 
destructive. Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) say that solid ties received from family and 
friends positively impact business survival and sales growth. However, Starr and 
Macmillan (1990) see that strong ties are beneficial at the initial stage of a new business 
serving as low-cost and readily available critical resources. However, Aldrich, Rosen and 
Woodward (1987) highlight the fact that those young organisations less than three years 
of age benefitted from solid ties to generate profit. In contrast, Zhao and Aram (1995) saw 
a positive impact on gaining access to resources to grow the business. They saw no 
differences in resource diversity between the initial and later stages of growth. However, 
Lechner and Dowling (2003) say that organisations must strive hard to transform weak 
ties into strong ties even though they share differences of opinions and value 
propositions. Hite and Hesterly (2001) say that networks proceed through numerous 
changes, from being identity-based to calculative, and shifts from being dominant and 
socially embedded to arm’s-length ties. As the organisation progresses, the initially 
cohesive network shifts from being sparse to loosely knitted and characterised by 
structural holes. The bottom line is that new businesses benefit from cohesive networks 
and networks that focus on structural holes, suggesting that one type of network caters 
at emergence and the other is appropriate for early growth. 
 
Similarly, Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) explain the impact of solid ties on an 
organisation’s financial and survival performance. Their study showed that strong ties 
could not stop entrepreneurial success. However, an organisation’s survival depends on 
implementing the right action at the right time. Interestingly, Gimeno et al. (1997) say that 
family entrepreneurs who have been in business for an extended period of time benefit 
from the business circle for emotional support and are less likely to collapse. However, 
Hoang and Young (2000) report that entrepreneurs have benefitted from their network 
contacts at the initial stage as a key source of information or to gain the initial idea. 
Cooper, Folta and Woo (1995) suggest that management experience and age positively 
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correlate to personal ties at the initial stages of the business. Likewise, the business 
owner’s education level also has a positive impact on seeking professional advice. 
Additionally, Hoang and Antoncic (2003) say that a business plan plays a critical role in 
building an extended network. Smeltzer, Van Hook and Hutt (1991) endorsed these 
thoughts and argued that business leaders with a robust business plan had more advisors 
than those without one. Those with a business plan at the inception of the business were 
able to acquire high-quality information. The close relationships increased the quantity of 
information but did not guarantee the quality data. However, Krackhardt (1990) says 
extracting information from the circle is determined by the accuracy of one’s views and 
perceptions held on the network structure. Flisrand (2016) as shown through (Figure 14) 
demonstrates benefits of networking.  
 
Figure 14: Benefits of networking 
 
Source: (Flisrand, 2016, p.3) 
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2.6.1. Networking approach 
An organisation is not an isolated entity but a connected network (Ritter, Wilkinson and 
Johnston, 2004). These networks are enhanced by organisational relationships and are 
precious resources for an organisation’s development, especially those that do not have 
necessary resources, network contacts, and/or customers. 
 
The aforementioned networking approach that was introduced in this section is 
summarised in (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: SME behaviour and related theory 
 
 
 Chapter summary 
This chapter began by showing a past economic crisis, the ‘dot-com bubble’ crash (2.1), 
and learned that organisations, instead of keeping with logic-based reasoning, were 
emotionally driven by hopes and speculations, similar to the pertaining economic crisis.  
 
This was followed by discussing SME challenges within Bahrain’s economic crisis (2.2). 
With a drop in oil prices, and the government’s decision to stall new and large 
infrastructure projects and increased utility charges, this took a toll on the dependents’ 
survival. (2.2.1) identified that with a drop in oil prices, an organisation’s revenue could 
still grow, but as it did not correlate with a rise in oil prices, revenues begin to drop. The 
increased utility charges discussed through (2.2.2) showed excessive pressure on small 
and medium organisations. However, as the revised utility charges were new to Bahrain, 
and due to a lack of previous studies, measuring the impact it had on SMEs was not 
feasible. (2.2.3) identified late payments as part of the culture, shifting the financial burden 
from one party to the other, generating continuous cash flow challenges through the 
supply chain. This was followed by discussing personal and professional relationships 
S/No Theory Year Explanation
1 Networking approach Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston (2004)
This approach sees a business as a connected system that is 
strengthened by precious resources towards its development, and this 
approach is valuable for organisations that do not have the right 
resources, network contacts, and/or customers.
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playing an influential role when conducting business transactions in the Middle East 
(2.2.4). 
 
Section (2.3) discussed possible discriminatory practices from a global perspective, 
hindering foreign-owned organisations benefitting from local support. Complex regulatory 
systems was a primary concern (2.3.1). Likewise, the government’s unethical practices 
were addressed through (2.3.2). Correspondingly, (2.3.3) discussed the government’s 
bureaucratic procedures hindering foreign organisations from benefiting from new 
markets. Another primary concern was a lack of transparency in awarding government 
tenders, favouring local or large organisations compared to small organisations. Equally, 
as discussed through (2.3.4), finding the qualified employees in a foreign land was a 
primary concern for organisations operating in foreign countries.  
 
An added challenge was high employee turnover at the executive level. An inequality 
between localisation and imports discussed through (2.3.5) showed that, despite the 
government’s calls to increase local production, the protection given to local organisations 
prevented foreign organisations from localising production. Similarly, complex customs 
procedures with a lack of notification and directives, as discussed through (2.3.6), was a 
significant challenge. Biased trade mechanisms addressed through (2.3.7) showed that 
organisations were experiencing biased treatment in foreign countries, violating free-
trade laws by favouring local organisations. Lastly, (2.3.8) discussed a country’s biased 
technology practices, resulting in unfair treatment which hinders foreign organisations 
operating in foreign lands. 
 
Section (2.4) discussed three key elements relating to organisational knowledge within 
the leadership. (2.4.1) showed the absence of a leader’s strategic planning knowledge 
when it comes to the business model. Likewise, a lack of organisational knowledge within 
the leadership was identified in compiling the business plan. Similarly, (2.4.2) discussed 
the absence of leader practical knowledge as a primary challenge when dealing with the 
government and showed the importance of the government’s role in how they manage 
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their relationships with the government. Lastly, (2.4.3) discussed the absence of the 
leader’s knowledge missing subject domain knowledge on government activities and 
showed the importance of involving the government on its growth.  
 
Section (2.5) discussed three leadership competencies and self-efficacies of a leader. 
(2.5.1) showed an absence of the leader’s competency skills, hindering building a working 
relationship with external stakeholders. This inability hinders receiving the right guidance 
from its business circle. The absence of leader knowledge competencies due to a lack of 
leader knowledge competencies and overlooking recognising areas for improvement was 
discussed in (2.5.2). Lastly, (2.5.3) discussed the absence of leader self-efficacy 
characters and LSE judgments and recognised its levers of change and working towards 
completing them. 
 
Section (2.6) discussed the importance of inter- and- internal-personal relationships and 
said that social networking should not be limited to gain access to intangible resources 
but to gain access to emotional support for entrepreneurial risk-taking. This was followed 
by demonstrating the appropriate approach applicable to this DBA research (2.6.1).  
 
The next chapter addresses the theoretical underpinnings of the research methodology 
employed in this DBA research. 
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 Chapter 3: Theoretical Underpinnings of the Research Methodology  
This chapter addresses the research methodology employed in this DBA research. 
Towards uncovering the theoretical underpinnings of the research methodology to 
develop coordinated intervention strategies, this DBA research employed Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill’s (2019) Research Onion model (Figure 15). This section first 
addressed the research philosophies (3.1), followed by the research approach (3.2). The 
next step (3.3) discussed the methodological choice and looked at the research strategy 
(3.4) with an overlook of AR cycles before discussing the time horizons (3.5). Data 
collection and analysis steps are discussed through (3.6), followed by data analysis 
process (3.7), and this chapter ends with the ethical considerations that were relevant to 
this DBA research (3.8). 
 
Figure 15: Research Onion model 
 
Source: Adapted from Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2019, p.130)
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 Research philosophies 
Ontology was the starting point relating to the nature of reality and its characteristics and 
saw the importance of seeing the reality through many views, enabling the researcher to 
report different views to build themes. Epistemology looked at ways of acquiring the best 
methods from the surroundings and recognised the importance of the researcher being 
an ‘insider’ and participant immersed in the actual crisis to build collaborative knowledge, 
as shown through (Table 10) (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014; Raelin, 2015). Action learning 
set participants held differing views depending on their status and past experiences, and 
was shaped by politics and resource availability (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983). There 
was no single implication relating to epistemology that resonated with the objectives. The 
aim was to step the surroundings objectively, paying no attention to the boundaries that 
governed it (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). 
 
Table 10: Philosophical assumptions with implications for practice 
 
Source: Adapted from Creswell (2013, p. 21) 
 
Interpretative frameworks as shown in (Table 11) helped to convey the relevant 
philosophical beliefs. The two governing principles that were associated with ontology 
and epistemology were pragmatism and social constructivism. Pragmatists are motivated 
by the researcher’s values and questioning, which begin with a doubt that caused the 
problem and ends with a belief when the problem is solved (Elkjaer and Simpson, 2011). 
These researchers concentrate on practical results rather than abstract ideas and 
understand that there are various ways of understanding the problem. Pragmatists 
believe that one viewpoint does not explain the full picture and focus on conducting 
Assumption Questions Characteristics Implications for practice (examples)
Ontological What is the nature of reality?
Realities are multiple and are seen through 
many views.
Researcher reports different perspectives as 
themes develop in the findings.
Epistemological
* What counts as knowledge?
* How are knowledge claims justified?
* What is the relationship between the 
researcher and what is being researched?
Subjective evidence from participants; 
researcher attempts to lessen distance 
between himself/herself and what is being 
researched.
Researcher relies on quotes as evidenced 
from participants; collaborates, spends time 
in the field with participants, and becomes an 
'insider'.
Methodological
* What is the process of research? 
* What is the language of research?
Researcher uses inductive logic, studies 
within its context, and uses an emerging 
design.
Researcher works with particulars (details) 
before generalisations, describes in detail the 
context of the study, and continually revises 
questions from field experience.
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research studies using methods that lead to reliable, well-researched and practical data 
(Kelemen and Rumens, 2008).  
 
The next section (3.2) addresses the research approach adopted in this DBA research. 
 
Table 11: Interpretative frameworks and associated philosophical beliefs 
 
Source: Adapted from Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 26)  
 
 Research approaches 
This DBA research adopted a combination of inductive and abductive approaches (Table 
12). Inductive is moving from a specific observation to forming a general understanding. 
Additionally, arguments based on experiences or observations were conveyed 
inductively. "An inductive researcher works from the bottom-up, using the participants’ 
views to build broader themes and generate a theory interconnecting the themes” 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007, p.23). Abduction began with a ‘surprising fact’, then 
worked out a plausible theory of how it occurred (Van Maanen, Sørensen and Mitchell, 
2007; Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). Going back and forth between the data allowed 
participants to engage and form themes or abstracts that emerged from the process 
‘reason backwards’ (abductive) (Suddaby, 2006). The two research approaches allowed 
the identification of known premises to generate untested (inductive) and testable 
(abductive) conclusions. Data collected helped to explore a phenomenon to identify 
themes and patterns that emerged from the process. This allowed location of these 





(the nature of reality)
Epistemological beliefs 
(how reality is known)
Methodological beliefs 
(approach to inquiry)
Pragmatism Reality is what is useful, practical and 'works'. 
Reality is known through using many research 
tools that reflect both deductive (objective) and 
inductive (subjective) evidences.
The research process involves both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to data collection and 
analysis.
Social constructivism
Multiple realities are constructed through our 
lived experiences and interactions with others.
Reality is co-constructed between the researcher 
and the researched and shaped by individual 
experiences.
More of a literary style writing is used. Use of an 
inductive method of emergent ideas (through 
consensus) obtained through methods such as 
interviewing, observing, and analysis of texts. 
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Table 12: Deduction, Induction and Abduction – from reason to research 
 
Source: Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2019, p.153) 
 
Selecting the most suitable methodological choice was indeed a challenge; however, the 
research philosophy (pragmatism) and the research approaches (inductive and 
abductive) applied in this DBA research helped decide a qualitative methodological 
choice over a quantitative.  
 
The next section (3.3) justifies the methodological choice implied in this DBA research 
and what characteristics qualified to select this specific methodological choice. 
 
 Methodological choice 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) see the qualitative researcher as a ‘quiltmaker’ or ‘bricoleur’ 
who crafts and interweaves their interpretations skilfully to generate high-quality research. 
"The methodological bricoleur is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks, 
ranging from interviewing to intensive self-reflection and introspection" (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005, p.6). Additionally, Prasad (1993), Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000), and 
Symon and Cassell (2004) say that qualitative research takes place within several 
different ontological and epistemological positions or “historical moments” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005, p.3) and means different things to different researchers. 
 
Quantitative data is subjected to statistical procedures such as calculating the average or 
mean several times an event or behaviour occurs (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 
Approach Deduction Induction Abduction
Logic
In a deductive inference, when the premises are 
true, the conclusions must also be true. 
In an inductive inference, known premises are used 
to generate untested conclusions.
In an abductive inference, known premises are used 
to generate testable conclusions.
Generalisability Generalising from the general to the specific. Generalising from the specific to the general.
Generalising from the interactions between the 
specific and the general.
Use of data
Data collection is used to evaluate propositions or 
hypotheses related to an existing theory.
Data collection is used to explore a phenomenon, 
identify themes and patterns and create a 
conceptual framework.
Data collection is used to explore a phenomenon, 
identify themes and patterns, locate these in a 
conceptual framework and test this through 
subsequent data collection and so forth.
Theory Theory falsification or verification. Theory generation and building.
Theory generation of modification; incorporating 
existing theory where appropriate, to build new 
theory or modify existing theory.
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2012). This happens because numbers are ‘hard’ data and are not interpreted and can 
give definitive or nearly definitive answers to different questions. A quantitative analysis 
is typically deductive, highly structured and contains large samples, and for a positivist, 
as an ‘outsider’ who would like a value-free way and collect data, a quantitative analysis 
is plausible (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009).  
 
The methodological choices discussed in (3.1) recognised the importance of the 
researcher being an ‘insider’ and participant immersed in the actual crisis to build 
collaborative knowledge (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014; Raelin, 2015). The research 
philosophies discussed in (3.1) ontology and epistemology (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson, 2012) recognised the value of flux of processes, experiences and practices and 
emphasis on practical solutions and outcomes (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2019). 
Also, the research approaches were a combination of inductive and abductive (3.2), 
whereas positivism is typically deductive and highly structured and focuses on large 
samples (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2019). By drawing on the qualities discussed in 
(3.1) and (3.2), it seemed a qualitative choice was more suitable for this DBA research.  
 
The next section discusses the research strategies that were employed in this DBA 
research (3.4). 
 
 Research strategies 
As shown through this section, this DBA research employed a combined research 
strategy, starting with AR (3.4.1) as an enquiry process incorporating a qualitative case 
study strategy (3.4.2), which helped in understanding the problem recognised to build 
awareness among external actors. This DBA research also addressed a sizeable area on 
culture and its components relating to business practices in Bahrain; therefore, it 
incorporated some parts of the ethnographic research (3.4.3) and ended with a narrative 
analysis (3.4.4).  
 
3.4.1. Action Research  
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AR is an enquiry process to identify and solve an actual work problem (Shani et al. 2008; 
Adu, 2017) (Table 13). AR is a co-enquiry developed with people and not for them 
(Greenwood and Levin, 2007). It is a methodology of piloting research inside an 
organisation towards bringing value to both the organisation and the researcher (Zṻber–
Skerrit and Perry, 2002). It is a collection of attempts by a group of people dedicated to 
planning, observing, reflecting, and executing a set of actions towards a change within an 
organisation. It is strictly participatory, uses democratic reforms, and is not revolutionary 
(Greenwood and Levin, 2007). Coghlan and Brannick (2014), as shown through (Figure 
16), see AR as a cycle requiring different stages of constructing, planning action, taking 
action and evaluating action. This cycle is influential and challenges people to engage as 
participants to seek ideas, action, and outcomes and educates the changes introduced 
by change agents. 
 
AR can be viewed from two angles: ‘inquiry from the outside’ and ‘inquiry from the inside 
(Evered and Louis, 1981). With ‘inquiry from the inside’, the researcher physically gathers 
knowledge by being immersed in the actual crisis, and ‘inquiry from the outside’ 
assessments are carried out externally. The intention was to collect new and continuous 
knowledge (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014), and it was observed that ‘inquiry from the 
outside’ was unsuitable, as being an insider, participant and immersed in the actual crisis 
(inquiry from the inside) was vital to collect information. This allows having face-to-face 
conversations with (6-15) people of mutual concern (co-operative inquiry) who can work 
as co-researchers. This shift in understanding from first to second person allows “going 
public” with the investigation and collaborating with others who have faced similar 
challenges (Kemmis, 2001, p.13).  
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Table 13: Evaluating AR 
 
Source: Adu (2017, p. 2) 
 
The three AR characteristics are: Action, Research and Participation, and if any of the 
characteristics are missing, it leads to an imbalance (Greenwood and Levin, 2007).  
➢ Action: AR can change the initial plan of an organisation to direct a more self-
handling and sustainable level.  
➢ Research: AR is an influential tool to generate new research information.  
➢ Participation: researchers can facilitate and create new ideas and an AR agenda, 
bringing change to an organisation (actionable knowledge). 
Description Action Research (AR)
Definition
An AR is a systematic process of identifying a practical 
problem, collecting and analysing data to better understand 
the problem (which may sometimes include implementing an 
initial intervention  to see its effect), and using the findings to 
develop an action plan to address the problem. 
Purpose
The main purpose of conducting an AR is to address a 
practical problem (which could be defined as an issue that a 
practitioner has directly or indirectly experienced as he/she 
was carrying out his/her professional duties). 
Focus
The focus could be:
* Understanding a problem 
* Implementing an intervention to see its impact in terms of 
   addressing the practical problem identified. 
Rationale
AR could be conducted with or without an intervention but it 
should always be based on practical problem. 
Utilisation of findings
AR findings are used to develop an action plan to address a 
specific practical problem. 
Level of stakeholder's involvement 
in utilising the findings
Stakeholders (such as participants and those who are 
affected by or concern about the problem) are less involved 
in the development of the action plan.
Ultimate goal
The ultimate goal is to address the practical problem 
identified so as to improve a professional practice.
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Figure 16: General empirical method in AR projects 
 
 
Source: Coghlan and Brannick (2014, p.30) 
 
Actionable knowledge  
Adler and Shani (2001) define actionable knowledge as helpful knowledge to foster and 
develop executives as practitioner-researchers (Jarvis, 1999). Argyris (2003) says the 
quality of actionable knowledge is work based on continuous reflections. Zὒber-Skerritt 
and Perry (2002) define the difference between a ‘core’ AR project and a ‘thesis’ AR 
project; the core AR project focuses on research undertaken within an organisation where 
the manager-researcher works with its actors and with an expected outcome towards a 
successful change. In contrast, the latter comprises a doctoral inquiry into an 
organisational project, which may not result in successful terms defined by the core 
project. Coghlan (2006) says that a doctorate-level AR project focuses on developing 
theory through inquiry-in-action on the core project within the organisation. This means, 
while the researchers are engaged in the project or AR cycles, they need to diagnose, 
plan, take action and evaluate how the project is progressing and the learning they 
accumulate. To shape the consequent steps, the researchers need to continually inquire 
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into these four primary stages, reflecting how they are being conducted and if they are 
consistent with each other. 
 
As Argyris (2003) argues, this inquiry into the cycles is central to developing actionable 
knowledge. This learning process of the AR cycles is different from everyday problem-
solving. Coghlan and Brannick (2005) say learning about learning (meta-learning) brings 
quality into AR. The knowledge that emerges can be actionable, bringing value to the 
academic and practitioners. Coghlan (2006) says first-, second- and third-person inquiry 
and practice give ‘insider’ AR doctorates their integrity. Levin (2003) states that what is 
most important in an AR is not adhering to rigour-relevance polarity but focusing on robust 
arguments related to participation, actual problems, jointly built understanding and 
workable solutions. The knowledge and practice that is created comes from research in 
action (third person), which is embedded in the individual practitioner-researchers 
learning in action (first person) and collaborative (second person).  
 
Nevertheless, AR has been criticised for its recommendations being limited to a specific 
context, but due to its qualitative nature, AR is easily prone to bias yet hard to replicate 
(Harrell and Bradley, 2009) and neglects to build a theory from a particular intervention 
that can be easily applied (Cairns, Harris and Carroll, 2008). However, this was not what 
was expected of AR as a methodological strategy in this DBA research; rather the aim 
was to create actionable contextual knowledge that can directly benefit Org. A and not 
generalised knowledge. Greenwood and Levin (2007) say an AR approach should be 
robust enough to link action, theory, and knowledge to improve existing conditions. The 
adjoining sections show how this knowledge was built. 
 
➢ AR Cycle 1 (constructing): first-person AR and the researcher multiple roles in the 
research process 
The journey began with an observation leading to an inquiring approach to see "what was 
really going on?" and what can be done to change and improve the situation (Torbert, 
2004). Frequent discussions and media news on the drop in oil prices leading to an 
economic crisis were observed in June 2014. Matters relating to the ongoing economic 
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crisis were heard at several networking events, and the business circle was concerned 
about the government’s decisions to stall large and new infrastructure projects and how 
these decisions have impacted their organisation’s survival and sustainability (assess 
outer world influences). The business circle was concerned with the government’s 
decision to withdraw government-sponsored utility subsidies for the community. There 
were constant discussions on matters relating to obtaining or having obtained Tamkeen’s 
support to survive and sustain in this economic crisis. An additional observation was that 
Org. A’s customer base was government or semi-government offices and its primary 
income derived from government projects. However, the government’s decision to stall 
large and new infrastructure projects worth over US$350–400 million contributed to Org. 
A’s 75% profit loss. Org. A also presumed the government favours locally owned 
organisations over foreign-owned organisations, and this perception hindered it from 
seeking Tamkeen’s support.  
 
➢ AR Cycle 2 (planning action): second-person AR to uncover unseen roots below 
wrong traits 
The next attempt was to have a jointly built understanding with Org. A as to why it was 
losing revenues, and consequently, the findings are to be resolved through a behavioural 
change with those to whom the problem relates within the organisation (AR cycle 3) 
(7.3.3). AR cycle (2) (7.3.2) comprised an overall plan and a decision relating to the first 
step to execute. Actions involved taking the first step, followed by fact-gathering to 
evaluate the first step. This was to analyse what was learned and create a foundation to 
address the next step, ensuring that there was a continuing “spiral of steps, each of which 
is composed of a circle of planning, action and fact-finding about the result of the action” 
(Lewin, 1946, p. 146). 
 
➢ AR Cycle 3 (taking action): third-person AR to build up organisational knowledge 
to avoid following wrong traits in the future  
Based on the learnings from AR cycles, (2) and (3) addressed the need to impose jointly 
agreed strategies within Org. A and to resolve the situation together with whom the 
problem relates within Org. A from two aspects: 1) evaluating ways to ‘scale up’ small-
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scale inquiry at the organisational level and 2) to inquire whether AR can add value to 
address significant challenges (Kemmis, 2001).  
 
➢ AR Cycle 4 (evaluating action):  
Time limitation was a constraint with AR cycle (4) given the implementation of actionable 
cycles generated within Org. A and to measure people’s practices and engage in the 
continual adaptation of new knowledge. This is a limitation of AR as a methodological 
choice.  
 
However, before settling on AR as the most suitable research strategy applicable for this 
DBA research, other research strategies were evaluated. The objective was not to create 
a theory; the grounded theory was therefore considered unsuitable. Phenomenological 
research relates to inquiries of philosophy and psychology, with the researcher assessing 
individuals’ experiences concerning an event or ‘phenomenon’. The purpose was to 
collect data by the researcher, ensuring transparency, correctness, quality, and the 
participants’ confidentiality (interpretivism) and not through archived data. In the 
observation method, the researcher gathers data on a subject (i.e., through a 
questionnaire/survey) or a behavioural checklist (i.e., through observation) and may 
involve site visits or open-ended interviews without specific questions. The data is then 
interpreted for statistical results for emerging patterns. However, it was decided not to 
use the questionnaire; even though this instrument can reach a larger group of people, a 
semi-structured questionnaire split into three major areas (introductory, linking, and key 
questions) was used (Appendix B). After evaluating other approaches over AR, it was 
observed that other approaches were either unsuitable or less suitable for this DBA 
research.  
 
3.4.2. Case study 
To build awareness among external actors, the case study strategy helped in building the 
problem. Woodside (2010) sees Case Study as a powerful research strategy to 
understand, suggest or supervise individual actions to improve practice, which was the 
fundamental requirement of this DBA research. In addressing a complex and messy 
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This DBA research addressed a considerable area on culture and its components relating 
to business practices in Bahrain; therefore, some parts of the ethnographic research were 
incorporated as well. Agar (1980) says ethnography is a qualitative research strategy 
which interprets and describes behaviours, beliefs, languages, values, and patterns of 
values among a culture-sharing group. Similarly, Fetterman (2010) argues in 
ethnography, the researcher acknowledges regularities, rituals and customary social 
behaviours, ideas or beliefs conveyed through material or language.  
 
3.4.4. Narrative analysis 
This DBA research addressed inquiries from humans (narrative analysis), and the 
researcher looked for individual stories (Riessman, 2008). These stories were then 
reproduced into a narrative order and combined with the individual’s story with the 
researcher’s opinions and views to create a joint statement (Clandinin and Connelly, 
2000). 
 
By employing combined research strategies as discussed in (3.4.1), the importance of 
AR as a methodological strategy of piloting research inside an organisation was identified 
by exploring its benefits over other research strategies. This was followed by discussing 
the case study strategy (3.4.2) to understand the problem well and how it helped to 
understand, suggest or supervise individual actions to improve practice. The next step 
addressed a considerable area on culture and its components relating to business 
practices in Bahrain and saw the benefit of ethnography to interpret and describe cultural 
aspects of the participants (3.4.3). Lastly, a narrative analysis (3.4.4) helped to reproduce 
the participants’ and the researcher’s stories into a readable format to create a joint 
statement.  
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The next step (3.5) address time horizons applied in this DBA research, followed by the 
detailed data collection steps applied in this DBA research (3.6). 
 
 Time horizons 
Time horizons, longitudinal (repetitive over an extended timeframe) and cross-sectional 
(limited to a specific timeframe) are imperative for the research design irrespective of the 
research methodology (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2019). This DBA research was 
limited to a particular time frame and therefore the cross-sectional time horizon was 
applied. 
 
 Data collection  
(Figure 17) and (Table 14) shows the coordinated intervention strategies of the 
stakeholder engagement process to depict a clearer roadmap on how the data was 
collected. The timeframe of the stakeholders approached and the knowledge it 
contributed and where the knowledge is documented is shown in (Figure 17). As shown 
through this section, the interview protocols are addressed through (3.6.1) followed by 
the discussion points (3.6.2) that helped facilitate the conversations. The initial informal 
discussions with Org. A are addressed through (3.6.3) and the progress of meetings with 
other stakeholders is addressed through (3.6.4). 
 
3.6.1. Interview protocols 
Creswell (2013) says that once a researcher decides on an action learning set and sites, 
there should be more than one source to collect data and protocols to record the 
information, as shown in (Table 15). This must be done bearing in mind possible field 
issues (lack of data, the need to leave the site early, or loss of information) associated 
with data collection. This includes data storing, retrieving and protecting from possible 
damage or loss. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) advise using an interview guide, a four- to 
five-page form with approximately five to seven open-ended questions with ample space 
to write responses to note the participants’ comments (Appendix B).
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Figure 17: Data collection and stakeholder engagement process 
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Table 14: Data collection road map 
 
 
S/No Timeframe Data collection step Actions taken Remarks
1 June-2014 Initial informal discussions with Org. A
The initial informal meetings helped to explore concept-context rich data 






Visiting the government offices
Visiting the government offices helped in identifying:
*Government tender announcements and allocations are public and are 
through the tender board.      
*Tamkeen provides loans for starting up and small and medium 
organisations.
*Tamkeen provides coaching and mentoring for all the organisations at 
differing maturity levels. 








Meeting and networking with other business 
leaders
Meeting a vast network of other business leaders helped in identifying 
how these leaders have embraced the economic crisis and what they do 
curtail the situation. These meetings helped to unveil how these business 
leaders were informed of:
*Upcoming new government projects or tenders
*Discussions and learning from failed strategies       
*Best practices of the broader business circle
*Competitor tender practices and qualifier selection
*Making the best use of government loans and bail-out plans




Attending workshops, forums, seminars 
and exhibitions
Attending these events helped in uncovering:
*An overall picture of the economic situation of Bahrain
*Regional stability and advice on best investments
*Failed projects or failed strategies                                                          
*Government policy changes and directions
*Crisis recovery plans and industry best practices
5 Sep-2016-Jun-2017 Attending 'Majlis' open houses
Meeting other business leaders helped in identifying:
*What do they do differently to adjust to the current economic crisis?
*How do they get information on government tender announcements?
*How can the government granted packages be utilised best?
*What new business opportunities have opened in the market?
*Can a foreign-owned business owner join hands with a local business 
partner?
6 April-2017 The initial problem framing
What was found out by meeting multiple stakeholders? Was it one or a 
collection of stakeholders? Who were the direct contributors towards the 
challenge; was it Org. A as a whole or a collection of organisations? Was 
it a problem within Org. A on or an external contribution that has a direct 
impact on it? Were there any indirect influences that played a significant 
role in Org. A's revenue losses?
What was found out by meeting external stakeholders spanning over two 
years? How can I start addressing my enquiry process? I was 
overwhelmed with more questions than answers, but I must find a way to 
address the main research question.
7 Jun-Jul-2017 Action learning sets
Meeting seven comparable, independent and diversified SMEs that have 
been impacted by the drop in oil prices to see what these organisations 
did better, worse, or different than to Org. A to survive in this economic 
crisis.
8 Sep-Dec-2017 Data analysis and key findings
Summarising the key findings from the initial meeting with the action 
learning sets.
9 Jan-2018
Individual meetings with the action learning 
sets
To follow up on what was not covered at the initial action learning sets. 
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Table 15: Data collection activities by five strategies 
 
Source: Adopted from Creswell (2013, pp.148-149) 
 
3.6.2. Discussion points 
The seven discussion points as shown in (Table 16) and other business leaders helped 
to reflect on government actors who can help shape and respond to some of the doubts 
(macro-economic conditions). Visiting government offices, having meetings and 
networking with other business leaders, and attending ‘Majlis’ open houses and 
workshops, forums, seminars, and exhibitions were in parallel. Meeting seven 
comparable, independent, and diversified SMEs and Org. A helped to understand what 
these organisations did better, worse, or different than Org. A. However, while engaging 
with the action learning set, visits to the government offices and meeting other business 
leaders were continuous and in parallel. Key findings and data analysis began in January 
2018 soon after the initial action learning set findings to follow up on unclear areas. 
Meetings and networking events as discussed through (Figure 17) and (Table 14) further 
strengthened the discussion points. Also, experience working as a commercial manager 
Data collection 
activity
Case study Ethnography Narrative
What is traditionally studied? 
(sites or individuals)
A bounded system, such as a 
process, an activity, an event, a 
programme or multiple individuals
Members of a culture-sharing group 
or individuals representative of the 
group
Single individual, accessible and 
distinctive
What are typical access and rapport 
issues? 
Gaining access through the 
gatekeeper, gaining the confidence 
of participants
Gaining access through the 
gatekeeper, gaining the confidence 
of informants
Gaining permission from individuals, 
obtaining access to information and 
archives
How does one select a site 
or individuals to study? 
(purposeful sampling strategies)
Finding a 'case' or 'cases', atypical' 
case, or a 'maximum variation' or 
'extreme' case
Finding a cultural group to which 
one is a 'stranger' a 'representative' 
sample
Several strategies, depending 
on the person (i.e. convenient 
politically important, typical, a critical 
case)
What type of information typically is 
collected? (forms of data)
Extensive forms, such as 
documents and records, interviews, 
observation, and physical artifacts 
for 1 to 4 cases
Participant observations, interviews, 
artifacts, and documents of a single 
culture-sharing group
Documents and archival material, 
open-ended interviews, subject 
journaling, participant observation, 
casual chatting; typically a single 
individual
How is information recorded? 
Field notes, interview and 
observational protocols
Field notes, interview and 
observational protocols
Notes, interview protocol
What are common data collection 
issues? 
Interviewing and observing issues
Field issues (i.e. reflexivity, 
reactivity, reciprocality, 'going 
native', divulging private 
information, deception) 
Access to materials, authenticity of 
account of materials
How is information typically stored? 
Field notes, transcriptions, 
computer files
Field notes, transcriptions, 
computer files
File folders, computer files
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and now as an SME consultant were of significant help to build discussion points. 
Similarly, the literature review and media news further tweaked the discussion points.  
 
The discussion points mapped to the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix B) helped 
facilitate the action learning set. These discussion points helped to shape AR cycles 
shown in (Figure 16). A specific discussion point addressed a particular research question 
which was later improved, reframed, or added during the discussions, allowing the action 
learning set participants to argue or rearrange research questions. Additionally, some 
answers related to question (1) arose when discussing research question (2); sometimes, 
some fit both the questions fully and partially. The primary aim was to collect as much 
data as possible, which was later read and analysed to fit the research questions.  
 





Relevance to the 
research question
1 The organisational journey The ice breaker
2




The significant challenges to SMEs’ survival: are there only 
economic and financial consequences or were there other 
challenges as well? 
Research question (3)
4 SME remedial measures towards survival and sustainability Research questions (1) and (2)
5 The funding sources towards SME's survival and sustainability Research question (2)
6




Going forward and closing comments: SME’s perception on the 
drop in oil prices-will it remain longer and leave behind further 
challenging economic footprints or reach an acceptable level?
Closing question
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3.6.3. Initial informal discussion with Org. A 
The initial informal discussion started in June 2014, and as discussed in (1.2), it was 
observed that Org. A’s revenue losses coincided with the drop in oil prices. Org. A’s 
participants (Table 17) were from different departments and were not compensated. 
Every participant attended at least one session. These initial meetings helped to explore 
concept-context data about the challenging environment. Apart from the action learning 
set and individual meetings, these initial mini-meetings (about 1 hour) helped to explore 
pre-designed discussion points (Table 16). Org. A’s participants devoted approximately 
100 hours [2 hours x 2 meetings (4 hours) + individual meetings (51.5 hours)], allowing a 
total of 55.5 hours. In addition to face-to-face meetings, an additional 20 hours and initial 
informal conversations (25 hours) were spent on coordination and follow-up activities.  
 
























Total hours 25 51.5
Researcher
Projects 4 8 Researcher
2Quality assurance 3.5
Finance 4 10 Researcher
Operations 7 10 Researcher
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3.6.4. Meeting other stakeholders 
The next step was to involve other stakeholders, as shown through (Table 18), in 
acquiring information to strengthen the final recommendations. These visits were in 
parallel and required several other data collection and selection methods. Patton (2002) 
identifies three qualitative interview methods: (a) the interview guide method; (b) the 
informal conversational interview (unstructured interviewing); and (c) the standardised 
open-ended interview (structured interviews). 
 
Table 18: Government offices visited 
 
 
Visiting the government offices 
By visiting the government offices between January and June 2015, September and 
December 2015, January and June 2016, and September and December 2016, this 
helped the collection of information on what support these offices were extending to 
SMEs. The appointments were scheduled monthly and at the convenience of the 
employee’s availability. However, there were no meetings scheduled in July and August 
due to summer vacations (low headcount) and during the holy month of ‘Ramadan’6 
(shortened working hours). There were 20 scheduled visits to government offices; the 
highest number was to Tamkeen, and the lowest to EWA.  
 
 
6 6 The ninth month of the Islamic calendar, observed by Muslims as a month of fasting, prayer, reflection, and 
community. 
S/No Government office Findings
1 Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI)
Government tender notifications can be obtained through the BCCI's website 
or by visiting their office in person.
2 Bahrain Tender Board (BTB)
Government tender announcements and allocations are public and can be 
obtained through the BTB's website or visiting their office in person.
3 Electricity and Water Authority (EWA)                                                            
The increased utility charges apply to both locally and foreign-owned 
organisations. The increase is only for expat households and not on their 
organisations, and the impact is more on water than on electricity.                                                                                                        
4 Tamkeen
Tamkeen provides loans to all the SMEs irrespective of the organisation’s 
ownership and size. Tamkeen also provides coaching and mentoring support 
for all the organisations at differing maturity levels. 
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Meeting and networking with other business leaders 
Attending networking events, informal gatherings, and customer visits from January to 
July 2015, September to December 2015, January to July 2016, September to December 
2016, and January to June 2017 were useful to see what other business leaders do and 
helped understand what these organisations did better, worse, or different compared to 
Org. A. These meetings also helped to establish how these business leaders were 
informed of upcoming government projects or tenders, discussions and learning from 
failed strategies, best practices of the broader business circle, competitor tender practices 
and qualifier selection, making the best use of government loans and bail-out plans and 
up-to-date competitor and market knowledge. These were monthly networking events and 
there was no need to schedule prior meetings. However, there were no visits in August.  
 
Attending workshops, forums, seminars, and exhibitions 
Attending workshops, forums, seminars, and exhibitions ran in parallel to visiting 
government offices and meeting and networking with other business leaders. These visits 
helped to form an overall picture of the economic situation of Bahrain and regional stability 
and advice on best investments. These visits were also helpful to learn from failed projects 
or failed strategies and the government’s policy changes and directions. These meetings 
provided a vast opportunity to learn crisis recovery plans and industry best practices. 
These were one-day events that took place between December 2015 and July 2016 and 
September and December 2016, and there were no meetings in July and August (the 
warmest months).          
 
Attending ‘Majlis’ open houses  
Attending ‘Majlis’ open houses between September 2016 and June 2017 and meeting 
other business leaders helped to identify what they do differently to adjust to the current 
economic crisis. There were plenty of discussions on how these business leaders get 
information on government tender announcements. These informal meetings also helped 
to demonstrate how the Tamkeen’s support can best be utilised and what new business 
opportunities have opened in the market. Discussions were also extended to learn if a 
foreign-owned business owner can join hands with a local business partner. These were 
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weekly events held on Thursday evenings between 7 and 10 pm, and there were no 
meetings in July and August (the warmest months). 
 
Action learning set 
The next step was to seek views from comparable, independent, and diversified SMEs 
who have been in business for over three years (Kameyama and Kobayashi, 2018). This 
time frame helped to show if these organisations have experienced a similar crisis in the 
past. Ten SMEs that might have been impacted with the drop in oil prices were contacted 
(Table 19). Seven SMEs accepted and three rejected the request. The rejection was due 
to a lack of knowledgeable actors who could participate in an AR. This was followed by 
formally inviting Org. A as the 8th participant.  
 
Table 19: Business backgrounds of the action learning set 
 
 
3.6.5. Stakeholder mapping process 
The critical boundary was selecting the action learning set participants who can add value 
to this DBA research, but precise guidelines helped address this challenge. The SME 
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owner was guided in selecting participants, and the meetings were held at the customer’s 
site (Table 15). One critical boundary was selecting participants who have experienced a 
similar crisis in the past. They did not have to be from the same organisation, but having 
worked for another organisation and having experienced a similar crisis in the past was 
mandatory. Another critical boundary was that the participants must also be decision-
makers who see the value in this DBA research and must be able to argue or challenge 
others’ thoughts. An added boundary was that participants must know how much the 
current drop in oil prices has impacted their organisation and the economic crisis in 
general. The participants who did not fit these criteria were discarded. 
 
The action learning set meetings took place in June and July 2017. These meetings 
helped to understand what these organisations did better, worse, or different than Org. A 
to sustain their business in the current economic crisis. The semi-structured questionnaire 
(Appendix B) helped to facilitate the meetings. To clear any doubts regarding missing or 
unclear data, a second round of meetings with Heads of Departments (HoD) from Orgs. 
A to H was carried out in April 2018. These individual meetings did not exceed one hour, 
and discussions were informal. By not scheduling more than one meeting per day and 
two meetings per week, this allowed enough time to analyse and transcribe the data 
before the next meeting.  
 
Org. G (construction) had the highest number of participants; in the medical industry, it 
was as low as four (Orgs. B and H). In other sectors, it did not exceed six. Wall (2001) 
says having a higher number of participants does not assure a quality output, while a 
large group may contribute substantial knowledge, but better results are achieved through 
a smaller group (Krueger and Casey, 2000).  
 
Section (3.6) findings showed a detailed description of the data collection process applied 
in this DBA research. (Figure 17) and (Table 14) showed the coordinated intervention 
strategies of the stakeholder engagement process and the data collection road map.  
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The next section (3.7) addresses the data analysis process and the announcement of 
future actions is through (3.7.1). This is followed by the steps in transcript analysis (3.7.2) 
and ends by comparing Thematic Analysis (TA) versus Content Analysis (CA) (3.7.4). 
 
 Data analysis process 
As shown through (3.4), this DBA research involved access to action learning set 
participants. This meant that care was taken to approach these participants with full 
consent and with no intended harm or violation of the local culture (Table 15). Creswell 
(2013) recommends that this must be undertaken under the guidance of research 
philosophy (3.1) and the interview protocols (3.6.1). The action learning set was informed 
of the future actions (3.7.1), and (3.7.2) details the steps involved in analysing participant 
transcripts. This was followed by narrating a detailed analysis of the data analysis steps 
that relied on the Description, Interpretation, Presumption (D.I.P) coding method (Adu, 
2013) and a TA (King and Brooks, 2016). Additionally, the leader core competencies set 
alongside the OECD competency framework (Figure 5) helped to interpret chapter (6)’s 
findings. Organisational knowledge and its role in ensuring competitiveness of modern 
socio-economic systems (Figure 4) and the expected competencies by professional IT 
architects’ frameworks (Figure 13) further strengthened chapter (6)’s findings. Lastly, this 
chapter ends with the ethical considerations (3.8) that were followed when undertaking 
this DBA research. 
 
3.7.1. Announcement of future actions 
At the end of every action learning set, the participants were thanked and informed of: 
✓ How the accumulated information would be evaluated, interpreted and transcribed; 
✓ Any other specific actions that would count; and/or 
✓ The timeframe of reporting and follow-up actions.  
This was followed by personal notes directly addressed to the SME owners, 
appreciating their time and effort. Within 48 hours of the interviews, the action learning 
set received the transcripts of the discussions. Krueger (1998) says that action learning 
sets collapse because of:  
✓ The inability to update the participants; and/or 
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✓ The inability to narrate the findings in line with the original objective. 
 
3.7.2. Transcript analysis  
Colaizzi’s (1978) phenomenological method helped to analyse transcripts. First this 
involved reading all the written transcripts several times for an overall understanding, 
followed by identifying a significant phrase or sentence that displayed a significant 
experience. Meanings were then developed from these phrases or sentences, followed 
by clustering them into themes, recognising common themes across the transcripts, and 
then integrating them into an in-depth, detailed description of the event. In the final step, 
to validate the findings, some action learning set participants were approached for 
another round of meetings (3.6.5). At this stage, new data emerged, which allowed 
verification of the fundamental structure. Morrow, Rodriguez and King (2015) say that 
even though this method is little known in psychology, it is extensively used in other 
disciplines and is valuable for qualitative psychologists. Colaizzi’s (1978) 
phenomenological method is a seven-step process, with each step closely bonded to the 
data generated with a concise description of the event (Table 20). This was then followed 
by detailing Content Analysis (CA) and TA used as a coding as a tool (3.7.3), followed by 
qualitative data coding, a three-step process as shown through (Table 21).  
 
3.7.3. Thematic vs. content analysis  
Both TA and CA analyse life stories and address a particular event to develop insights. 
However, Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas (2013) say CA is suited to analyse a multi-
faceted and sensitive matter relating to exploratory work where not much is known. CA 
focuses more on a micro-level, and even within a qualitative analysis, CA quantifies data 
and counts instances of codes (Wilkinson, 2000). In contrast, a TA provides a detailed 
data account of data (Boyatzis, 1998) and is flexible and blends with different research 
methods. (Figure 18) shows TA’s main characteristics and (Figure 19) shows TA’s 
phases.  
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Table 20: Colaizzi’s descriptive phenomenological method 
 
Source: Morrow, Rodriguez and King (2015, p.2) 
 
3.7.4. Thematic vs. content analysis  
Both TA and CA analyse life stories and address a particular event to develop insights. 
However, Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas (2013) say CA is suited to analyse a multi-
faceted and sensitive matter relating to exploratory work where not much is known. CA 
focuses more on a micro-level, and even within a qualitative analysis, CA quantifies data 
and counts instances of codes (Wilkinson, 2000). In contrast, a TA provides a detailed 
S/No Step Description
1 Familiarisation
The researcher familiarises with the data by reading through 
transcripts several times.
2 Identifying significant statements
The researcher identifies statements that are of direct relevance 
to the phenomenon under investigation.
3 Formulating meanings
The researcher identifies meanings relevant to the phenomenon 
that arise from a careful consideration of significant statements. 
The researcher must reflexively 'bracket' pre-suppositions to stay 
closely to the phenomenon as experienced (though Colaizzi 
recognises that complete bracketing is never possible).
4 Clustering themes
The researcher clusters the identified meanings into themes 
that are common across all accounts. Again bracketing of pre-
suppositions is crucial, especially to avoid any potential 
influence of existing theory.
5 Developing an exhaustive description
The researcher writes a full and inclusive description of the 
phenomenon, incorporating all the themes produced at step (4).
6 Producing the fundamental structure
The researcher condenses the exhaustive description down to a 
short, densed statement that captures just those aspects 
deemed to be essential to the structure of the phenomenon.
7
Seeking verification of the fundamental 
structure
The researcher returns the fundamentally structured statement 
to all participants (or sometimes a sub-sample in larger studies) 
to ask whether it captures their experiences. He/she may go 
back and modify earlier steps in the analysis in light of this 
feedback.
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data account of data (Boyatzis, 1998) and is flexible and blends with different research 
methods. (Figure 18) shows TA’s main characteristics and (Figure 19) shows TA’s 
phases.  
 
Figure 18: Main characteristics of TA 
 
Source: Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bordas (2013, p.399) 
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Figure 19: TA phases 
 
Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006, p.35) and Maguire and Delahunt (2017, p.335) 
 
3.7.5. Qualitative data coding  
Qualitative data coding "involves seeing and interpreting what has been said, written, or 
done; reflecting on evolving categories; deciding [on] what is important to follow up" 
(Bazeley, 2013, p.15). Similarly, Adu (2013) says qualitative coding is part of qualitative 
analysis and is a systematic, transparent, and subjective process of reducing data to a 
credible format and simultaneously addressing the research problem and research 
questions. (Table 21) shows the three-step data coding process implied in coding 
chapters (4), (5) and (6) findings.  
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Table 21: Three-step data coding process 
 
 
Chapter (4) coding 
To uncover wrong traits discussed in Chapter (4), Adu’s (2013) seven steps of manual 
coding helped to code data and form themes (Table 22). Adu (2019) says description-
focused coding is ideal to explain selected excerpts by staying focused on the research 
question.  
 
Chapter (5) coding 
A template analysis helped to uncover the impact of organisational particularities on 
revenue losses as discussed in chapter (5) and helped in producing a list of codes (a 
template) to form themes (King and Brooks, 2016). This template included organising, 
exploring the meeting minutes, coding, and highlighting the key themes (Creswell, 2013). 
These steps helped to discover patterns across data.  
 
The template analysis began by classifying and grouping the PRIORI7 themes. The 
critical benefit of a template analysis is that it allowed a structured method to classify data 
while maintaining room to expand themes (King and Brooks, 2016). The template analysis 
was a mixture of analytical and descriptive data. PRIORI themes (1), (2) and (3) were 
descriptive and themes (4) and (5) were analytical. An extensive data analysis prior to 
developing themes (4) and (5) was undertaken. The level (2) code depicts the trait of the 
 
7 Identifying some themes in advance. 
Step Chapter Method Reference
1 Chapter (4) Qualitative analysis coding and categorising Adu (2013)
2 Chapter (5)
Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five 
approaches
Braun and Clarke (2006); Creswell (2013); King and Brooks (2016); 
Maguire and Delahunt (2017)
OECD competency framework OECD (2014)
Organisational knowledge and its role in ensuring 
competitiveness of modern socio-economic systems
Tumenova, Kandrokova, Makhosheva, Batov and Galachieva (2018)
Expected competencies by professional IT architects Spencer and Spencer (1993)
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first code, and the level (3) code is the process relating to the first code. The level (4) 
code indicates the direct consequences relating to the first code. These steps helped in 
formulating (5) themes (Table 23).  
 
Table 22: D.I.P coding to uncover wrong traits 
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Level 1 code Level 2 code Level 3 code Level 4 code
Inability to network with the 
business circle
Inability to benefit from the 
business circle
Poorly designed R&S 
processes
Employees not seeing the 
benefits of expanding the 
client base 
CEO new to the business 
world
CEO not seeing the benefits 
of networking 
Inability to select the right 
employees
Employees not helping to 
grow the organisation
Unable to secure 
government tenders
Unable to pre-qualify Org. A 
with government offices
Unable to extract government 
tender information from the 
business circle
Not being pro-active in 
looking for government 
tender information
Not attempting to visit the 
tender board 
Assumed professional 
qualifications or years of 
experience is enough
Not attempting to meet fellow 
tenderers to see what they 
do
Assumed that government 
tenders are extended only to 
selected organisations




Unable to ask for loan 
support
Not utilising Tamkeen's 
coaching and mentoring help
Org. A being foreign-owned
Not attempting to see the 
underlying loan support 
needs
Not attempting to see how 
the government procedures 
work
Assumed coaching and 
mentoring is given only to 
locally-owned organisations
Neglecting to identify the 
market needs
Expansion in an economic 
crisis
Hiring employees in an 
economic crisis
Not considering economic 
crisis
Unable to diversify and 
reduce risks 
Not identifying consequences 
of an early expansion
Neglecting to see the 
dangers of adding more 
employees 
Excessive pressure on 
operating costs
Too early to expand Not imposing restrictions Quick to expand 
Not amending the business 
plan
Neglecting to calculate 
underlying costs before 
expansion
Neglecting to see underlying 
impacts in an economic crisis
Neglecting to carry out a 
market study
Not expanding the client 
base beyond government 
customers
Theme 1: Inability to benefit from the business circle
Theme 2:  Lack of access to critical information
Theme 3:  Inability to benefit from external financial support
Theme 4:  Neglecting to amend the business plan in line with the economic setting 
Theme 5:  Neglecting to react to the crisis
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Chapter (6) coding 
The leader core competencies set alongside the OECD competency framework (Figure 
5) helped to interpret chapter (6)’s findings. Organisational knowledge and its role in 
ensuring competitiveness of modern socio-economic systems (Figure 4) and the 
expected competencies by professional IT architects frameworks (Figure 13) further 
strengthened chapter (6)’s findings.  
 
The next section (3.8) addresses the ethical considerations relevant to this DBA research.  
 
 Ethical considerations 
A significant challenge relating to this DBA research was that since data generation 
involved human interactions relating to positions and relationships governed by existing 
roles, the researcher was bound by ethical considerations throughout the research 
(Holian and Coghlan, 2013). Guillemin and Gillam (2004) discuss two dimensions of 
ethics in research: (1) procedural and (2) practical ethics.  
 
The procedural ethics consisted of many steps (Figure 20). Before reaching out to action 
learning set, prior approval from UoL was sought (Appendix A). Action learning set 
participants were invited with no forced participation. Participant identification was 
through job titles, respecting anonymity and privacy. Before carrying out the action 
learning set, the semi-structured questionnaire was sent to the organisation in advance 
(Appendix B). This ensured transparency and gave participants enough time to prepare. 
Meeting transcripts were sent for approval, ensuring that they have been correctly 
transcribed, ensuring first-person comments within quotation marks (3.6.1).  
 
All the meetings were audio-recorded using a mobile phone with prior permission, and 
there were no video recordings. The meetings were held at the customer’s site and within 
48 hours, data was analysed, transcribed (3.7.1), and stored on a personal computer (PC) 
secured with a password. Two extra backup copies were also held on the same PC and 
secured with passwords. The data will be stored for five years.  
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Figure 20: Ethical considerations followed 
 
 
Addressing practical ethics mainly related to ethical challenges about unexpected 
problems with the action learning set (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). These were primarily 
associated with challenges relating to being an insider within the research and hidden 
cultural norms (Holian and Coghlan, 2013). Argyris (1990) sees these as the researcher 
being radical and unnecessarily forceful in compelling sweeping transformation. 
  
This section showed that with any research, ethical challenges were unavoidable, but 
they were mostly culturally related. The local culture treats discussing profit gains/losses 
during challenging economic times as sensitive or forbidden. Being in Bahrain and 
accustomed to these norms indicated that either the question needs reframing or toning 
down, or the participant/s should be approached in private. Similarly, business leaders 
presume that discussing expansion plans attracts unnecessary challenges, letting the 
104 | P a g e  
 
competitors know that even during an economic crisis, organisations generate profits. 
However, a one-to-one discussion with the business owner(s) helped to re-clarify this 
area. Additionally, the business owner is a father figure in Arabic society, which compels 
the subordinates to believe that decisions executed by them are always right. This 
prevented the subordinates from answering some questions in full or not showing the 
truth. However, individual meetings helped in addressing them. It was also sensed that 
some participants were sometimes reluctant to share information and saw the researcher 
as a fault finder or being unnecessary forceful (Argyris, 1990). However, with continuous 
reassurance that the journey was about completing DBA research and that any 
information collected would not be used as a disciplinary tool, it generated trust.  
 
 Chapter summary 
In a bid to uncover the theoretical underpinning of the research methodology, this 
research employed Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill’s (2019) research onion model. The 
research philosophy applied in this DBA research was pragmatism (3.1), and it outlined 
how a pragmatist begins a study with a problem focused on discovering practical solutions 
to influence future practitioners and what motivates them. Interpretative frameworks 
(Table 11) helped to relate the associated philosophical beliefs. This was then followed 
by discussing the research approaches (3.2), a combination of inductive and abductive.  
 
The methodological choice applied in this DBA research was qualitative (3.3) and 
combined research strategies comprised of AR, case study, ethnography and narrative 
analysis (3.4), and justified selecting these particular strategies. This section also 
discussed the AR general empirical method in AR projects, as shown in (Figure 16). This 
was followed by discussing the time horizons (3.5), and this DBA research applied the 
cross-sectional time horizon. (3.6) discussed the data collection steps followed by the 
data analysis process (3.7). This section outlined how chapters (4), (5) and (6) data were 
analysed and coded. The last section in this chapter (3.8) discussed the ethical 
considerations from two dimensions: procedural and practical aspects.  
 
105 | P a g e  
 
The next chapter discusses the combined causes behind the revenue losses at Org. A 
and how the evidence was collected and analysed.    
106 | P a g e  
 
 Chapter 4: Uncovering the causes of revenue losses at Org. A 
This chapter explores how stakeholder responses to the impact of a drop in oil prices 
impact the organisation from a macro-economic aspect. Org. A began its operations in 
Bahrain in 2008. In that year, Org. A secured two large government projects that ensured 
work for five to seven years. While the outlook for Org. A appeared positive, a drop in oil 
prices hit in June 2014. This unfavourable circumstance contributed to a long-term 75% 
profit loss. Org. A’s leadership also presumed the government would favour locally owned 
organisations over foreign-owned organisations. These presumptions kept Org. A from 
seeking Tamkeen’s financial and advisory help.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. This chapter investigates how the drop in oil 
prices (4.1), which began in June 2014, impacted Org. A (1.3.1). (4.2) investigates 
whether any discriminatory practices impacting foreign-owned organisations benefitted 
from Tamkeen’s financial and advisory help (1.3.2). This chapter also explores external 
stakeholder involvement and their opinions during this economic crisis (1.3.3) and ends 
by addressing how Orgs. A-H managed to maintain sustainable operations during the 
economic crisis (4.3). Additionally, a literature review relating to organisational macro- 
meso, and micro-economic challenges helped to compare, contrast and synthesise other 
scholars’ views to build a theoretical foundation for this DBA research.  
 
Section (4.1) begins by analysing how the drop in oil prices contributes to an 
organisation’s sales and profit losses (4.1.1), followed by the impact of increased utility 
charges (4.1.2). This section then addresses the impact of the drop in oil prices leading 
to receiving late payments (4.1.3) and ends by analysing the local culture discouraging 
outsiders from joining the business circle (4.1.4). 
 
 Bahrain’s economic crisis (macro-economic conditions) 
As a result of the drop in oil prices that started in June 2014, the government decided to 
stall large and new infrastructure projects worth over US$350–400 million, and this has 
caused severe economic hardships on its direct dependents (MEED, 2018). An additional 
cost-cutting step included withdrawal of government-sponsored utility subsidies that were 
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offered to the community (EWA, 2018). With 99% of organisations in Bahrain being 
SMEs, these decisions caused the direct dependents of government contracts to lose 
their primary customers and, thus, income (BNA, 2015). When oil prices fluctuated 
between US$110–140 pb, the SME sector in Bahrain was lucrative (Vohra, 2017). This 
changed in 2014 when oil prices dropped to less than US$40. This section reviews the 
collective reasons for the drop in oil prices and its consequences through seven 
comparable, independent and diversified SMEs and Org. A. Furthermore, the researcher 
conducts a thorough literature review provided with insight of the existing research and 
debates relevant to the research topic (the impact of the drop in oil prices on SMEs in 
Bahrain) while comparing, contrasting, and synthesising relevant scholars’ views to 
provide a theoretical foundation.  
 
Formal meetings and networking events confirmed that other organisations, both in 
similar and dissimilar sectors, had been impacted by the drop in oil prices. However, 
further evidence was needed to determine whether revenue losses were a result of the 
drop in oil prices or if there were other causes that were not immediately visible that would 
have been mostly responsible for its revenue losses. (Figure 21) shows the impact the 
drop in oil prices had on the action learning set.  
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4.1.1. Drop in oil prices contributes to an organisation’s sales and profit losses 
Org. A experienced the highest revenue loss, resulting in a high profit loss. This finding 
is supported by the OM’s quote: “we have experienced 50% lower sales and a 75% 
lower profit.” Org. E has also experienced a 50% lower profit margin, evidenced through 
the CEO’s quote: “we feel the pain of a 50% drop in our profit margin.” For Org. G, the 
profit loss has been minimal. Listening to the FM’s statement: “the current drop in oil 
prices has caused our revenue to drop marginally. Even under a grim economic 
climate, we achieved our sales targets, but the government’s decision to stall large 
infrastructure projects has eroded our profit margin by 40%.”  
 
On the other hand, Org. B had not been significantly impacted by the drop in oil prices. 
With customers becoming cost-conscious in an economic crisis, this had been 
acceptable, heard through the CMO’s quote: “our projected revenue margin has shrunk 
by 20%, in addition to a 15% drop in mark-up.” Org. D has not experienced loss of 
sales, but by not managing to get new customers, its growth had slowed. This was 
evidenced through the MP1’s quote: “we have not experienced a lowered sales 
volume, but not having new customers had delayed our growth by 25%.”  
 
Org. F was not spared by the drop in oil prices either, but the impact on its profit margin 
was only 10%. Its CEO stated: “we have experienced a 20% reduced turnover and 10% 
profit loss.” Org. H lost less than 20% of sales. Analysing what has been said by the 
CRM: “the patient numbers have declined. This has hampered our profit goals – profits 
are less than 20%.” The organisation that experienced the least impact was Org. C 
(2.3%). The reason behind this could be the type of projects it undertakes. Its CFO stated: 
“in the present crisis, the impact on our turnover has been marginal (2.3%).” 
 
A study carried out in Oman (UlHaq, 2017) from 2012 to 2015 shows a positive correlation 
existed between the drop in oil prices and an organisation’s profit when the oil prices 
ranged between US$115 and US$50. However, there was inconsistency between the 
profitability and the revenue. This study concluded that due to the high operating costs of 
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doing business in the region, with a drop in oil prices, the income of an organisation could 
still grow but the profit margin could decrease.  
 
In summary, the initial findings were that the economic crisis had impacted the entire 
action learning set at differing scales as a result of a drop in oil prices. It was evident that 
Org. A experienced the highest profit loss (75%). Similarly, Orgs. E and G experienced 
50% and 40% profit losses, respectively. Even though the figure was not exceptionally 
high, Orgs. B and H experienced a 20% profit loss, whereas this figure was only 10% for 
Org. F and 2.3% for Org. C. While Org. D did not report a profit loss, a lack of new 
customers delayed its growth by 25%. Analogous to the work of UlHaq (2017), it was 
evident that a drop in oil prices had a direct correlation to an organisation’s profit but no 
relationship with its revenue. The reason why Org. A endured hardships more than the 
other organisations will now be explored.  
 
4.1.2. Increased utility charges 
Only two organisations experienced increased utility charges. For Org. B, this was a 20% 
increase, evidenced through the CMO’s quote: “we have experienced a 20% increase in 
utility charges.” The impact has been marginal for Org. C. In the CFO’s own words, 
“utility charges have risen marginally by 3–5%.”  
 
Except for Org. B (a dental clinic), the increased utility charges for other organisations 
had no severe impact. As the impact was higher for water bills, the increase will impact 
households more. As the operations of Org. G were mostly site-based, the impact on the 
organisation led to no significant increase. The other organisations were small offices that 
were primarily operated during the traditional five-day working week. 
 
A study carried out by Wang (2016) among 130,000 SMEs across 135 developing 
countries identified increasing utility charges as a severe problem faced by small 
organisations. In 2017, Alviss Contracting in Australia showed the impact of increased 
utility charges and concluded that New South Wales (NSW) (31%), South Australia 
(33%), Queensland (22%), the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) (25%), and Western 
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Australia (13%) were the most impacted. Small and medium organisations, with fewer 
than 200 employees, account for AU$10 billion of the total spending annually on electricity 
and gas. Ontario business owners claim high utility charges threatened their survival. 
Independent business groups criticised utility charges as their biggest challenge (Chu, 
2017). 
 
In summary, apart from two organisations, the rest did not raise concerns related to 
increased utility charges. This can be due to the early stages of the revised utility charges 
(Figure 3), and organisations may have only experienced a partial impact. However, Org. 
B reported the highest increase of 20% mainly due to its industry. Org. C operates on a 
‘projectised’ basis, with no requirement for a permanent office, and the impact on 
increased utility charges was marginal. Org. A operates during a five-day business week, 
with services extended at customers’ sites. Therefore, the impact on increased utility 
charges for Org. A was low.  
 
4.1.3. Impact of the drop in oil prices leading to late payments  
An additional challenge was collecting customer dues. This was evidenced by individual 
quotes from Orgs. A, C, D and E. Org. A declared: “not getting timely customer 
payments is disrupting our cash flow.” Org. C’s CFO also shared concerns: “we are 
not receiving timely contractor payments.” Org. D’s MP1 shared mutual concerns: 
“delays in getting customer payments are significant challenges for a small 
organisation like us.” However, Org. E’s (CEO) has seen an improvement in the recent 
past, sharing: “in the past 12 months, we experienced an effort in collecting customer 
payments, but this has improved to a certain degree in the last six months.” Org. 
F’s customers, being investors, fear a loss of reputation in the market and are therefore 
punctual with payments, which was confirmed by the AGM: “we have not been 
experiencing hitches in collecting customer past dues. Our customers are swift with 
their payments, fearing a loss of reputation in the corporate world.”  
 
Since oil revenues continue to be the driving force of government expenditure, the impact 
of reduced spending keeps reverberating across GCC economies. In 2016, a combination 
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of projects from private and government-funded offices fell by 32% from the previous 
year, with a further 8% decline in 2017 (MEED, 2018). Bills are often paid late, or 
governments renegotiate contractual terms, even after work has been completed (Young, 
2018). The overall challenges relating to delayed payments in the region have worsened 
in the past few years. Based on the project, late payments exceeding two or three times 
the agreed contractual conditions have become a familiar pattern (Fahy, 2017).  
 
Late payments generate an adverse impact in multiple ways, and small organisations 
spend significant effort and time trying to collect their dues. Abdul-Rahman, Kho and 
Wang (2013), in a study conducted across Malaysia, say the lost days in collecting 
customer payments could be used to increase productivity. The main consequences are 
reduced investments with a delay in meeting supplier payments (Sweeney, 2010).  
 
In sum, as the general business culture is a driver against late payments, customers do 
not see significant consequences if a payment is late. In Bahrain, customers informally 
agree on late payments, or debts are written off on religious grounds. The feedback of 
Orgs. E and F, which have seen significant improvements in recent months, depicts that 
with changes applied, there are many ways other organisations can improve. 
 
4.1.4. Local culture discourages outsiders from joining the business circle    
The local culture is built around shared religion and customs among extended family 
members. The preference is either for immediate family members or for GCC nationals 
(2.2.4). In terms of securing business deals, the close ties shared between the community 
ensures that business secrets are tightly protected and are exclusive to this network 
(4.3.4). Evidenced by Org. A’s CEO’s quote: “Bahrain, being small and with a close 
business circle, means the preference is always for immediate family members. 
People take time to develop trust with anyone outside this circle. I respect these cultural 
and religious bonds, but these unwelcome gestures are hindering gaining access to vital 
information.” These factors led to Org. A being marginalised and prevented it from joining 
the business circle and seeking information (5.1.1).  
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Middle Eastern businessmen look for family, connections, and friendship. They neither 
view external appearances as prestigious, nor do they impress customers and lenders by 
these means. It is essential to stress that in the Middle East and Latin America, your 
‘friends’ will support you. The fact that they personally are experiencing challenges is not 
an excuse for neglecting their acquaintances. They are meant to look out for your interests 
(Hall, 1960). According to the findings of Hall (1960), Org. A was not marginalised with 
the external matters relating to the business. Org. A lacked connections from the business 
circle, and as it was foreign-owned, it was not considered a ‘friend’ in the business circle 
(5.1.1).  
 
4.1.5. Concluding remarks associated with Bahrain’s economic crisis (macro-
economic conditions) 
The initial findings showed that the drop in oil prices led to an economic crisis where Orgs. 
A, E and G experienced the highest profit losses (4.1.1). The losses experienced by the 
other organisations were considered acceptable during an economic crisis. Except for 
Org. B, the rest of the action learning set had experienced a marginal increase in utility 
charges (4.1.2). First, this can be directly related to the industry. Second, the full impact 
of the increased utility charges was only partially implemented at the time of completing 
this DBA research. The late payments were primarily related to the government stalling 
projects and customers re-negotiating payment plans. Late payments appear to be 
related to cultural habits and did not significantly impact the entire action learning set 
(4.1.3). Lastly, Org. A lacked connections within the business circle and, therefore, was 
considered an outsider (4.1.4).  
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (4.1) findings showed that a drop in 
oil prices disrupts a country’s macro-economic environment (Hamilton, 1983; Ederington 
and Guan, 2010). In such an economic environment, a government is compelled to imply 
cost-cutting steps to curtail government spending. These steps can vary from stalling 
large infrastructure projects (MEED, 2018) to or withdrawal of government-sponsored 
subsidies given to the community (EWA, 2018). These steps vary according to the 
country’s macro-economic environment. However, (4.1) also showed that cultural habits 
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would remain unchanged even during an economic crisis. Late payments were one step 
(Fahy, 2017; Young, 2018). Another step was that the business circle preferred to work 
with immediate family members and treated foreigners as outsiders (Hall, 1960). 
However, this section showed that except for sales and revenue losses, one could not 
consider the other factors as significant influences on an organisation’s revenue losses 
(Deloitte, 2019), but business owners must learn to overcome these challenges and adapt 
to the economic environment. 
 
Analysing the four factors, except for sales and revenue losses as showed in (4.1.1), Org. 
A’s 75% profit loss cannot be explained by the economic crisis alone. In this aspect, the 
following section (4.2) investigates if there had been any discriminatory practices 
hindering foreign-owned organisations benefitting from Tamkeen’s support.  
 
 Discriminatory practices impact foreign-owned organisations (meso-
economic conditions)  
This section investigates if there had been any discriminatory practices hindering foreign-
owned organisations benefitting from Tamkeen’s support. To investigate this, as 
discussed in (3.6.4), meeting some government actors (January 2015 to December 2016) 
helped to shape and respond to some doubts. The aim through these meetings was to 
understand the support extended by these government offices for SMEs and what 
qualifies them to receive them. This was followed by, as showed in (3.6.4) and 
summarised in (7.3.2), assessing how Orgs. A to H have made use of such support. It 
was necessary to investigate why Org. A did not utilise funding support from the primary 
funding organisation, Tamkeen, that was spread across all industries, irrespective of the 
ownership and size. This section investigates if Org. A was denied benefits or if it was not 
qualified to benefit from its help. Was this due to being unaware that such facilities were 
available, or was Org. A denied support at any stage? Was Org. A being discriminated 
against because it is owned and headed by a foreigner?  
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4.2.1. Overview of Tamkeen’s support schemes 
(Figure 22) shows Tamkeen’s support schemes available to Bahrain’s SMEs. 
 




Founded in 2006, Tamkeen’s objective is to provide loan and advisory support to all SMEs 
regardless of ownership and size. Funding for Tamkeen is derived through fees collected 
from the private sector by the Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA). Tamkeen’s 
segment-based packages are in line with the market needs of SMEs (Tamkeen, 2018). 
Tamkeen also provides coaching and mentoring to all organisations at different maturity 
levels. Within its three strategic pillars of: 1) diversifying offerings, 2) accelerating delivery, 
and 3) sustaining impact, Tamkeen’s focus involves developing the business sector. 
Tamkeen helps organisations expand either home or abroad through its Tamweel+ 
support, but it does not pay cash or cash equivalent options to eradicate an organisation’s 
profit loss.  
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Sections (4.2.2) to (4.2.5) assesses how the support given to the action learning set 
helped them grow and sustain their organisations. These sections also addressed the 
action learning set participants that did not ask for financial support and how these 
organisations managed to sustain their operations during this economic crisis. Evidence 
collected from the action learning set was strengthened, referring to (Table 24) and 
participant quotes. 
 
Table 24: Overview of support sought  
 
 
4.2.2. Tamkeen’s business development programme 
This programme provides organisations with financial support to propel their growth. The 
financing is based on the organisation’s business needs. Tamkeen regularly amends its 
loan and advisory support programmes in line with market and economic needs. Initially, 
when the programme was launched, it allowed 70% of the total amount asked, but under 
its revised plan, it now allocates 50% of the total amount. The next paragraphs explain 
how the action learning set benefitted from Tamkeen’s support. 
 
Org. A presumed that the loans were only allocated to locally owned organisations. 
Evidenced through the OM’s quote: “we heard that Tamkeen’s loans are extended to 
buy office equipment and wage support help for Bahraini-owned organisations, but as we 
are 100% foreign-owned, we were not sure if we can ask for Tamkeen’s financial 
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support.” By presuming that Tamkeen’s loans were only for locally owned organisations, 
Org. A was unable to see the available benefits.  
 
Orgs. C (AGM) and F (CEO) shared thoughts that internal funding helped them: “we 
operate on a ‘projectised’ basis. Once a project reaches its maturity, we wind up the 
project and pass the operating costs to our subsidiary offices. In this way, we have 
no daily running costs, and see no reason for external financial support.” Similar 
thoughts were shared by Org. F (CEO): “internal funding through our subsidiary offices 
has helped us to keep our operating costs at bay, and not wanting to have loans.” In 
this economic crisis, internal funding arrangements within the group, without requiring 
external financial support, helped Orgs. C and F sustain operations.  
 
Orgs. B, D, E, G’s CEOs and H’s (MP1) benefitted from Tamkeen’s 70% allocation at its 
inception and shared similar thoughts: “if we obtain loans, we have to shoulder 50% of 
the loan amount, which is risky in the current economic crisis. However, at the inception, 
with Tamkeen bearing 70% of the loan amount helped us with machinery and 
equipment and marketing and branding. This arrangement helped us to safeguard 
70% of our operating costs and save our capital. This saving is now helping us to 
sustain ourselves.” Fearing additional costs as an unnecessary burden, Orgs. B, D, E, G 
and H saw no benefit in seeking additional financial support. However, at the inception, 
Tamkeen bore 70% of the loan amount, which helped these organisations safeguard 
operating and capital costs. 
 
In summary, Orgs. C and F were able to sustain their operations without taking external 
financial support. Orgs. B, D, E, G and H benefitted from Tamkeen’s 70% loan help at its 
inception. However, Org. A presumed Tamkeen would discriminate against helping 
foreign-owned organisations. Therefore, Org. A spent a substantial amount on its initial 
set-up which could have been allocated towards operating costs. 
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4.2.3. Tamkeen’s training and wage support programme 
Tamkeen has an additional co-financing programme for organisations aiming to hire, train 
or increase the salaries of new Bahraini graduates. Organisations could benefit from 50% 
support in the first year, and 30% for the next six months, with a maximum cap of BD500 
per month per employee. Expatriates or employed Bahrainis are ineligible for this support.  
  
Not wanting to drain its operating costs in the current economic crisis, Orgs. D (MP2) and 
F (FM) imposed a freeze on new hires. Org. D’s (MP2) shared thoughts: “we did not 
experience a profit loss, but to not drain our capital, we imposed a freeze on new hires.” 
To be followed by Org. F’s (FM): “under the current economic crisis, we do not aim to 
hire new workers, and so far, worker retention has not been a problem for us.”.  Orgs. 
D and F shared no information on whether they benefitted from the wage support 
programme.  
 
Orgs. B, E, G and H benefitted from the Tamkeen’s wage support programme, with Org. 
B’s (CEO) saying, “to keep our operating costs at bay, we obtained wage support help 
for our new Bahraini employees. By doing it, this placed a lesser impact on our operating 
costs.” Org. H’s (FM) agreed with Org. E’s (CEO) and shared thoughts: “in the current 
economic crisis, salaries have been maintained, and the Tamkeen’s wage support 
programme even helped us to increase Bahraini employee’s salaries”. Considering the 
industry type, Org. G benefitted at large: “it was a win-win situation for both the employer 
and employee. This scheme not only helped us hire new Bahraini engineers but even 
minimised the risk of hiring new employees as well. Even our new employees benefitted 
from the certification courses.” Tamkeen’s wage support programme helped Orgs. E, 
G and H to reduce the risks associated with hiring new employees, which helped to 
minimise the impact of its operating costs.  
 
In summary, Org. A was unaware of Tamkeen’s wage support programme and therefore 
did not benefit from the available perks. By imposing a freeze on new hires, Orgs. D and 
F managed to restrict its cash flow. Furthermore, Orgs. B, E, G and H benefitted from the 
wage support and the certification programmes.  
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4.2.4. Tamkeen’s Tamweel+ programme 
For organisations seeking expansion opportunities either at home or abroad, Tamkeen 
extends Sharia-compliant loans8 at 8%, reducing balance through collaborative partner 
banks. Tamkeen shoulders 70% of the loan amount with an agreed loan repayment 
period of up to 10 years. Loans range from BD1-2.5 million based on the bank’s policy.  
 
Only Org. H benefitted from Tamkeen’s Tamweel+ programme. Org. H’s (CEO) admitted 
that depending only on dermatology and laser would not sustain operations, sharing: 
“dermatology and laser is fast gaining recognition in Bahrain. This year, there are more, 
at least five to seven, new clinics that offer similar services, which is increasing 
competition. However, seeing the future, laying all your eggs in one basket is risky. 
Keeping this in mind, we saw the potential in transforming our clinic into diagnostic 
and polyclinics. 70% of the required funds were obtained through Tamkeen’s Tamweel+ 
programme.” However, the CEO sensed that the two new clinics would take time to attract 
customers and expanded into two new business sectors. Evidenced through the CEO’s 
quote: “we trust in keeping our customers close and treating them well and, in doing 
so, recently opened a pharmacy and laboratory. In this way, our customers do not have 
to go ‘clinic hopping’ for blood tests and prescribed medication. All these services are 
served under one roof. While external customers can obtain our services, our regular 
customers enjoy our services at discounted prices.’’  
 
Org. H’s (CEO) was pro-active and knowledgeable of Tamkeen’s programmes and saw 
Tamkeen’s Tamweel+ as beneficial to expand into many sectors. Org. B’s (CEO) also 
wanted to transform the organisation into a polyclinic but assessed that borrowing through 
banks is risky and complex, and shared concerns: “to transform the current clinic into a 
polyclinic, funding will be sought through personal reserves and family 
borrowings. We fear not being able to meet regular loan installments. Internal 
financing is not only tax-free, but informal discussions help to extend repayment plans, 
which is challenging with bank loans. Furthermore, a bank loan is not only dangerous but 
time-consuming as well.”  
 
8 An Islamic mortgage that doesn't charge interest on loans. 
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In summary, only Org. H benefitted from Tamkeen’s Tamweel+ programme to expand 
into four new business sectors within Bahrain, whereas Org. B perceived borrowing funds 
to expand during an economic crisis as risky and complex. No other organisations 
benefitted from the Tamweel+ programme.  
 
4.2.5. Tamkeen’s international placement programme 
Tamkeen’s international placement programme provides financial support for 
organisations to send its Bahraini employees on international assignments, training or 
educational courses. 80% of the funds are provided for a duration of two to twelve months. 
This support is used to fund employees’ salaries, flight, visa, medical insurance, and 
settlement costs during the stay. No participating organisations in this DBA research used 
this programme.  
 
4.2.6. Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring programme 
Through its advisory service platform, Tamkeen extends mentoring and coaching support 
to enrich business owners during any stage of their business cycle.  
 
Org. A said that it was unaware of this programme. The OM said, “we thought that 
Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring were only for locally-owned or big organisations.” 
The other organisations shared no comments on benefitting from this programme.  
 
During an economic crisis, government support programmes play a supportive role to 
help SMEs overcome slow growth (Fatoki, 2014). A survey (Peter et al. 2018) conducted 
across 400 small and medium Nigerian business owners claimed government played a 
significant role in uplifting them. This survey showed that in Korea and China, the 
government provided considerable help to develop both small and medium sectors. In 
1997, the Chinese government supported the small and medium sectors, which managed 
to elevate the economic status of nearly 200 million people. Financial support not only 
brings in growth and development across the industry, but it also advises on risk reduction 
and business activities.  
 
120 | P a g e  
 
4.2.7. Concluding remarks associated with discriminatory practices impact 
foreign-owned organisations (meso-economic conditions)  
(Table 25) shows the main findings from the action learning set on how these 
organisations managed to lessen the impact operating under the current economic crisis. 
Through Tamkeen’s business development programme, Orgs. B, D, E, F, G and H sought 
financial support to buy new machinery and equipment or implement marketing and 
branding campaigns (4.2.2). The training and wage support programme helped Orgs. B, 
E, G and H to lessen their operating costs (4.2.3). The Tamweel+ programme helped Org. 
H to expand overseas (4.2.4). No action learning set participant benefitted from either the 
international placement (4.2.5) or Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring programmes 
(4.2.6).  
 
Table 25: Action learning set findings associated with the meso-economic conditions 
 
 
By seeking financial support at different stages of the business cycle or with internal 
financial arrangements, the action learning set lowered its operating costs and preserved 
its capital. However, Org. A continuously used its internal savings, which significantly 
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impacted its capital. In the action learning set findings discussed in (4.2), it was observed 
that Tamkeen practised no discriminatory procedures that would hinder foreign-owned 
organisations from operating under the economic crisis. Org. A presumed that Tamkeen’s 
support was only for locally owned or large organisations and neglected to inquire about 
available benefits.  
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (4.2) findings showed the 
importance of seeking external financial support in an economic crisis, either through 
personal or government (Fatoki, 2014). In a crisis, business owners should be proactive 
to see the government's help irrespective of size and ownership (Peter et al. 2018). 
Presumptions will only hinder them benefitting from external financial support (A’Ali, 
2017). This section also showed that business owners must regularly check for available 
support rather than waiting until a crisis hits. 
 
The next section (4.3) addresses how organisations A to H managed to maintain 
sustainable operations during this economic crisis. 
 
 Detecting organisational particularities (micro-economic conditions) 
This section addresses how organisations A to H managed to maintain sustainable 
operations during the economic crisis. What did they do to adapt to changes? What did 
they do differently from Org. A? The following discussions from (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) attempt 
to uncover what organisations A to H did better, worse or different to adjust to the 
economic crisis. This is followed by discussing challenges from taking Tamkeen’s 
financial help (4.3.3). This section ends by discussing the Tender Board’s role towards 
allocation of government’s tender quotas (4.3.4).  
 
4.3.1. The role of failed or stalled government projects 
The action learning set identified organisational particularities as to how the role of failed 
or stalled government projects impacted each organisation. During the golden era of 
Bahrain (2008–2011) (1.2.3), contractors depended on large government projects. 
122 | P a g e  
 
However, stalling these government projects caused both contractors and sub-
contractors (MEED, 2018) to lose their primary income and customers (BNA, 2015).  
 
Orgs. A and G secured government9 projects under two different categories. However, 
based on the project category (essential and non-essential), the government stalled large 
and new infrastructure projects worth over US$350–400 million, and this decision 
impacted Org. A considerably. The CEO said: “when the projects were terminated with 
the reasoning that our services were non-essential, this began to disrupt our cash 
flow." Org. G, as part of a Government Action Plan (GAP) through the Saudi 
Development Fund (SDF), was granted permission to construct 25,000 government 
housing units (BNA, 2017). As per the donor’s contractual terms, such plans must 
proceed as planned. Org. G’s (CEO), having secured this opportunity, shared: “even 
though we experienced a 40% loss in the previous years, the newly awarded 
government project should help us to be sustainable for the next two years. Since 
our project is considered essential, we are confident it will go ahead as planned.” Org. 
G, by having secured projects under the SDF, has managed to keep the organisation 
afloat.  
 
From 2015 onwards, the government decided to stall large and new infrastructure projects 
worth over US$350–400 million except for the ongoing housing projects intended for its 
citizens. As per the royal order, providing citizens with affordable housing is a 
fundamental requirement (Construction Week, 2018). Org. G had been in the construction 
industry for over four decades. Experience had taught Org. G to sense forthcoming 
economic crises and adapt to the situation accordingly. Also, having earned a reputation 
for building affordable housing units, Org. G continuously secured government projects. 
When the drop in oil prices occurred and the government’s decision to terminate newly 
awarded projects impacted other contracting organisations, the Ministry of Housing (MoH) 
had awarded Org. G seven essential housing projects. Org. G had also secured contracts 
regarding civil and structure, electrical, public health engineering, air-conditioning and 
maintenance jobs under the Ministry of Works (MoW) since 2010.  
 
9 Org. A secured a ‘closed contract’, whereas Org. G secured the project through a tendering process. 
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However, Org. A’s services were categorised as non-essential and were ineligible for 
these projects. Org. A’s operating cost was disrupted when the government stalled non-
essential projects. A primary reason as discussed through (1.2.3) was that Org. A was 
too dependent on government projects and neglected to pay adequate attention to private 
sector customers when drafting its business plan. Furthermore, (6.2.2) shows Org. A. 
neither sought consultants to draft its business plan nor identify the loopholes when a 
government project is withdrawn. Additionally, as seen in (6.1.1), Org. A neglected to 
seek guidance from the business circle on how other business leaders were managing 
the situation when the government imposed such decisions. 
 
In summary, organisational particularities on the impact of the current economic crisis 
from each individual organisational perspective was observed. Org. A was significantly 
impacted by the government’s decision to stall its projects. While Org. G experienced a 
profit loss, the newly awarded government housing project and the ongoing projects and 
civil and maintenance contracts were safeguarding it from further losses. This privilege 
was unavailable to Org. A. The remaining organisations shared no concerns regarding 
government-sponsored projects.  
 
4.3.2. Remedial steps towards survival and sustainability 
This section identifies remedial steps towards survival and sustainability by Orgs. A to H 
to adapt to the economic crisis and what these organisations did better, worse, or 
different.  
 
Decisions taken to expand within Bahrain  
Orgs. B and H shared expansion into polyclinics. Org. B’s (CEO) added thoughts: “we 
have no intention of expanding beyond Bahrain, but to offer additional services, we 
have converted the dental clinic into a polyclinic.” Org. H’s (CEO) admitted that relying 
only on dermatology and laser is not going to help it survive, sharing: “dermatology and 
laser is fast gaining recognition in Bahrain. This year, there are more, at least five to 
seven, new clinics that offer similar services, which is increasing competition. However, 
seeing the future, laying all your eggs in one basket is risky. Keeping this in mind, we 
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saw the potential in transforming our clinic into diagnostic and polyclinics.” Except 
for Orgs. B and H, the other organisations did not discuss expansion plans within Bahrain. 
However, Orgs. A and H shared expansion plans beyond Bahrain.  
 
Decisions taken to expand beyond Bahrain  
Orgs. A and G planned to expand operations beyond Bahrain. Org. G moved its 
production facility to Iran to curb operating costs and preserve its capital. The AGM said, 
“living and working in Iran for us as Arabs is cost-effective. I have decided to move out 
my production facility to Iran; by doing this, I have managed to reduce the operating 
costs by two-thirds. Also, finding workforce in Iran is easier and cost-effective as well.” 
Org. A’s (CEO) also said, “having secured government projects at the early stage of our 
business gave us the confidence to look beyond Bahrain, and through this mind-set, 
within two years, we expanded our wings to Saudi Arabia.” However, as discussed 
in (5.5.2), Org. A was unable to carry out a feasibility study before moving into Saudi 
Arabia, further straining its operating costs.  
 
Organisations who have been successful at home often envisage the same benefit in the 
overseas markets (Winch and Binachi, 2006). Following a period of success and growth 
in the home market, such organisations often see the move as a route to rapid expansion. 
(Figure 23) sees what drives development away from home. Additionally, (Figure 24) 
shows the export boost to an already successful business at home. Organisations must 
understand that entering new and unfamiliar markets can be complex, having to deal with 
one or multiple challenges. If the growth is not well managed, it leads to undesirable 
consequences. A few challenges include sales and service functions, language 
differences, regulatory mechanisms, disrupted supply chains, and managing a complex 
network. The remaining organisations shared no concerns relating to expansion within or 
beyond Bahrain.  
 
By incorporating the findings of Winch and Binachi (2006), the reputation Org. A earned 
for its quality services at home was the initial decision to pursue its success beyond 
Bahrain. Having won government projects at an early stage was an additional boost as 
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well. However, as shown in (Figure 24), neglecting to carry out a feasibility study before 
moving into Saudi Arabia did not generate the expected results for Org. A. 
 
Figure 23: Growth drivers 
 
Source: Adapted from Winch and Binachi (2006, p.77) 
 
Figure 24: Growth with desired export boost 
This loop depicts the additional cost burdens in supporting international customers, and 
this can threaten a hard-earned reputation. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Winch and Binachi (2006, p.77) 
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(Figure 25) shows how quality and reputation loss impact an organisation’s operations, 
even losing its foothold at home. This is applicable across small organisations that are 
trying to grow alongside a viable backdrop of restricted capitalisation (Anderson, Boocock 
and Graham, 2001). This can lead to long-term consequences to secure payments in a 
foreign country.  
 
Figure 25: Inadequate resources damage growth trajectory 
 
Source: Adapted from Winch and Binachi (2006, p.78) 
 
Decisions taken to insource business activities  
In this economic crisis, organisations began to implement cost-cutting practices by 
outsourcing accounting and human resources jobs to small and medium-sized 
organisations. According to the MP1 from Org. D, “even though we have experienced a 
slow growth, since the drop in oil prices, to curtail operating costs, medium and large 
organisations began outsourcing accounting and human resources jobs to 
organisations like us. This has helped us to keep our cash flow intact.” While Org. A was 
armed with information consultants, it was challenged to sustain the operations of these 
consultants’ operations while keeping them unaware that the organisation was insourcing 
jobs, as was like Org. D.  
 
Outsourcing IT work to a third-party provider is increasing. Carmel and Agarwal (2002) 
shared success stories of three major global organisations. In 2000, GE outsourced IT 
work to India worth US$200 million. In 2001, this increased to US$400 million. In 2002, it 
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reported 7,000 outsourced software professionals. In addition to India, GE outsourced IT 
work to Mexico and China. Intel Corp opened a software lab in central Russia, which 
employs 100 local programmers and 100 contractors. Ford has shifted most of its 
computer-aided design work to India to slash operating costs from US$30–60 million per 
year (Copeland, 2001). Carmel and Agarwal (2002) show that large organisations 
outsource most of the IT work to a third party to reduce operating costs. However, Org. 
A’s operating costs were further hampered from not outsourcing work. 
 
Decisions taken to outsource business activities  
Org. E amended its business model by sub-contracting projects to third-party provider. 
The AGM confirms this: “to cut our costs, we have sub-contracted part of our business 
needs to freelancers or virtual offices. Under the current economic crisis and having 
experienced a 50% profit loss, we cannot afford to hire new employees. Instead of new 
hires, with an adjustment to our business model, we have decided to sub-contract our 
business needs to freelancers or virtual offices. This option is easy and cost-effective as 
well.” Org. E managed to sub-contract part of its business needs to cut costs instead of 
hiring new employees.  
 
Business transactions with low insecurity and low assets are more likely to be outsourced 
(Aubert, Rivard and Patry, 1996). Service firms, when dealing with constant changes 
requiring continuous adaptation, should consider outsourcing as an operation choice 
(Miles and Snow, 2001). When organisations need to redefine their business activities, 
outsourcing adds significant value. However, at present, there seems to be minimal 
attention on outsourcing (Arias-Aranda, Bustinza and Barrales-Molina, 2011). 
Outsourcing is an excellent way to reduce economic pressure and to optimise costs 
(Table 26). However, having lost two key government projects, Org. A was left with no 
work to outsource, and by not seeking an alternative benefit of undertaking insourcing 
activities from large or medium organisations similar to Org. D, this has placed a 
significant pressure on its operating costs. The remaining organisations shared no 
concerns regarding insourcing or outsourcing business activities.  
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Table 26: Benefits of outsourcing business activities 
 
Source: Adapted from Ehie (2001) and Kremic, Tukel and Rom (2006)  
 
Decision to explore new business areas 
Orgs. E, F, G and H discussed expanding into new business areas. Org. E saw an 
opportunity for search engine optimisation and amended its business model accordingly. 
The CEO said, “with search engine optimisation fast gaining recognition, with an 
amendment to our business model, we have added this new service to our existing list 
of services.” By watching the market environment, Org. F noticed two business 
opportunities and amended its business plan accordingly. Org. F did the necessary in-
house training to prepare for the new business opportunities and was confident the next 
financial year would be better. Org. F’s AGM said “as additional steps to curtail revenue 
losses, we added two new business areas to our portfolio; back-office support for new 
and forthcoming stock exchanges in other countries and analytics10. To keep the 
overhead costs low associated with these two new services, the added new services 
will be carried out by the existing employees. Training for them will be through our 
principal or subsidiary offices in India.”  
 
 
10 Systematic computational analysis of data. 
129 | P a g e  
 
However, Org. G, being in the industry for over four decades, was accustomed to 
employing remedial steps to curtail economic crises. The CEO said, “towards our 
existence and sustainability, focus on a new direction is essential. Energy-saving 
products for new buildings are now in the market.” Similarly, Org. H’s (CEO) sensed that 
two new clinics took time to attract customers and expanded into two new business areas 
as well. The CEO said, “we trust in keeping our customers close and treating them 
well and, in doing so, recently opened a pharmacy and laboratory. In this way, our 
customers do not have to go ‘clinic hopping’ for blood tests and prescribed medication. 
All these services are served under one roof. While external customers can obtain our 
services, our regular customers enjoy our services at discounted prices.’’ 
 
Diversification leads to an organisation’s long-term growth and sustainability by selling 
new products to the existing customer base or creating new markets. An organisation 
with a limited product line or service considers diversification as a good step to survive 
(Santander Corporate and Commercial, 2016; Lewis, 2020). Diversification is a good 
strategy if the market is strong enough to withstand competitors, the customer pool is 
small, and/or the operation costs are higher than potential revenue.  
 
Orgs. E, F, G, and H discussed expanding into new business areas. However, Org. A did 
not seek alternative ways to add new services to extend its business plan, which further 
constrained its operating costs. 
 
Decisions taken not to adopt any steps 
Org. C did not discuss a new product line or an expansion plan. However, Org. C’s 
business plan was based on a ‘projectised’ basis to keep its costs low. The CEO said, 
“since our business model is based on a ‘projectised’ basis, we do not need a 
permanent office or staff, and once a project reaches its maturity, we wind up the 
project, and assign our employees to other countries. In this way, we pass the 
operational costs onto our global partners.” By sharing its operational costs with its 
global partners, Org. C has managed to maintain minimal operating costs.  
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In summary, detecting organisational particularities in remedial steps taken implied how 
the organisation survived and sustained itself, and the ways in which these particularities 
impacted an individual organisation were observed as taking many forms. Orgs. B and H 
expanded within Bahrain by converting its clinics into polyclinics. Org. G outsourced its 
production plant to Iran. Org. D benefitted from insourcing steps adopted by large and 
medium-sized organisations. Additionally, Org. E sub-contracted some of its business 
needs to freelancers or virtual offices. Similarly, Orgs. E, F, G, and H branched out into 
new business sectors. Org. C did not impose new remedial steps. Lastly, when detecting 
organisational particularities in remedial steps taken to survive and sustain which 
impacted an individual organisation, it was observed that Org. A was unable to look for 
alternative ways to amend its business plan, and that placed Org. A under severe survival 
challenges. 
 
4.3.3. Challenges from accepting Tamkeen’s financial help 
This section shows challenges from accepting Tamkeen’s financial help. Complex and 
lengthy application processes were challenges associated with accepting Tamkeen’s 
financial help. The literature and some organisations reported Tamkeen’s practice of 
charging high interest rates and practising discriminatory attitudes towards the industry.  
 
Lack of awareness  
If Tamkeen was more pro-active, it would have served more organisations, a point which 
was shared by Orgs. A and H: “if Tamkeen takes a more pro-active approach in 
promoting its services, more organisations will benefit. The only way we knew of its 
services was through its website. What about organisations that are not computer-
friendly? How are they going to obtain their services?” Discussions showed that 
Tamkeen’s former loans benefitted Orgs. B, D, E, G, and H. However, Org. A presumed 
Tamkeen discriminated against foreign-owned organisations and did neglect to approach 
Tamkeen for support.  
 
Complex and lengthy loan application process  
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Orgs. B, D, E, G, and H had benefitted from Tamkeen’s loans in the past and shared that 
the lengthy and complicated loan application process was challenging. Collectively Orgs. 
B, D, E, G, and H said, “the application process was quite lengthy and complex with a 
high requirement of collateral support, but overall, we are satisfied with Tamkeen’s 
services.”  
 
High interest rates 
Orgs. B and H saw Tamkeen’s Tamweel+ support as helping organisations expand either 
at home or abroad. However, organisations would receive significant help if Tamkeen 
revised its interest rates. Org. B’s (CEO) shared thoughts: “the high interest rates 
compelled us to borrow from relatives.” The rest of the organisations agreed and stated, 
“the high interest on Tamkeen’s loans were too high for us to bear. Once the loan is 
fully paid, we are left with no savings for our future.” 
 
Discriminatory attitude towards the industry  
Org. G faced discrimination while seeking a loan from Tamkeen and said, “funding 
organisations favour the high-tech sector, rather than manufacturing (2.3.1).” Org. A 
and the other organisations shared no thoughts in this area.  
 
Due to fragile collateral challenges, SMEs are often challenged with credit regulating and 
complex interest rates matters (Alrabeei and Kasi, 2014). Comparing SMEs with larger 
organisations, they are unable to comply with higher disclosure requirements for equity11, 
loans and bonds. Higher interest rates on loans are concerns for SMEs (Saxena, 2017). 
During an economic crisis, it is evident that interest rates rise considerably, increasing the 
debt burden (Sato, 2000). With loan repayment periods being extended, SMEs pay back 
larger sums. SMEs feel trapped, as any earnings or profits generated are settled on loan 
repayment, leaving no savings for future growth (Ojeka, 2011). High interest rates lead 
business leaders to seek funding from venture capital organisations or relatives rather 
than from banks. The complex loan application process and the lack of transparency are 
 
11 The difference between the value of the assets and the liabilities. 
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additional drawbacks (Injaz, 2013). Discriminatory attitudes regarding the business sector 
were an additional challenge.  
 
In summary, the problems when seeking loans involved a complex, lengthy loan 
application process and high interest rates. The individual’s lack of awareness was not a 
real problem. Detecting organisational particularities and identifying problems 
encountered when seeking Tamkeen’s financial support showed that the overall findings 
were positive except for the loan application process. 
 
4.3.4. Tender Board’s role towards allocation of government’s tender quotas  
When identifying organisational particularities on the role played by the Tender Board in 
allocating tender quotas, stakeholders criticised the Tender Board over its tender 
practices. Critical findings included hidden clauses and a lack of transparency when 
awarding government tenders.  
 
Lack of transparency allocating government tenders 
Marginalising small organisations over large organisations when allocating government 
tenders was a significant concern for some action learning set participants. Org. A’s CEO 
said, "I have been in business for the last few years and have never been successful 
even securing part of a tender, but my friends in the big business circle have been 
successful winning government tenders.” Orgs. D, E, and F shared similar opinions and 
said, “we often see a lack of transparency in granting government tenders. We are 
concerned that they are secretly awarded to larger organisations (5.2).” 
 
Clauses associated with awarding government tenders 
Orgs. A, D, E, and F were further critical, adding that government tender awards carry 
hidden clauses, which is evidenced through collective thoughts: “I feel that the 
government tenders have hidden clauses favouring large organisations.” It was 
observed that the action learning set felt that the Tender Board was not transparent with 
its tender allocation, disallowing small organisations in benefitting from government 
tenders.  
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A’Ali (2017) said that the Tender Board supports big organisations over small 
organisations. This challenge was mainly due to the ‘inside’ information shared before 
releasing a government tender (5.2). Projects were often not given based on skilled labour 
and knowledge, but to sectors outside the scope. Another drawback was the lack of 
transparency in allocating government tenders; SMEs were concerned that they were 
secretly awarded to larger organisations (Yusuf, 2014).  
 
In summary and agreeing with A’Ali (2017) and Yusuf (2014), detecting organisational 
particularities on the Tender Board’s role towards allocating government’s tenders, Orgs. 
A, D, E, and F presumed that hidden tender clauses prevented small organisations from 
winning government tenders. Orgs. D, E, and F criticised the Tender Board for not being 
transparent in tender allocations, often discriminating against small organisations by 
hindering access to critical tender information. The remaining organisations, due to the 
type of the industry they operate in, shared no concerns regarding government tenders. 
(Table 27) shows what organisations A to H did better, worse, or different to adjust to the 
economic crisis.  
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Table 27: Detecting organisational particularities 
 
 
4.3.5. Concluding remarks associated with detecting organisational 
particularities (micro-economic conditions) 
Reflecting on the discussions with Orgs. A–H, the drop in oil prices and the economic 
crisis harmed all organisations. The findings showed that the damages to SMEs 
correlated with the level of dependency on government support. However, it was also 
observed that the stakeholders’ intense reliance on government projects were preventing 
them from seeking alternative arrangements during an economic crisis.  
 
Except for Org. A, the rest of the organisations imposed survival steps to embrace the 
economic crisis. Forming business partnerships with comparable businesses and 
expanding into other sectors helped these organisations to curtail their operational costs 






































































































































































































































































































































































Org. A √ x √ x x x √ √ x x x √ √
Org. B x √ x x x x x x √ √ x x x
Org. C x x x x x x √ x x x x x x
Org. D x x x √ x x x x √ √ x √ √
Org. E x x x x √ √ x x √ √ x √ √
Org. F x x x x x √ x x x x x √ √
Org. G √ x √ x x √ x x √ √ √ x x
Org. H x √ x x x √ x √ √ √ x x x
4.3.2 Remedial steps towards survival and sustainability
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complex, lengthy, discriminatory, and favouring the high-tech industry. These 
organisations regarded the complex loan application process and high interest rates as 
additional challenges (4.3.3). Additionally, securing a government tender had been a 
significant challenge for some action learning set participants, and they feared such 
tenders carried hidden clauses and were awarded either to large organisations or within 
the known business circles (4.3.4). Additionally, these action learning set participants 
criticised the Tender Board for being non-transparent when awarding government 
tenders.  
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (4.3) findings showed that except 
for Org. A, the rest of the action learning set participants imposed several survival steps 
to sustain themselves and survive this economic crisis. These steps varied according to 
the business needs and organisation’s business model; however, neglecting to impose 
remedial steps in this economic crisis has not been favourable for Org. A. Due to the type 
of industry, it operates in, Org. A had several opportunities to impose remedial steps. 
Product diversification (Santander Corporate and Commercial, 2016; Lewis, 2020) or 
accepting insourcing business activities were some of the actions Org. A could have 
explored in its favour (Copeland, 2001; Carmel and Agarwal, 2002). A primary 
observation through this section was that Org. A presumed that Tamkeen would favour 
local organisations over foreign-owned organisations (A'Ali, 2017), resulting in neglecting 
to seek Tamkeen loans. This presumption was once again seen when government 
tenders were discreetly awarded to big organisations (Yusuf, 2014) or awarded outside 
the scope. Findings showed that there had been a certain degree of corruption in 
awarding government tenders (Yusuf, 2014; A’Ali, 2017), but they were not the primary 
causes for not winning a government tender. 
 
 Chapter summary 
Data collected from Orgs. A–H showed that every organisation had faced multiple 
challenges, but the impact on turnover varied. The findings showed that the problems 
discussed in this chapter were common across all the organisations, but that changes 
within the organisations have helped them adapt to the situation. Increased utility charges 
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were common across all organisations, irrespective of the organisations’s ownership and 
size. Likewise, discrimination when obtaining Tamkeen’s loans was experienced to a 
certain extent, but this was an unimportant cause of revenue losses. 
 
Findings of (4.1) showed the high percentage on Org. A’s sales and profit losses cannot 
be explained by Bahrain’s economic crisis alone. (4.2) showed that there were no 
discriminatory practices from Tamkeen towards foreign-owned organisations operating in 
Bahrain. Except for Org. A, the rest of the organisations had either benefitted or were 
aware of Tamkeen’s support. Lastly, seeing the problem from the perspective of 
organisational particularities (4.3), findings showed that there were several challenges 
across all industries, but the way each organisation handled the challenges was different.  
 
The findings from the action learning set uncovered reasons for Org. A’s revenue losses. 
It was evident that most of the challenges were only encountered within an economic 
crisis, and only particular areas were actual problems. While other business leaders 
recognised and responded to the threats, why did Org. A neglect to adapt? Was it due to 
a lack of ability or skills from the organisation or leadership? These challenges are 
discussed in detail in chapters (5) and (6).  
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 Chapter 5: Lack of Organisational Knowledge, Competencies, and 
Self-efficacies 
As will be shown through this chapter, one of the primary causes appeared to be due to 
a lack of organisational knowledge, competencies, and self-efficacies, which resulted in 
Org. A being unprepared to respond to the economic crisis. Thoughts and opinions from 
Orgs. A–H and a literature review relating to organisational knowledge, competencies, 
and self-efficacies helped to compare, contrast, and synthesise other scholars’ views to 
build a theoretical foundation for this DBA research.  
 
Organisational knowledge and its role in ensuring competitiveness of modern socio-
economic systems framework, as shown through (Figure 4) and summarised in (2.4), 
helped to analyse the challenges relating to organisational knowledge, competencies, 
and self-efficacies within Org. A. This framework suggests that organisations must assess 
long-term competitive advantages before proposing a solution to a changing environment. 
Rapid changes lead to identifying frequent internal and external reviews to recognise 
necessary strategies to bring in improvements to an organisation. Expected 
competencies by professional IT architects, as discussed in (Table 6), shown in (Figure 
13), and summarised in (6.1), strengthened chapter 5’s findings. 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. (5.1) discusses Org. A’s CEO’s lack of 
entrepreneurial experience and how it hindered benefitting from the business circle. 
Likewise, (5.2) discusses how a lack of access to critical information hindered Org. A 
when attempting to secure government tenders. Similarly, (5.3) addresses Org. A’s 
negligence to evaluate the benefits of external financial support. Additionally, (5.4) 
analyses Org. A’s inability to amend the business plan in line with the economic setting. 
Lastly, (5.5) addresses Org. A’s negligence to react to the crisis.  
 
 Inability to benefit from the business circle  
One reason for the inability to benefit from the business circle was the CEO’s lack of 
entrepreneurial experience, which hindered networking with the business circle, and is 
discussed through (5.1.1). Similarly, (5.1.2) discusses an additional reason for the CEO’s 
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inability to assess the benefits of networking with other business leaders, and lastly, the 
HR selection processes not linked to organisational development is discussed through 
(5.1.3).  
 
5.1.1. CEO’s lack of entrepreneurial experience hindered networking with the 
business circle  
Findings from (4.3) showed Org. A’s CEO showing some inability to network with other 
business leaders, which hindered it benefitting from the business circle. Data collected 
showed that a key reason for this inability was due to the CEO being new to the business 
world and being a foreigner at the same time: “as a foreigner in Bahrain since 1995, I was 
networking with employees from my previous or similar organisations. However, I was 
not belonging to a business circle. My challenge is knowing and connecting with 
other business leaders.” These challenges are addressed through (6.1.2).  
 
The biggest challenge a foreigner often lacks in a new country is a social circle (Bird and 
Wennberg, 2016). Native business leaders usually have a network of friends, business 
associates, and family members as a primary customer base in the initial stages of the 
business. However, this facility is not easily available to a foreigner when in a new country. 
They must start from the beginning in terms of getting to know people.  
 
Thoughtful opinions from the CEOs of Orgs. H and C in this regard were constructive. 
Org. H stated, “in the first three years, build a relationship with your customers and let 
them be your brand ambassadors. Get closer to them and visit them often.” Followed by 
Org. C: “you must meet and talk to people, to see what they are doing, and see what 
makes them different to you.”  
 
Evaluating the situation with Bird and Wennberg’s (2016) findings showed what led to a 
lack of local network. A significant challenge was Org. A’s CEO being a foreigner, and not 
having the primary customer base in the early stage of Org. A’s business. This inability 
hindered it benefitting from the business circle. Unlike the examples of Orgs. H and C’s 
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CEOs, Org. A’s CEO neglected to attempt to see what other business leaders were doing 
before launching Org. A, and this hindered it benefitting from the business circle.  
 
5.1.2. CEO’s inability to assess the benefits of networking with other business 
leaders  
An additional reason for Org. A’s inability to network with other business leaders, which 
hindered it benefitting from the business circle, was that the CEO did not attempt to see 
the benefits of networking with other business leaders before becoming an entrepreneur. 
As evidenced by the CEO’s quote: “I now see the implications of not attempting to link 
entrepreneurially before I became an entrepreneur.” By overlooking this area, building 
bridges with the business circle has been a continuous challenge for Org. A. 
 
Elfring and Hulsink (2003) see social interactions as excellent sources for an organisation 
to identify and exploit new business opportunities (Figure 26). In a study carried out by 
Schoonjans, Van Cauwenberge, and Vander Bauwhede (2013) between 1992 and 2008 
across 6,000 Flemish small organisations, it was identified that since small organisations 
are often ill-equipped with adequate knowledge and resources to adjust to an economic 
crisis, networking provides an excellent platform to look for solutions. Cronin-Gilmore 
(2012) highlights that networking events are competitive platforms for small business 
owners to see how other business leaders build their market segment strategies.  
 
Figure 26: Conceptualisation of the contribution of networking to small firm marketing 
 
Source: Adapted from O’Donnell (2014, p.167)  
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Analogous to the findings of Elfring and Hulsink (2003), not weighing the benefits of social 
interactions has hindered Org. A benefiting from a broader business circle. By not taking 
the opportunities shown by Schoonjans, Van Cauwenberge, and Vander Bauwhede 
(2013) and Cronin-Gilmore (2012), Org. A neglected to benefit from the resources and 
solutions from the business circle.  
 
5.1.3. HR selection processes not linked to organisational development 
Another reason for Org. A’s inability to network with other business leaders, which 
hindered it benefitting from the business circle, was its employees not seeing the benefits 
of expanding its client base through networking. This was evidenced through the CEO’s 
quote: “during the hiring process, preference was given to knowledge and experience, 
and a lesser attention to soft skills.” By overlooking this area, Org. A’s employees focused 
on delivering the assigned tasks at a client’s site, but less significant attention was paid 
to expanding or retaining the client base. 
 
Employees networking with customers build successful relationships and develop mutual 
respect (Kay, 2004). When employees network with the existing customers, it opens 
avenues to an insight of future projects and competitor habits. Employees who lack this 
understanding see no benefit in networking, except for delivering the tasks given. Bhide 
(1996) says that a lack of talented employees with a good balance of knowledge and 
skills is often the primary obstacle that hinders implementing a strategy. Bhide’s (1996) 
views are supported by Shepherd, Douglas, and Shanley (2000), who found that 
competent employees who have an eye for a new venture are an asset for new 
organisations.  
 
Aligned with Bhide’s (1996) findings, Org. A did not face challenges in finding qualified 
and experienced employees but did find it difficult to find employees with a balance of 
knowledge and skills. By overlooking this area, similar to Kay’s (2004) findings, Org. A’s 
employees were interested in completing a job assigned to them but saw no benefit in 
acquiring additional business leads from the existing client. Corresponding with 
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Shepherd, Douglas, and Shanley’s (2000) findings, as a new venture, this inability has 
hindered Org. A in retaining and expanding its customer base. 
 
5.1.4. Concluding remarks related to Org. A’s inability to benefit from the 
business circle  
(Table 28) summarises Org. A’s inability to network with other business leaders, which 
hindered it benefitting from the business circle. This table evidences that by not belonging 
to a business circle, Org. A’s CEO displayed a lack of self-confidence related to a fear of 
uncertainty and feelings of failure. The CEO’s self-evaluation was shown to be accurate 
in that the CEO did not weigh the benefits of connecting entrepreneurially. The inability 
to form a business circle showed the CEO’s inferior competency skills. Giving more 
preference to work knowledge and less attention to soft skills when selecting the 
organisation’s employees showed the CEO’s lack of knowledge on HR selection 
processes.  
 
Table 28: Summary of inability to benefit from the business circle 
 
 
In sum, three factors contributed to Org. A’s inability to network with other business 
leaders, which hindered it benefitting from the business circle. Org. A’s CEO, being new 
to the business world and being a foreigner at the same time, had no previous 
entrepreneurial experience and therefore appeared to lack understanding of the 
entrepreneurial culture. Additionally, the CEO did not attempt to see the benefits of 
networking with other business leaders before becoming an entrepreneur, which has not 
been favourable for Org. A. Lastly, during the employee selection process, giving 
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preference to knowledge over soft skills hindered the hiring of candidates with a mixture 
of knowledge and skills. (6.1) shows these skills from an individual perspective.  
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (5.1) findings showed the 
importance of networking with other business leaders and how it can help small 
organisations (Cronin-Gilmore, 2012), especially if the business owner is a foreigner and 
new to the business world (Bird and Wennberg, 2016). This section also showed that 
networking should not be limited to generate business opportunities (Elfring and Hulsink, 
2003) but should look for every opportunity to expand the network. Lastly, it also showed 
that networking is not limited to the business owner only. Every member of the 
organisation should know how to develop the circle and the benefits that networking can 
generate (Bhide, 1996; Shepherd, Douglas, and Shanley, 2000; Kay, 2004). 
 
The following section (5.2) identifies when an organisation lacks ‘inside’ information and 
how it will be marginalised when attempting to secure government tenders. 
 
 Lack of access to critical information 
Sections’ (4.3.4) and (6.1.3) findings showed that Org. A lacked ‘inside’ information, 
resulting in it being marginalised when attempting to secure government tenders. Org. A 
neglected to devote adequate efforts to discovering enough information on government 
tenders by attending networking events, ‘Majlis’ open houses or even by paying regular 
visits to the government offices. As said by the CEO: “securing a government tender or a 
sub-contract has been a significant challenge for us. A considerable challenge was due 
to ‘inside’ information before the tender is released. Tenders are awarded based on 
personal relationships, paying low attention to project skills or knowledge we can provide.” 
The reasons relating to Org. A’s lack of access to ‘inside’ information when securing a 
government tender or a sub-contract will be shown through this section.  
 
5.2.1. Not taking the initiative to visit the Tender Board  
A key reason for Org. A lacking ‘inside’ information, resulting in it being marginalised when 
attempting to secure government tenders, was due to not taking the initiative to visit the 
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Tender Board regularly. Shown by the CEO’s quote: “we thought that visits to the Tender 
Board were through invitation, and never knew that every organisation had this 
opportunity.” This inability was further evidenced through the OM’s quote: “we do read 
daily newspapers for government tender openings, but we see only limited 
announcements from selected government offices.” All tender announcements may not 
be public, but all tender awards are made public, and the fact that the organisation was 
not aware of this was stated by the OM: “we never knew that government tender 
openings are open to the public.” Not being proactive by visiting the Tender Board 
frequently resulted in Org. A losing critical government tender announcements.  
 
McKinsey and Company, through their online survey sent to 1,167 business leaders 
between 17 and 30 November 2009, showed that government actions impact an 
organisation’s existence (Dua, Heil, and Wilkins, 2010). However, this survey also 
showed that this depends on an organisation’s practice of managing its relationship with 
the government, which is defined as less robust than managing relationships with other 
stakeholders. This survey also showed that the participants were not good at engaging 
with the government, and that even though there were several practices for an 
organisation to manage its relationship with the government, they were not efficiently 
executed, and this was mainly due to the executive’s views on the government offices. 
 
Analogous to the work of Dua, Heil, and Wilkins (2010), this showed that by not visiting 
the Tender Board regularly, Org. A missed critical tender announcements. Aligned with 
these findings, this was partly due to the CEO’s views on government offices, which 
largely contributed towards missing information. However, compared to this survey 
information, Org. A was small and new, and this meant that it was disadvantaged in 
securing government tenders to some extent (4.3.4), but this inability was mainly linked 
to not making the initial attempt to visit and develop a relationship with the Tender Board, 
resulting in it being marginalised when attempting to secure government tenders. 
 
5.2.2. Inability to pre-qualify with the government offices  
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An additional reason for Org. A lacking ‘inside’ information, resulting in it being 
marginalised when attempting to secure government tenders, was not being able to pre-
qualify with the Tender Board or with the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(BCCI). Instead, Org. A’s CEO placed a high level of confidence in expecting only 
professional qualifications or years of practical experience to add value to a tender and 
expected that it would be called in to participate. This high level of confidence has 
resulted, in practice, in not being invited for government tenders. This misplaced 
confidence is heard through the CEO’s quote: “I thought by default, based on our service 
category and employee qualifications, we were by default short-listed as potential 
tenderers. I never knew that organisations must initially register and pre-qualify with 
the Tender Board or Chamber of Commerce and Industry.” Not attempting to qualify as a 
potential tenderer with BTB or BCCI has not been favourable for Org. A in that it did not 
receive government tender information.  
 
Additionally, BCCI’s log-in access allows organisations to evaluate competitors’ past 
tender practices and pricing decisions. By not pre-qualifying, Org. A missed this 
opportunity to learn tender writing skills and tender onboarding strategies. This was 
shown through the OM’s quote: “by not registering with the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, we missed numerous opportunities to study competitor tender pricing 
strategies and tender writing skills.” Neglecting to carry out measures to step into the 
‘tender world’, and instead waiting for ‘inside’ information, was not favourable for Org. A.  
 
Registering through the BCCI system allows small and medium-sized organisations to 
receive the classification certificate and cabinet decisions on government tenders (BCCI, 
2019). Perry (2011) reports that many small organisations can participate in public 
tenders, but fear or ignorance of the process hinders this ability. Also, a lack of awareness 
of and familiarity with government offices’ frameworks are additional challenges for small 
organisations. Time constraints and qualified personnel required to source contracts are 
other drawbacks.  
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Aligned with the work of Perry (2011), by not being pro-active in registering with the BCCI, 
either due to fear or ignorance of the tendering processes, Org. A was being marginalised 
when attempting to secure government tenders. Analogous with the BCCI (2019) 
guidelines, by not registering with the BCCI, Org. A was hindered in receiving cabinet 
decisions on government tender announcements. Added significant factors, similar to the 
findings of Perry (2011), were time constraints and its employees’ lack of experience and 
knowledge on government tenders, hindering its ability to access ‘inside’ information. 
 
5.2.3. Org. A’s inability to meet fellow successful tenderers 
Sections’ (5.1.1) and (5.1.2) findings showed an additional example whereby Org. A 
lacked ‘inside’ information, resulting in it being marginalised when attempting to secure 
government tenders, which was due to not attempting to meet fellow tenderers who had 
won past government tenders. As evidenced by the CEO: “I have heard that there are 
weekly ‘Majlis’ or open houses held by other business leaders. I thought that they were 
accessible by invitation only and were only for local or GCC nationals who speak 
Arabic.” Org. A’s inability to look for information on how to attend these weekly ‘Majlis’ or 
open houses to meet fellow business leaders meant it missed several discussion 
opportunities on past government tenders.  
 
Information received through a tight-knit network carries credibility than when it is 
received from an ‘arm’s length’ point of view (Uzzi, 1999). This saves time and money for 
new organisations (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). Peer learning is an added advantage, 
allowing small business owners to trust their network for support and encouragement to 
overcome obstacles (Pages and Garmise, 2003). 
 
Corresponding with the work of Pages and Garmise (2003), by not attempting to meet 
fellow tenderers who had won past government tenders, tender learning skills for Org. A 
has been a continuous learning journey. Relating to the findings of Uzzi (1999) and Aldrich 
and Zimmer (1986), this has hindered Org. A from receiving credible advice from fellow 
business leaders. Aligned with the work of Pages and Garmise (2003), by not trusting the 
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business network for encouragement and support, Org. A was further marginalised when 
attempting to secure government tenders. 
 
5.2.4. Concluding remarks associated with lack of access to critical information   
In summary, as seen in (Table 29), by not being pro-active in visiting the Tender Board, 
Org. A displayed a lack of practical knowledge. Impression management was evidenced 
by assuming that organisations by default were short-listed as potential tenderers (self-
efficacy). Neglecting to register with the government offices as a potential tenderer once 
again showed a lack of practical knowledge to meet the conditions for government 
tendering. Additional findings were that a lack of skills prevented it benefitting from the 
business circle (competency skills).  
 
Table 29: Summary of lack of access to critical information 
 
 
In summary, four factors contributed to Org. A missing ‘inside’ information, resulting in it 
being marginalised when attempting to secure government tenders. Firstly, Org. A did not 
attempt to visit the Tender Board regularly. Furthermore, by not pre-qualifying with the 
Tender Board and Chamber of Commerce, Org. A did miss receiving government tender 
announcements. Moreover, neglecting to see the benefits of learning from fellow 
successful tenderers prevented Org. A from learning the tender culture. Lastly, the CEO’s 
inability to spend enough effort in attending weekly ‘Majlis’ of other business leaders did 
not generate positive results for Org. A. This collective evidence hindered Org. A having 
access to critical information, resulting in it being marginalised when attempting to secure 
government tenders.  
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The core advancements in thinking brought about by (5.2) findings showed several 
factors contributing to why an organisation would be marginalised when securing 
government tenders. One primary reason was neglecting to visit the primary government 
offices that publish tender announcements (Dua, Heil, and Wilkins, 2010; Perry, 2011; 
BCCI, 2019). The next reason was neglecting to learn from fellow tenderers (Aldrich and 
Zimmer, 1986; Uzzi, 1999; Pages and Garmise, 2003), especially if you are new to the 
business and tender worlds. Another way to learn tender culture was from the business 
circle (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Uzzi, 1999; Pages and Garmise, 2003). 
 
The next section (5.3) shows that when an organisation neglects to benefit from external 
financial support, this will threaten its survival and sustainability. 
 
 Inability to benefit from external financial support 
Neglecting to weigh the benefits of external financial support has not been favourable for 
Org. A. In order to survive and sustain itself, having external financial support, at least 
until the economic situation improves, is important. (4.2.1) showed this importance 
through (Figure 22). However, Org. A’s CEO saw external financial support as a burden, 
evidencing: “in this economic crisis we are reluctant to apply for loans, fearing 
payback.” With a disruptive business pipeline and an economic crisis, fearing payback, 
Org. A saw no benefit of asking for external financial support. This section addresses 
other reasons behind this inability to recognise such benefit.  
 
5.3.1. Lack of support given to foreign-owned organisations 
One reason for Org. A being unable to realise the benefits of external financial support to 
sustain itself and survive, as addressed through (4.2.2), was presuming because it is 
foreign-owned that Tamkeen will discriminate when extending help. As heard from the 
CEO: “being 100% foreign-owned, we are not sure we will receive fair treatment in 
getting our loans approved.” With not having collateral assets in the form of vehicles, 
land, or equipment, Org. A feared applying for loans (4.3.3). This was shown through the 
CEO’s quote: “with our limited collateral assets, meeting payback prevented us from 
seeking external financial support.” Org. A presumed that being foreign-owned and 
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having limited collateral assets prevented it from benefitting from Tamkeen’s support to 
survive and sustain itself.  
 
Small organisations, compared to bigger organisations, are unable to meet with higher 
disclosure needs for equity, loans, and bonds. Higher interest rates on loans also worry 
small organisations (Saxena, 2017). They feel trapped, as any earnings or profits made 
are re-invested on loan repayment, leaving no savings for the future. Fragile collateral 
matters often challenge SMEs with credit regulating challenges and complex interest 
rates (Alrabeei and Kasi, 2014).  
 
Section (4.3.3) findings showed that no discriminatory practices were hindering foreign-
owned organisations benefitting from Tamkeen’s support. However, analogous to the 
work of Alrabeei and Kasi (2014), Org. A presumed that by being foreign-owned and with 
limited collateral assets, the government would discriminate against it in not approving its 
loans. Aligned with the findings of Saxena (2017), since Org. A did not ask for loans, there 
were no discussions based on high interest rates or complex loan application processes. 
 
5.3.2. Org. A’s inability to benefit from Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring  
An additional reason for Org. A’s inability to benefit from Tamkeen’s financial support was 
not seeing the value of Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring, as addressed through 
(4.2.6). This was shown by the CEO’s quote: “we thought that Tamkeen’s coaching and 
mentoring workshops were for locally-owned or for big organisations”. By assuming that 
Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring workshops were only for locally-owned 
organisations, Org. A did not benefit from guidance extended on loan support. 
 
Skills transfer and training in business acumen through mentoring and coaching is 
essential for small and medium-sized organisations (Van Coller-Peter and Cronjé, 2020). 
Despite the similarities between coaching and mentoring, both contribute towards the 
development of the organisation. Bell (2014) says that for business owners who lack 
external learning, coaching is an ideal platform to unlock the learning ability. One potential 
benefit of coaching is its ability to create a learning context that prepares entrepreneurs 
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to look for quick solutions while also solving the problem and any future ones on their own 
(Audet and Couteret, 2012). 
 
5.3.3. Concluding remarks related to Org. A’s inability to benefit from external 
financial support 
(Table 30) shows that Org. A feared risks associated with government loans (self-
efficacy). Assuming that the government will be discriminatory as Org. A is foreign-owned 
showed a lack of knowledge on impression management (self-efficacy). These 
assumptions revealed a lack of subject domain knowledge on government matters. 
Neglecting to benefit from Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring once again showed a lack 
of subject domain knowledge on government matters.  
 
Table 30: Summary of inability to benefit from external financial help 
 
 
In summary, two factors triggered Org. A to not benefit from external financial support. 
One reason was presuming that as Org. A is foreign-owned, with no collateral assets in 
its favour, it neglected to ask for Tamkeen’s help. An additional inability was failing to 
seek Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring given to the industry, which hindered guidance 
on loan applications.  
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (5.3) findings showed the benefits 
of seeking external financial support in an economic crisis. The consequences of 
presuming that funding organisations would favour specific sectors and neglecting to visit 
them in person will not be favourable for an organisation (Alrabeei and Kasi (2014). This 
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section also showed the benefits of coaching and mentoring, and how it can help 
organisations benefit from external financial support in an economic crisis (Audet and 
Couteret, 2012; Bell, 2014: Van Coller-Peter and Cronjé, 2020). 
 
The next section (5.4) shows the consequences of an organisation’s inability to amend 
its business plan in an economic crisis. 
 
 Neglecting to amend the business plan in line with the economic setting 
By not amending its business plan in line with the economic setting, Org. A experienced 
loss of sales and profits. Therefore, the question lies in why Org. A has not amended its 
business plan in line with the economic setting, which is addressed through the following 
sections. 
 
5.4.1. Org. A’s inability to amend its business plan in line with the economic 
setting 
One reason for Org. A’s inability to amend its business plan in line with the economic 
setting was due to its lack of knowledge on how to diversify and reduce risks. Org. A 
began its operations in Bahrain in 2008, and in that year, Org. A secured two large 
government projects that ensured work for five to seven years. In hindsight, the leadership 
realised that this strategy did not consider an economic crisis as can be seen by the 
CEO’s quote: “government projects were our main income pipeline to secure our 
sustainability for a lengthy period.” This resulted in Org. A being too dependent on 
government projects and neglecting to pay adequate attention to private sector customers 
when drafting its business plan. 
 
(Figure 23) and (Figure 24) showed that winning a big customer at an early stage of a 
business is a big boost for a small organisation. An early success gives much-needed 
financial stability and promotes the organisation’s reputation. However, such a boost 
carries its drawbacks as well; the eagerness to ‘win big’ overlooks the potential damages 
of relying on one or a few clients (Khosla, 2012). Over-dependence on a single client can 
mean an organisation is just one step away from disaster (Spence, 2015). Truesdell 
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(2017) highlights that during a loss of market share or sensing a competitor strategy, an 
organisation must seriously consider revising its business plan.  
 
Aligned with Khosla’s (2012) and Spence’s (2015) findings, winning government projects 
at an early stage gave Org. A the much-needed security towards its initial success. This 
over-reliance neglected to identify the concerns associated with an over-dependence on 
a single customer. The initial success Org. A achieved by winning government projects 
meant that it failed to identify the risks of not growing its customer base beyond 
government customers. Analogous to the findings of Truesdell (2017), by over-relying on 
government projects and not incorporating mandatory components into its business plan 
and by not expanding its client base beyond government projects, Org. A experienced 
significant risks when the government stalled its projects. 
 
5.4.2. Org. A’s inability to explore the consequences with an early expansion 
beyond Bahrain 
An added reason for Org. A’s inability to amend its business plan in line with the economic 
setting was due to a lack of knowledge on how to diversify and reduce risks before 
expanding into Saudi Arabia. As heard from the CEO: “having secured government 
projects at an early stage gave us the confidence to look beyond Bahrain, and through 
this mind-set, within two years, we expanded our wings to Saudi Arabia.” A lack of 
knowledge and neglecting to amend its business plan in line with the economic setting 
meant Org. A was unable to consider the risks associated with an early expansion.  
 
Furthermore, expansion plans within two years beyond Bahrain were not in the initial 
business plan, and this was seen from the CEO’s quote: “keeping the initial success in 
mind of having secured government projects in Bahrain, we were eager to move to Saudi 
Arabia.” However, it took time to realise that not having carried out a feasibility study 
before moving to Saudi Arabia was a miscalculation on Org. A’s part, and this is 
evidenced by the CEO: “we should have carried out a market survey before we moved 
to Saudi Arabia.” Org. A was unable to carry out a feasibility study before moving into 
Saudi Arabia, which placed further strains on its operating costs.  
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Corresponding with Khosla’s (2012) and Truesdell’s (2017) findings, winning government 
projects at an early stage encouraged Org. A to expand into Saudi Arabia. However, 
similar to Spence’s (2015) findings, neglecting to carry out a feasibility study before 
moving into Saudi Arabia and revise its business plan in line with the economic setting 
further strained Org. A’s operating costs. 
 
5.4.3. Hiring new employees during an economic slow down  
One other added reason for Org. A’s inability to amend its business plan in line with the 
economic setting was due to its lack of knowledge on how to diversify and reduce risks 
by hiring new employees to its Saudi Arabia’s office (6.2.2). Evident from the CEO’s 
quote: “hiring new employees to our Saudi Arabia’s office took a heavy toll on our 
operating costs.” By not weighing the risks associated and hiring employees during an 
economic crisis before moving to Saudi Arabia and revising the business plan in line with 
the economic setting, this has placed a significant constraint on Org. A’s operating costs.  
 
Aligned with Spence’s (2015) and Truesdell’s (2017) findings, not amending its business 
plan in line with the economic setting and hiring new employees for its Saudi Arabia’s 
office during an economic crisis placed significant constraints on Org. A’s operating costs.  
 
5.4.4. Concluding remarks relating to neglecting to amend the business plan in 
line with the economic setting 
(Table 31) and (4.3.1) findings show that by being too dependent on government projects 
and due to its lack of knowledge on how to diversify and reduce risks, Org. A neglected 
to pay adequate attention to private sector customers when drafting its business plan. 
This showed a lack of strategic knowledge (competency skills) needed to revise a 
business plan in line with the economic setting.  
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Table 31: Summary of business plan not aligned with the economic setting 
 
 
In conclusion, three factors prevented Org. A from revising its business plan. The first 
reason was over-dependence on government projects and the inability to look at the 
consequences of over-reliance on a single customer and not expanding the customer 
base beyond government projects. Furthermore, not seeing the consequences of 
expanding into Saudi Arabia during an economic crisis further constrained Org. A’s 
operating costs. Lastly, hiring new employees for the Saudi Arabia office and neglecting 
to consider the associated risks of not having a steady income pipeline further constrained 
its operating costs. 
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (5.4) findings showed that 
neglecting to seek customers beyond government projects and depending on a single 
large customer is one step away from disaster (Khosla, 2012; Spence, 2015; Truesdell, 
2017). The importance of drawing up a feasibility plan before an expansion, especially 
during an economic crisis, is mandatory (Spence, 2015). This section also showed the 
consequences of rushing into opening new offices in an economic crisis and that hiring 
new employees would impact an organisation’s operating costs (Spence, 2015; Truesdell, 
2017). 
 
The next section (5.5) shows the consequences of neglecting to react to an economic 
crisis.  
 
 Neglecting to react to the crisis  
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By neglecting to respond to the crisis, Org. A was unable to identify the risks associated 
with operating in an economic crisis. Therefore, the question, as similarly addressed in 
(5.4), is, why did Org. A neglect to react to the economic crisis? This is seen from multiple 
aspects.  
 
5.5.1. Neglecting to calculate the underlying costs associated with an early 
expansion 
One reason for Org. A’s inability to respond to the economic crisis was due to its lack of 
knowledge to calculate the costs associated with an early expansion. This inability, as 
shown through (5.4.2) and (5.4.3) findings, of not seeing the consequences of an early 
expansion and hiring new employees for its Saudi Arabia’s office showed the inability to 
identify underlying risks with an early expansion (5.4.3). As heard through the CEO’s 
quote: “within two years of starting our business in Bahrain, we expanded our wings to 
Saudi Arabia.” Another neglected area was hiring new employees for its Saudi Arabia’s 
office: “we hired new employees to our Saudi Arabia’s office.” By neglecting to react to 
the economic crisis, and deciding to move into Saudi Arabia, Org. A failed to address the 
risks associated with an early expansion.  
 
In good times, risk is often overlooked (Simons, 1999). Optimism grows when markets 
grow, leading to higher returns. Organisations are eager to hire new employees and 
enhance the scale of opportunities for growth. However, it is in good times that managers 
need to be watchful for approaching dangers. These times have a mysterious way of 
setting an organisation up for trouble. These hidden risks are not only external sources, 
regulators, or competitors, but can be within the organisation itself. Simons (1999) further 
explains how the risk exposure calculator identifies the pressure points of an organisation 
to quantify the increased risks. This calculator identifies the level of international 
competition and the operational expansion speed. Based on an organisation’s 
management style and environment, the amount of pressure on each point can either be 
low or high. A high score indicates that the organisation is exposed to higher levels of 
risks, requiring immediate remedial actions.  
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Aligned with Simons’ (1999) work, by having only considered the market growth and being 
eager to hire new employees when moving into Saudi Arabia, Org. A neglected to 
evaluate the pressure points before such a move. This resulted in overlooking the need 
to calculate the underlying risks related to an early expansion.  
 
5.5.2. Org. A’s inability to adopt a course of action to minimise damaging 
influences  
Analysing chapters (4) and (5) findings, they showed that Org. A’s CEO’s lack of 
knowledge resulted in it failing to adopt a course of action to minimise the negative impact 
of an economic crisis, which is discussed through this section.  
 
One reason for Org. A not adopting a course of action to minimise damaging influences 
was due to its lack of knowledge to address the drop in oil prices in its business plan 
(Ulhaq, 2017). Instead of addressing this key element, Org. A presumed that the oil prices 
in 2008 would remain unchanged and it did not consider alternative options if there are 
future drops in oil prices. This meant that Org. A projected that the business was growing, 
but in reality, and as shown in (4.1.1), the drop in oil prices contributed to revenue losses. 
 
An additional reason for Org. A not adopting a course of action to minimise damaging 
influences was due to its lack of knowledge to balance the operating costs when client 
payments were late. As a business owner, and as discussed in (4.1.3), Org. A’s CEO’s 
inability to understand that late payments were a cultural norm (Fahy, 2017, Young, 2018) 
and neglecting to implement a holistic plan on how it can absorb the impact when 
payments are late further constrained its operating costs. 
 
One other reason for Org. A not adopting a course of action to minimise damaging 
influences was due to its lack of knowledge regarding identifying the risks when 
government projects are withdrawn or stalled (BNA, 2015; MEED, 2018). This meant that 
Org. A overlooked the risks of not building a customer base beyond government projects 
when it was stable with such projects. Over-dependence and the inability to expand the 
customer base beyond government projects, as shown in (4.3.1), meant Org. A neglected 
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to identify the influence of the government deciding to stall large and new infrastructure 
projects worth over US$350–400 million. This inability to calculate the associated risks 
and over-dependence on government projects severely disrupted its primary income. 
 
Lastly, a further area overlooked by Org. A in not adopting a course of action to minimise 
influences was due to its lack of knowledge in being able to identify how it could continue 
with declining operating cost. This inability, as shown in (4.3.2), was due to Org. A’s CEO 
presuming that Tamkeen’s support was only for locally-owned or large organisations, thus 
not realising that Tamkeen supports all organisations regardless of ownership and size. 
This added further constraints to its operating costs. 
 
In an economic crisis, small businesses must pay closer attention to crisis management 
efforts (Herbane, 2010). By not adopting a course of action in challenging times, 80% of 
small businesses go out of business within two years of a challenging event (Penrose, 
2000). However, organisations with good crisis management plans recover twice as 
quickly as organisations without a plan (Fink, 1986). A survey by the Bank of Scotland in 
2003 across the UK showed that two million small businesses were not prepared to deal 
with natural or criminal disasters. Another study across 1,000 SME owner-managers said 
49% of organisations did not have a crisis management plan in place to deal with threats. 
A study by AXA claimed 46% of organisations did not consider having a plan to deal with 
an economic crisis (The Economist, 2005). Moreover, a survey by the Chartered 
Management Institute (CMI) across small organisations in the UK found that only 40% of 
organisations had a business continuity plan, showing a proactive desire to address 
recovery efforts in an economic crisis (Woodman, 2006).  
 
Aligned with Penrose’s (2000) and The Economist’s (2005) findings, by not addressing 
the underlying challenges associated with an economic crisis, Org. A neglected to 
address the destructive influences. Similar to the findings of Woodman (2006) and Fink 
(1986), overlooking the fundamental aspects of implementing a crisis management plan 
to address the underlying challenges of an economic crisis, and moving into a new 
territory, has placed severe constraints on Org. A.  
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(Table 32) shows Org. A’s inability to investigate the means of operating in an economic 
crisis, and this showed a lack of strategic knowledge in neglecting to react to such a crisis. 
The inability to adopt a course of action to minimise the influence showed a lack of 
knowledge in executing such a plan.  
 
Table 32: Summary of neglecting to react to the crisis 
 
 
5.5.3. Concluding remarks associated with neglecting to react to the crisis  
In summary, several factors showed Org. A’s inability to react to the economic crisis. 
Firstly, by not responding to the economic crisis in a timely manner, Org. A did not 
calculate the underlying risks associated with an early expansion. (4.1.1) findings showed 
that by assuming that the oil prices in 2008 would remain unchanged and neglecting to 
consider the June 2014 drop in oil prices in its business plan, Org. A failed to show its 
actual revenue losses. An additional underlying challenge was not implementing a holistic 
strategy to address how it could absorb the influence of overdue client payments. One 
other reason was over-dependence on government projects and neglecting to calculate 
the risks associated when government projects are withdrawn, and not attempting to 
expand the client base beyond government customers. Lastly, not seeking Tamkeen’s 
help to sustain itself and presuming that such help is only for locally-owned and big 
organisations hindered its progress. 
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (5.5) findings showed several 
influences of neglecting to react to the crisis. Timely response to an economic crisis is 
mandatory (Fink; 1986; Herbane, 2000; Penrose, 2000; The Economist, 2005; Woodman, 
2006). This section also showed the extent of calculating underlying risks in an expansion 
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(Simons, 1999). Likewise, the section also demonstrated the importance of considering 
cyclical crises (Ulhaq, 2017) when drafting business plans and that neglecting to do so 
will result in false information (Penrose, 2000; The Economist, 2005; Woodman, 2006). 
This section also showed how vital it is to imply a holistic strategy to absorb the impact of 
overdue client payments (Fahy, 2017, Young, 2018). An additional finding was the 
consequences of neglecting to calculate the risks associated with government projects 
being withdrawn (BNA, 2015; MEED, 2018). Finally, this section also showed that an 
organisation must approach the primary funding organisations until the situation improves 
(A'Ali, 2017; Saxena, 2017). 
 
This section ends by summarising the overall findings (5.6) shown in this chapter. 
 
 Chapter summary 
The overall findings of this chapter as shown through (Table 33) were that Org. A scored 
low on strategic and practical knowledge. A lack of subject domain knowledge was 
observed as well. Skills and knowledge showed low competencies. Impression 
management was observed, especially on government matters. Fear of uncertainty and 
fear of risks were also felt during the discussions. Overall findings from (5.1) to (5.5) are 
summarised through this section. Summarised paragraphs below onwards (n) indicate a 
point alongside each key competency. 
 
Table 33: Overall summary of organisational knowledge, competency skills, and self-efficacy 
 
 
Identifying what Org. A lacked showed that it had less ‘inside’ information, resulting in it 
being marginalised when attempting to secure government tenders. It also showed that 
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one reason for not securing government tenders was due to not taking the initiative to 
visit the Tender Board (n=1=practical knowledge). Another reason for not securing 
government tenders was Org. A’s CEO placing a high level of confidence in expecting 
only professional qualifications would add value to win a government tender 
(n=1=impression management), and this resulted in not qualifying with the relevant 
government offices (n=1=practical knowledge). Lastly, an additional reason for not 
securing government was neglecting to seek advice from fellow tenderers who have won 
past tenders, and this inability further marginalised Org. A when attempting to acquire 
government tenders (n=1=competency skills). 
  
Fear of risks (n=1=fear of risks), (n=1=fear of uncertainty), (n=1=feelings of failure) 
associated with government loans prevented Org. A asking for Tamkeen’s support 
(n=1=accurate self-evaluation). One other reason not to ask for Tamkeen’s financial 
support was Org. A presuming that as it is foreign-owned, Tamkeen would discriminate 
against it (n=1=impression management). An added inability was neglecting to benefit 
from Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring, which would have guided Org. A to apply for 
loans (n=1=subject domain knowledge). 
 
Likewise, Org. A’s CEO’s lack of knowledge (n=1=knowledge) meant that it did not revise 
its business plan (n=1=knowledge) to diversify and reduce risks (n=1=strategic 
knowledge) in an economic crisis. Furthermore, the CEO’s lack of knowledge 
(n=1=knowledge) resulted in not identifying the risks before expanding into Saudi Arabia 
(n=1=strategic knowledge). An added risk was hiring employees for Saudi Arabia’s office 
(n=1=strategic knowledge) in an economic crisis.  
 
Lastly, (5.4) and (5.5) findings showed that Org. A’s CEO’s lack of knowledge 
(n=1=knowledge) meant that it did not react to an economic crisis to minimise risks. A 
further reason for the failure to react was neglecting to calculate the underlying challenges 
in an economic crisis; it was eager to move into Saudi Arabia and hire new employees as 
well (n=1=strategic knowledge) and (n=1=lack of self-confidence). Another finding due to 
Org. A’s CEO’s lack of knowledge meant Org. A’s inability to absorb the drop in oil prices 
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in its business plan (n=1=practical knowledge). One important finding was Org. A’s over-
dependence on government projects, neglecting to expand its client base beyond 
government projects (n=1=strategic knowledge). Lastly, by not reacting to the economic 
crisis, Org. A neglected to address the declining operating costs or identify ways to survive 
and sustain itself (n=1=strategic knowledge).  
 
The next chapter addresses how organisational knowledge, competencies, and self-
efficacies within Org. A’s leadership hindered it from being prepared to respond to the 
economic crisis.   
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 Chapter 6: Identifying Organisational Knowledge, Leadership 
Competencies and Self-efficacies within the leadership  
The findings in chapter (5) showed that the observed problems in Org. A seem to relate 
to a certain lack of organisational knowledge, competencies or self-efficacies. This 
chapter therefore will analyse further how organisational knowledge, competencies and 
self-efficacies within the organisation’s leadership hindered Org. A from being prepared 
to respond to the economic crisis.  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. (6.1) discusses organisational knowledge from 
the Org. A’s CEO’s perspective, and (6.2) addresses leadership competencies and self-
efficacies within the leadership.  
 
 Organisational knowledge from Org. A CEO’s perspective  
(Figure 4) analysed chapter (5) findings relating to organisational knowledge and is 
summarised in (2.4). A summary of organisational knowledge traits compiled into one 
chart is shown through (Table 34). Findings from chapters (4) and (5) showed an absence 
of strategic, practical, and subject domain knowledges within Org. A. There were no 
findings relating to absence of people, theoretical and process knowledge. Once this was 
done, the leader core competencies set alongside the OECD competency framework as 
shown through (Figure 5) helped to analyse the chapter (6) findings as shown through 
(Figure 27). Then (Table 1), (Table 2) and (Table 3) interpreted the key indicators of each 
key competency, as shown through parentheses in (6.1.1), (6.1.2), (6.2.1) and (6.2.2). 
This was followed by further strengthening the findings using (Figure 4) and (Figure 13), 
as shown through parentheses in (6.2.3). 
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Table 34: Summary of organisational knowledge traits 
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Figure 27: Organisational knowledge findings summarised using the OECD competency framework 
 
Source: OECD (2014, p.4) 
 
6.1.1. Absence of Org. A’s CEO’s knowledge in strategic planning in business 
strategies 
The findings showed that the absence of Org. A’s CEO’s knowledge in strategic planning 
has been a significant challenge for the organisation. The findings of (4.3.1) and (5.4.1) 
showed a lack of strategic planning knowledge from the CEO’s perspective once it comes 
to the business model. Likewise, (5.2.3), (5.4.2), (5.4.3), (5.5.1) and (5.5.2) findings 
showed  that the CEO’s contribution on strategic planning was also lacking once it comes 
to the business plan. 
 
Additionally, findings from (4.3.1) and (5.4.1) showed that the absence of the CEO’s 
strategic planning for not being rational in responding to internal and external challenges 
(be visionary) were due to the CEO’s lack of flexible thinking (flexible thinking) (OECD, 
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2014). Likewise, the absence of the CEO’s strategic planning knowledge to recognise the 
level of influence applied with an organisational setting, as discussed in (5.2.3), (5.4.2), 
(5.4.3), (5.5.1) and (5.5.2), was due to the CEO’s lack of analytical thinking (analytical 
thinking).   
 
Lack of adequate attention to strategic planning places an organisation at risk (Berry, 
1998). To stay ahead of turbulent times, business leaders “must actively plan for the 
future” (Ennis, 1998, p.54). Business leaders who abide by quick strategies enforce quick 
actions to grow the organisation (Jabbar and Hussein, 2017). These actions act as 
gateways to produce higher average results and strategic competitiveness. A business 
leader with a strategic vision thinks and plans to respond to challenges.  
 
By not actively planning when it was stable with government projects, as endorsed by 
Ennis (1998), Org. A’s CEO neglected to adopt a long-term vision for the organisation. 
Similar to the work of Berry (1998), not having a strategic plan resulted in hindering Org. 
A’s growth, and this placed Org. A at risk. Aligned with the work of Jabbar and Hussein 
(2017), by neglecting to adopt a strategic vision for the organisation, the CEO was unable 
to reduce the risks responding to the economic crisis.  
 
Executives must plan to execute the strategies to move the organisation in the right 
direction (Hrebiniak, 2005). Noble (1999, p.119) sees strategy implementation as a 
“relatively straightforward operationalisation of a clearly articulated strategic plan”, or it 
can be “the total of the activities and choices required for the execution of a strategic plan” 
(Wheelen and Hunger, 2006, p.214). For a well-articulated strategy, as defined through 
(Figure 28), Čater and Pučko (2010) propose four frequently identified strategies: 
planning, organising, leadership, and controlling activities. 
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Figure 28: Overview of key activities for effective strategy execution 
 
Source: Adapted from Čater and Pučko (2010, p.212) 
 
6.1.2. Absence of Org. A’s CEO’s practical knowledge with its external 
stakeholders 
The findings also showed that the absence of Org. A’s CEO’s practical knowledge had 
been an additional challenge for Org. A. The findings from (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) showed the 
CEO lacked practical knowledge when dealing with government offices. Additionally, 
findings from (4.1.3) and (4.1.4) further showed the absence of the CEO’s practical 
knowledge on local business culture.  
 
Additionally, (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) findings showed that the absence of the leader’s practical 
knowledge of managing relationships with its key external stakeholders, which generate 
a long-term relationship, was due to the CEO’s lack of knowledge on strategic networking 
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(strategic networking) (OECD, 2014). The inability to influence customers to consider 
challenging tasks and act, accordingly, as discussed in (4.1.3) showed a lack of the CEO’s 
practical knowledge on client focus (client focus) (OECD, 2014). The CEO’s practical 
knowledge on client focus (client focus) was once again observed in the (4.1.4) findings, 
with the CEO’s inability to influence the community using personal reputation (OECD, 
2014). 
 
Findings from (Figure 6) and (2.4.2) showed that organisations take less interest in 
managing relationships with the government and were less robust when compared with 
other stakeholders (Dua, Hail and Wilkins, 2010). This inability places an organisation’s 
operating income at risk. However, as shown through (Figure 7), government actions help 
organisations to develop infrastructure and provide capital to mitigate some of the 
negativity. Government’s laws and policies often generate an overall negative impact on 
an organisation; however, instead of increasing shareholder returns, business leaders 
should liaise with the government regularly (Reich, 2014). Instead of using the 
government to gain sympathetic treatment over competitors, the new norm is to engage, 
not shield. (Table 35) adapted using Oppenheimer (2015) and Ireland’s findings which 
show key activities for efficient practical execution.  
 
Similar to Dua, Hail and Wilkins’ (2010) findings, by not being proactive in managing its 
relationship with the government, Org. A’s CEO lost opportunities to access critical 
government information. Additionally, by not being pro-active in managing a client-
focused relationship with its stakeholders, the CEO missed information on local business 
culture. Corresponding with Reich (2014)’s findings, it was observed that the CEO visiting 
the government offices only at the time of forming Org. A, and not thereafter, has not been 
favourable for the organisaiton.  
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Table 35: Overview of key activities for effective practical execution 
 
Source: Adapted from Oppenheimer (2015) and Ireland (2019) 
 
6.1.3. Absence of Org. A’s CEO’s knowledge on subject domain knowledge on 
government activities 
Further findings showed that the absence of subject domain knowledge had been an 
additional challenge for Org. A. Findings from (4.3.3), (4.3.4), (5.3.15.3.1) and (5.3.2) 
showed that the CEO’s lack of subject domain knowledge on government matters had 
been a significant challenge for Org. A.  
 
Findings from (4.3.3), (4.3.4), (5.3.15.3.1) and (5.3.2) showed that the absence of subject 
domain knowledge was due to the CEO’s inability to build a strategic networking 
relationship with its key government offices (OECD, 2014). This inability has resulted in 
Org. A losing critical tender information. The inability to build a relationship with the 
government offices was partly due to the CEO not being pro-active and blaming the 
government offices for being discriminatory (Spencer and Spencer, 1993; Nolan, 1998). 
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Even though there was evidence of government malpractices in some instances, the 
CEO’s subjugated attitude on government offices and its working styles, presuming that 
every tender carried hidden clauses, hindered Org. A from having access to vital tender 
information (Spencer and Spencer, 1993; Dua, Hail and Wilkins, 2011).  
 
McKinsey and Company, through their online survey sent to 1,167 business leaders, 
show that today’s business leaders interact much less with government offices compared 
to 2009. Regulators and government offices are second only to customers and play an 
influential role in an organisation’s economic value. Developing country business leaders 
saw a good relationship built with the government offices significantly decreased its 
operating income. (Figure 29) shows ways an organisation should engage with 
government offices.  
 
Figure 29: Room for engagement 
 
Source: Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2011, p.5) 
 
Analogous to McKinsey and Company’s (2011) findings, Org. A’s CEO, by not proactively 
engaging with the government offices and neglecting to build a robust networking 
relationship with its key government offices, missed Org. A having access to key 
information. Additionally, similar to McKinsey and Company’s (2011) findings, the findings 
of (2.4.3) and ( 
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Figure 12) showed that by not being pro-active and building a relationship with the 
government, but instead blaming it for not being transparent, Org. A’s CEO displayed 
avoider qualities.  
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by findings in (6.1) identified that a lack 
of adequate planning when responding to an economic crisis places the organisation at 
risk (Berry, 1998). Business leaders who impose remedial steps in a crisis (Ennis, 1998) 
are likely to experience less damages than those who neglect to set such steps (Jabbar 
and Hussein, 2017). Planning comes from the leadership (Noble, 1999; Hrebiniak, 2005), 
and leaders who lack the knowledge in strategic planning is a significant challenge for the 
organisation (Jabbar and Hussein, 2017). Furthermore, having a strategic plan is not 
beneficial if it is not communicated and implemented amongst its key players (Hrebiniak, 
2005; Wheelen and Hunger, 2006). Strategic knowledge is a collective element learned 
through practice and collective knowledge from key external stakeholders, either through 
government offices or the business circle (Dua, Hail and Wilkins, 2010; Reich, 2014). This 
section also identified the importance of recognising the government’s role and laws and 
policies that impact the organisation (Dua, Hail and Wilkins, 2010). Instead of using the 
government to receive sympathetic treatment, regularly engaging with them helps identify 
executing practical strategies towards an organisation’s benefit (McKinsey and Company, 
2011; Reich, 2014). 
 
6.1.4. Concluding remarks associated with organisational knowledge from Org. 
A’s CEO’s perspective 
Three factors from the CEO’s perspective contributed to Org. A’s organisational 
knowledge neglecting to take the organisation forward. By not actively planning when it 
was stable with government projects, the CEO neglected to prepare a long-term strategy 
for Org. A. Additionally, by not being pro-active, the CEO neglected to build a strategic 
relationship with its key external stakeholders. Instead of being pro-active in managing 
healthy relationships with key government offices, the CEO blamed the government 
offices for not being transparent, resulting in not having access to vital information. 




(Table 36) shows that the CEO’s lack of flexible thinking prevented it from responding to 
internal and external challenges. Additionally, the CEO’s lack of analytical thinking 
neglected to identify the level of influx applied towards the organisation. Likewise, the 
CEO’s lack of knowledge on strategic networking neglected to build a long-term 
relationship with its key external stakeholders and this inability neglected to influence its 
clients.  
 
Table 36: Summary of organisational knowledge from Org. A CEO’s perspective 
 
 
 Leadership competencies and self-efficacies within Org. A’s leadership  
This DBA research also discovered that an absence of leadership competencies within 
Org. A’s leadership has been a significant challenge for the organisation. The findings 
showed, for example, that there was a lack of leadership skills when working with external 
stakeholders (5.2.3), as well as a lack of leadership knowledge in employee selection 
(5.1.3). However, as (Table 37) shows, there were no findings on absence of self-concept, 
traits, and motives within the leadership. Additionally, leader self-efficacy characteristics 
from the leader’s perspective are shown through (Table 38).  
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Table 37: Summary of missing leadership competencies 
 
 
Table 38: Summary of leader self-efficacy characteristics from the leader’s perspective 
 
 
6.2.1. Absence of Org. A CEO’s competency skills dealing with external 
stakeholders   
Findings from (5.2.3) showed that due to the CEO’s absence of competency skills (critical 
analysis and problem-solving skills), the CEO neglected to seek and recognise advice 
from the business circle on important business matters, and this was due to a lack of 
analytical thinking (analytical thinking) (OECD, 2014). An additional inability due to the 
CEO’s absence of competency skills was neglecting to identify a plan of directions to 
communicate (communication skills) its needs and strategic guidelines (strategic thinking) 
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OECD, 2014). Likewise, the inability to manage a strategic networking relationship 
(strategic networking) with its key government offices to build a long-term relationship 
was also due to Org. A’s CEO’s absence of competency skills, as shown through (6.1.2) 
and (6.1.3) findings. 
 
Less active and less prepared business leaders neglect to benefit from other business 
leaders. This inability is not due to the leader’s limited knowledge, but due to the lack of 
ability to seek the right information (Cooper, Folta and Woo, 1995). This prevents the 
business leader from playing an active role in assessing the organisation’s strengths and 
weaknesses to identify corrective steps. However, this inability seems to be quite 
common among less experienced business leaders who seek less information or operate 
in less familiar domains (Spencer and Spencer, 1993). (Figure 30) shows how an 
organisation can engage with its external stakeholders. Networking events are helpful 
platforms for small business owners to see how other business owners build their market 
segment strategies (Spencer and Spencer, 1993). Information shared through networking 
events are useful sources for competitiveness (Cronin-Gilmore, 2012). Org. A’s CEO, 
being less active and less prepared, was not able to seek the right information from the 
business circle. 
 
Analogous to Cooper, Folta and Woo’s (1995) findings, by not being proactive in engaging 
and building a healthy relationship with its business circle, Org. A’s CEO missed many 
learning opportunities, and this was shown through (6.1.2) and (6.1.3) findings.  
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Figure 30: Networking behaviour based on leader’s perspective  
 
Source: Zheng, Ahsan and DeNoble (2019, p.9) 
 
6.2.2. Absence of Org. A’s CEO’s knowledge competencies dealing with 
employees  
Findings from (5.1.3) showed that due to the CEO’s lack of knowledge competencies, 
Org. A neglected to identify areas for improvement. Due to inadequate leader focus on 
organisational achievements (achievement focus), this hindered Org. A from making 
employees responsible for translating business opportunities into goals (OECD, 2014). 
Likewise, setting and redefining priorities and the inability to increase employees’ 
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responsiveness to the organisation’s external and internal challenges (organisational 
alignment) showed the CEO’s lack of knowledge competencies in managing resources 
(managing resources) (OECD, 2014). An additional obstacle due to the CEO’s absence 
of knowledge competencies, which neglected to communicate its decisions and hold its 
team accountable for agreed commitments, was due to the CEO’s lack of knowledge in 
managing a team (managing resources) (OECD, 2014).  
 
Similarly, due to the CEO’s absence of knowledge competencies, they neglected to 
develop talent (developing talent) with due authority and neglected to direct their 
employees to take ownership to carry out job responsibilities (OECD, 2014). An additional 
challenge due to the CEO’s absence of knowledge competencies was neglecting to 
develop a strategic direction for the organisation and holding the team to account for its 
development (teamwork and team leadership) (OECD, 2014). 
 
The most complex, time-consuming, and cost-functional aspect of HR planning is 
Recruitment and Selection (R&S) (Chanda, Bansal and Chanda, 2010). When R&S 
strategies are not aligned with the organisation structure, processes and systems, 
reaching organisational goals is never a possibility (Johnson and Scholes, 1999). A well-
defined job description linked to a suitable selection method makes hiring successful 
(Plumbley, 1985). A strategic workforce with a holistic approach, aligning both internal 
and external drivers, leads an organisation towards its success (CIPD, 2018). However, 
the ‘best fit’ is an alignment between the organisation’s business needs and HR strategies 
(Armstrong, 2012, p.23). (Figure 31) shows steps for recruiting and selecting employees 
aligned with the organisational objectives.  
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Figure 31: Recruitment and selection framework set alongside organisational objectives 
 
Source: Chanda, Bansal, and Chanda (2010, p.5)  
 
Similar to the work of Johnson and Scholes (1999), Chanda, Bansal and Chanda (2010) 
and CIPD (2018), since Org. A’s R&S strategies were not aligned with its structure, 
processes and systems, its employees did not see the importance of transforming 
business opportunities into goals. Aligned to the work of Plumbley (1985) and Armstrong 
(2012), gaps in Org. A’s R&S strategy and the CEO’s inability to incorporate a holistic 
approach when hiring its employees neglected to absorb the right talent. 
 
6.2.3. Absence of Org. A’s CEO’s self-efficacy characteristics      
This DBA research also discovered that an absence of Org. A’s CEO’s self-efficacy 
characteristics has been an additional challenge for the organisation. However, not all the 
data collected alongside self-efficacy characteristics were challenges. There were 
positive findings as well. Findings from (5.1.2) showed an accurate self-evaluation from 
the CEO’s perspective by not belonging to a business circle and showed the CEO’s fear 
of failure and feelings of uncertainty for the organisation. Org. A’s CEO admitted that by 
not being in a business circle, this has significantly impacted the organisation and 
projected a lack of self-confidence.  
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Additionally, findings from (5.3) showed that due to an absence of the CEO’s self-efficacy 
characteristics, the CEO feared risks associated with government loans. By presuming 
that the government offices will discriminate against foreign-owned organisations, this 
showed that the CEO’s impression of government matters hindered it from benefitting 
from gaining help from the government (work experiential knowledge). This inability, as 
discussed in (5.3.1)’s findings, showed Org. A’s CEO abstained from asking for Tamkeen 
loans, and one reason for this inability was due to lack of collateral requirements. 
However, there were no findings relating to the CEO’s readiness to address this 
challenge. Likewise, since Org. A did not ask for government help, there were no findings 
related to a sense of accomplishment.  
 
Most business leaders presume that dealing with government offices is complicated, but 
Reich (2014) says, for the immediate future, the government must take an active interest 
in how an organisation is managed. Business leaders who expect the government to be 
pro-active with its progress must be proactive and adopt a different way to partner with 
them. (Table 39) shows effective steps to build a successful relationship with the 
government offices.  
 
Table 39: Effective measures to build a successful relationship with the government offices 
 
Source: One Acre Fund (2015, p.1) 
S/No Action Description
1 Understanding local government relations
To reduce the risk of miscommunication that could 
potentially lead to delays, knowing the local government 
systems and realities is vital.
2 Build an early outreach
Explaining the project plans at the inception gives a clear 
indication of the organisation's intentions and goals. A 
clear communication pattern established from the 
beginning ensures relationships are transparent.
3 Appointing a specialised person
To appoint a person who is knowledgeable in 
government affairs ensures establishing goodwill. 
4 Have a single point of contact
Integrating local government relations into fieldwork can 
be done by training field staff and maintaining a single 
point of contact. This emphasises the importance of 
regulatory approvals across departments.
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Similar to the findings of Reich (2014), by neglecting to actively seek information and not 
recognising that the government plays an important role in an organisation’s well-being, 
and presuming that the government discriminates against foreign-owned organisations, 
Org. A’s CEO neglected to benefit from Tamkeen’s support. (Table 40) is a summary of 
leadership competencies from the CEO’s perspective.  
 
Table 40: Summary of leadership competencies from Org. A CEO’s perspective 
 
 
The core advancements in thinking brought about by (6.2) findings showed the 
importance of leadership competencies within an organisation when encountering 
challenging situations. Leader competency skills are collective elements and can be used 
higher or lower depending on the situation (Chandler and Jansen; 1992; Man, 2001). A 
lack of these competencies can lead to failure to identify a plan of direction for the 
organisation (Cooper, Folta and Woo, 1995). This section recognised the critical 
importance of a leader’s analytical thinking and strategic networking to take the 
organisation forward (Spencer and Spencer, 1993). This section also identified the 
importance of having a balanced R&S strategy (Johnson and Scholes, 1999) when 
selecting employees. The ‘best fit’ aligns with an organisation’s business needs and HR 
strategies (Armstrong, 2012). An additional finding through this section discovered that 
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an absence of Org. A's CEO's self-efficacy characteristics has been an additional 
challenge for the organisation (Bandura, 1977). Due to the absence of the CEO’s self-
efficacy characteristics, the CEO feared risks associated with government loans. This 
inability was due to the CEO's impression on government matters that these offices would 
discriminate against foreign-owned organisations (Saxena, 2017). A critical finding 
through this section was that presumptions would not take the organisation forward. The 
only way to benefit from government offices and the business circle is to ‘get up and go’ 
and meet them in person to see what they do to ‘survive’ in an economic crisis (Reich, 
2014). 
 
6.2.4. Concluding remarks associated with leadership competencies and self-
efficacies within Org. A’s leadership 
Three competencies from Org. A CEO’s perspective hindered Org. A responding to the 
economic crisis. An absence of competency skills from the CEO led to neglecting to 
identify guidance from the business circle. Additionally, due to the CEO’s lack of leader 
knowledge competencies (comprehensive knowledge), they neglected to incorporate a 
holistic approach aligned with Org. A’s strategies and failed to attract the right talent for 
the organisation (work experiential knowledge). This inability (communication skills) 
hindered its employees from being responsible for its success. Lastly, due to the absence 
of the CEO’s self-efficacy characteristics (technical knowledge), Org. A’s CEO feared 
risks linked with government loans, presuming that Tamkeen will discriminate against 
foreign-owned organisations (organisational knowledge). This inability hindered Org. A 
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Table 41: Summary of Org. A CEO’s self-efficacy characteristics 
 
 
 Chapter summary  
The findings from (6.1) showed three key reasons that led to Org. A’s organisational 
knowledge neglecting to take the organisation forward from the CEO’s perspective. A key 
challenge was, as discussed through (6.1.1), neglecting to identify a strategic plan when 
Org. A was stable with government projects, and how to sustain it in the future. An 
additional challenge as discussed through (6.1.2) was due to the absence of the CEO’s 
practical knowledge: the CEO was not successful in managing relationships with key 
government offices. This inability hindered Org. A from forming a long-term relationship 
with its key stakeholders. Lastly, as discussed through (6.1.3), due to the CEO’s lack of 
subject domain knowledge on government matters, instead of being pro-active in 
maintaining healthy relationships with its key stakeholders, the CEO blamed the 
government for not being transparent. This inability hindered Org. A from having access 
to vital information.  
 
Additionally, findings from (6.2) showed three additional reasons that hindered the CEO’s 
ability to take the organisation forward. As shown through (6.2.1), a lack of leaders’ 
analytical thinking due to the CEO’s absence of competency skills led to a failure to 
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identify guidance received from the business circle. An additional inability, as discussed 
through (6.2.1), was due to the absence of leaders’ analytical thinking, which meant they 
failed to recognise a plan of direction to communicate the needs and strategic guidelines. 
Likewise, as discussed through (6.2.2), due to the inadequate leader focus on 
organisational achievements, the CEO did not set and redirect organisational priorities 
and hold its workforce to be responsive to internal and external challenges. This inability 
hindered its employees from being responsible towards the organisation’s success. An 
important inability, as discussed in (6.2.3), was the CEO not being pro-active to interact 
and engage with the business circle and neglected to appreciate their guidance. This 
inability was due to the CEO’s impression of government offices, which hindered Org. A 
from benefitting from Tamkeen’s support.  
 
Below are the summarised findings and (n=1)12 indicates a point given to each key 
competency. The OECD competency (Figure 5) and the expected competencies by 
professional IT architects’ frameworks (Figure 13) further strengthened the findings from 
chapter (6).  
 
(Table 36) showed the CEO’s lack of flexible thinking (n=1) which hindered Org. A’s 
employees from being rationally responsive to Org. A’s external and internal challenges. 
The CEO’s lack of analytical thinking (n=1) neglected to identify the level of influx applied 
towards Org. A. This showed the CEO’s inability to apply a strategic vision to plan and 
respond to the challenges (n=1). The inability to build a long-term strategic networking 
relationship with its key stakeholders was due to the CEO’s lack of knowledge on strategic 
networking (n=1). This inability hindered influence over customers to consider challenging 
tasks (n=1).  
 
(Table 40) showed that due to the CEO’s lack of analytical thinking (n=1), the CEO’s 
absence of competency skills neglected to identify guidance received from the business 
circle (n=1). This inability was, as discussed in (6.1.2), due to the CEO’s inability to 
 
12 Referred to a key competency.   
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network with the business circle (n=1). An additional inability was neglecting to identify a 
plan of action to communicate Org. A’s needs (n=1), which was due to an absence of 
strategic thinking (n=1). Inadequate focus on organisational achievements (n=1) led to 
failure to identify areas for improvement (n=1), and this inability overlooked holding its 
employees and translating business opportunities into goals. Likewise, by being 
unproductive in managing its employees (n=1), the CEO neglected to identify its 
employees’ response to internal and external challenges (n=1). An additional inability was 
due to the CEO’s lack of expertise to manage its team (n=1), by not recognising ways to 
communicate (n=1) its decisions to hold its employees to agreed commitments. By not 
developing talent (n=1) with due authority, the CEO neglected to direct its employees to 
take ownership and undertake job responsibilities.  
 
(Table 41) showed the CEO’s lack of practical knowledge when dealing with government 
offices (n=1). This inability was partly due to the CEO’s limited understanding of how 
knowledge can be used to lead and influence Org. A (n=1). The CEO’s limited practical 
knowledge (n=1) hindered seeing how government offices work. By presuming (n=1) 
Tamkeen will discriminate against foreign-owned organisations (n=1) and not reaching 
out to them, this prevented Org. A benefitting from Tamkeen.  
 
(Table 42) shows the overall findings from (6.1) and (6.2). The overall findings shown in 
this chapter were that Org. A’s CEO scored high on analytical thinking (n=2)13 alongside 
delivery-related findings. Except for drafting skills, the rest of the areas in delivery-related 
fields scored equal scores (n=1=achievement focus), (n=1=flexible thinking), 
(n=1=managing resources) and (n=1=teamwork and team leadership). Interpersonal 
competencies on client focus (n=1) and organisational knowledge (n=1) scored high as 
well. There were no findings alongside diplomatic sensitivity, influencing and negotiating 
skills. High scores were observed in all the areas alongside Org. A’s CEO’s strategic 
planning for the future. Strategic networking (n=1) secured the highest rating. Developing 
talent (n=1), strategic thinking (n=1) and organisational alignment (n=1) received equal 
 
13 Accumulated competency  
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scores. Analysing leader competency skills, leader communication skills (n=1) and work 
experiential knowledge (n=2) secured a high rating. Likewise, critical analysis and 
problem-solving skills (n=1), technical (n=1) and comprehensive (n=1) knowledge scored 
equal scores. A score was also received for not being a visionary leader (n=1) on 
organisational matters; however, there were no findings relating to the rest of the areas 
on leader competency skills. 
 
Table 42: Overall findings of chapter (6) 
 
 
The next chapter discusses the key findings by ‘uncovering of wrong traits and hidden 
roots’ and the absence of organisational knowledge, leadership and self-efficacies within 
Org. A’s leadership. This chapter also identifies jointly agreed strategies to address the 
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 Chapter 7: Conclusions, recommendations and action 
implementations 
This chapter is divided into four sections. (7.1) identifies the key findings by ‘uncovering 
of wrong traits and hidden roots’ as shown through (7.1.1), and the absence of 
organisational knowledge, leadership and self-efficacies within the organisation’s 
leadership that was a barrier to react to the economic crisis is shown in (7.1.2). (7.1) 
addresses the findings to be resolved together with whom the problem relates to within 
Org. A, as shown through (7.1.3). (7.2) answers the research questions addressed 
through (1.3.1), (1.3.2) and (1.3.3). Reflections on action implementations and changes 
achieved are discussed through (7.3), from a first-person (7.3.1), second-person (7.3.2), 
and lastly from a third-person (7.3.3) perspective. This chapter ends by addressing the 
limitations of undertaking this DBA research (7.4). 
 
 Key findings 
This section discusses the key findings of this DBA research from (7.1.1), (7.1.2) and 
(7.1.3) viewpoints. 
 
7.1.1. Uncovering of wrong traits and hidden roots 
As indicated through (1.2), Org. A presumed ‘outside causes’ associated with the drop in 
oil prices and the economic crisis were the core causes behind its revenue losses. This 
prevented it from investigating possible ‘inside causes’ within Org. A that could have been 
mostly responsible for its revenue losses. However, as with the findings of the ‘dot-com 
bubble’, as shown through chapters (4) and (5), the findings showed that the unseen 
causes were more profound than what was visible.  
 
The findings showed that Org. A’s actors neglected to amend its business plans to 
address market warnings and market pulling drives, and instead focused on unproven 
innovations. Similarly, by solely focusing on numerical values and overlooking how to 
generate cash flow, its actors overlooked the numerous warning signals of a possible 
burst. These collective reasons led to poorly informed decisions. As with the ‘dot-com 
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bubble’ period, Org. A’s actors neglected to set long-term goals and understand how to 
invest their capital and expand its portfolio. The findings showed that, instead of relying 
on logical reasoning, Org. A’s emotionally driven actors were following speculations and 
wrong traits. Similar to the ‘dot-com bubble’ period, the findings of chapters (4) and (5), 
set alongside the present economic crisis, disclosed how Org. A’s actors neglected to 
understand the common market rules and this has led to hidden roots behind its revenue 
losses.  
 
The next section (7.1.2) discusses the attempts to have a jointly built understanding with 
Org. A as to why it was losing revenues. This process needed a participative involvement 
(PAR) in an agreed setting to generate actionable knowledge to change and improve the 
situation. 
 
7.1.2. Absence of organisational knowledge, leadership competencies and self-
efficacies within the leadership of Org. A was a barrier to reaction 
Chapter (6) findings showed that the absence of the CEO’s strategic planning knowledge 
had been a key challenge for Org. A. The findings in (4.3.1) and (5.4.1) showed a lack of 
strategic planning knowledge from the CEO’s perspective when it comes to the business 
model. On reflection, the (4.3.1) and (5.4.1) findings showed that the absence of the 
CEO’s strategic planning knowledge for not being rational in responding to internal and 
external challenges was due to the CEO’s lack of flexible thinking. Likewise, the absence 
of the CEO’s strategic planning knowledge to recognise the level of influence applied with 
an organisational setting, as discussed in (5.2.3), (5.4.2), (5.4.3), (5.5.1) and (5.5.2), was 
due to the CEO’s lack of analytical thinking.  
 
Similarly, chapter (6) findings showed that the absence of Org. A’s CEO’s practical 
knowledge had been an additional challenge for Org. A. The findings of (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) 
showed the CEO’s lack of practical knowledge when dealing with government offices. 
Additionally, the findings of (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) showed that the absence of leaders’ 
practical knowledge of managing relationships with its key external stakeholders, which 
185 | P a g e  
 
 
generate a long-term relationship, was due to the CEO’s lack of knowledge on strategic 
networking (2.6).  
 
Similarly, findings of (4.1.3) and (4.1.4) further showed the absence of the CEO’s practical 
knowledge on local business culture. The inability to influence customers to consider 
challenging tasks and act accordingly, as discussed in (4.1.3), showed the CEO’s lack of 
practical knowledge on client focus. The CEO’s practical knowledge on client focus was 
once again observed in (4.1.4)’s findings, with the CEO’s inability to influence the 
community using personal reputation (OECD, 2014). 
 
The findings also showed that the absence of subject domain knowledge had been an 
additional challenge for Org. A. (4.3.3), (4.3.4), (5.3.1) and (5.3.2) showed that the CEO’s 
lack of subject domain knowledge on government matters had been a significant 
challenge for Org. A. On reflection, it showed that the CEO’s inability to form a strategic 
networking relationship with its key government offices resulted in losing critical tender 
information. This inability was partly due to the CEO not proactively engaging with the 
government offices and neglecting to build a robust networking relationship with its key 
government offices, which missed having access to vital government information. 
 
An additional challenge identified from the chapter (6) findings showed the CEO’s 
absence of competency skills when dealing with external stakeholders. On reflection, the 
chapter (6) findings showed the CEO neglected to seek and recognise advice from the 
business circle on important business matters, and this was due to a lack of analytical 
thinking. Another inability due to the CEO’s absence of competency skills was neglecting 
to identify a plan of directions to communicate Org. A’s strategic guidelines. This inability, 
as shown through (6.1.2) and (6.1.3), further hindered building a long-term relationship 
with its key government offices.  
 
An added chapter (6) finding was the absence of the CEO’s knowledge competencies in 
dealing with its employees. On reflection, the findings showed that due to inadequate 
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leader focus on organisational achievements, this hindered holding its employees to 
translate business opportunities into goals. Similarly, the CEO’s lack of knowledge 
competencies in managing resources resulted in not being able to influence its employees 
to respond to its internal and external challenges. Further reflections showed that the 
leader’s lack of knowledge in managing a team resulted in not being able to hold its team 
accountable on agreed commitments. An additional challenge due to the CEO’s absence 
of knowledge competencies was neglecting to develop a strategic direction for Org. A and 
holding its team to account for its development. 
 
The findings of Chapter (6) further showed that an absence of the CEO’s self-efficacy 
characteristics has been an additional challenge for Org. A. On reflection, (5.1.2) findings 
showed that the CEO, by not belonging to a business circle, lost important information. 
Similarly, (5.3.2) findings showed that the CEO’s impressions on government offices 
prevented it from benefitting from Tamkeen’s support. Likewise, (5.3.1) findings showed 
the fears associated with collateral assets, which further prevented acquiring Tamkeen’s 
support. Further reflections showed the CEO’s inability to seek help from the other 
business leaders, projecting a lack of accomplishment.  
 
The next section (7.1.3) identifies strategies to resolve the hidden roots within Org. A. 
 
7.1.3. Strategies to resolve the hidden roots within Org. A 
An overview of the findings of chapters (4) and (5) and (7.1.1), alongside those of the 
‘dot-com bubble’, showed that Org. A’s actors neglected to identify the standard market 
rules. Similarly, an overview of chapter (6)’s findings shown through (7.1.2) findings 
showed that the absence of organisational knowledge, leadership competencies and self-
efficacies within the leadership had been a primary challenge for Org. A. These findings, 
shown through (7.3), served as a ‘bridge’ to address the findings to be resolved together 
with whom the problem relates within Org. A.  
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The next section (7.2) attempts to answer the research questions addressed through 
(1.3.1), (1.3.2) and (1.3.3).  
 
 Answers to the research questions  
The causes of Org. A’s revenue losses examined through macro-, meso- and micro-
economic conditions are presented through (7.2.1), (7.2.2) and (7.2.3).  
 
7.2.1. What was the impact of Bahrain’s economic crisis on Org. A’s revenue 
losses? 
Initially, Org. A presumed the drop in oil prices and the government-imposed austerity 
steps caused its revenue losses since June 2014, which continued through the years 
2015 and 2016 as initially addressed through (1.3.1). As discussed in (7.1.1), chapter 
(4)’s findings showed that ‘outside causes’ associated with the drop in oil prices and the 
government-imposed austerity steps were not the primary causes behind its revenue 
losses. 
 
7.2.2. What was the influence of discriminatory practices impacting foreign-
owned organisations on Org. A’s revenue losses? 
An additional presumption was seen in Org. A not benefitting from Tamkeen’s support, 
presuming that Tamkeen discriminates against foreign-owned organisations as initially 
addressed through (1.3.2). (7.1.2) and chapter (4)’s findings showed that except for Org. 
A, the rest of the organisations have benefitted from Tamkeen’s support and Tamkeen 
did not discriminate against foreign-owned organisations in Bahrain. 
 
7.2.3. What was the influence of organisational particularities on Org. A’s 
revenue losses? 
As discussed in (7.1.1) and chapter (4), the findings showed that ‘outside causes’ 
associated with the drop in oil prices and the government-imposed austerity measures 
were not the primary causes behind Org. A’s revenue losses. Similarly, (7.1.2) and 
chapter (4) findings showed that except for Org. A, the rest of the organisations have 
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benefitted from Tamkeen’s support and Tamkeen had not discriminated against foreign-
owned organisations in Bahrain. Likewise, as discussed through (7.1.2) and chapters (5) 
and (6), the findings showed that ‘inside causes’ within the organisation were more 
profound than what was visible. Additionally, chapter (5) findings showed a lack of 
organisational knowledge, competencies, and self-efficacies within the organisation to a 
certain degree. Similarly, the findings of chapter (6) showed how organisational 
knowledge, competencies, and self-efficacies within the leadership hindered Org. A from 
being prepared to respond to the economic crisis.  
 
The next section (7.3) reflects on actions and changes achieved from a first-person 
(7.3.1), second-person (7.3.2), and lastly from a third-person (7.3.3) perspective. 
 
 Reflection on actions and changes achieved 
This section reflects on actions and changes achieved through the AR strategies as 
shown in (3.4.1) presented through first-, second- and third-person perspectives. As 
discussed in (7.3.1), one of the primary intentions of this DBA research was to have a 
jointly built understanding as to why Org. A was losing revenues. Secondly, as discussed 
through chapter (6), (7.3.1) findings show the first-person AR and the researcher multiple 
roles in the research process of taking action to resolve the challenging situation together 
with whom the problem relates within Org. A. Similarly, (7.3.2) findings will show the 
second-person AR and the researcher’s multiple roles in this DBA research exploring 
“what was really going on?" as discussed through (3.4.1). Lastly, the third-person AR 
addressed through (7.3.3) shows jointly built strategies within Org. A and to resolve the 
situation together with whom the problem relates within Org. A, discovered through 
chapters (5) and (6). 
 
7.3.1. AR cycle 1 (constructing): first-person AR and the researcher multiple roles 
in the research process 
As discussed in (3.4.1), this DBA research began with an observation leading to an 
inquiring approach to see "what was really going on"? As the primary researcher was an 
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‘insider’ and a participant immersed in the actual crisis, the findings from chapters (4), (5) 
and (6) were unexpected. However, these new findings generated steps to identify new 
actionable knowledge, as discussed in (7.3.3), to change and resolve the situation 
together with whom the problem relates to within Org. A. 
 
As the primary researcher, the first step was to discuss the findings with Org. A and its 
leadership separately. A one-on-one meeting with Org. A’s actors was necessary to avoid 
intimidating the organisation’s members when discussing the findings from an 
organisational perspective. It was also necessary to have a personal meeting with the 
CEO to protect the leader’s image when discussing leadership challenges within the 
leadership (7.3.2). However, Org. A’s team firmly presumed that the drop in oil prices and 
the government’s austerity measures were the primary causes behind its revenue losses 
and were unprepared to discuss any further findings beyond macro-economic 
perspectives. Org. A was also unprepared to accept that they neglected to benefit from 
Tamkeen. Additionally, Org. A firmly presumed that Tamkeen was discriminatory, being 
unwilling to help foreign-owned organisations to survive and sustain in this challenging 
economy (meso-economy). Similarly, from the first instance, Org. A’s team was critical of 
the researcher’s genuine interest in building the organisation and saw the researcher as 
a fault finder (8.7).  
 
This hostile atmosphere allowed the researcher to take a different route to not discuss 
the findings first but start by discussing learnings from the action learning set (knowledge 
broker). The years of experience working as a commercial manager and now as an SME 
consultant gave the researcher the necessary confidence and understanding of how to 
react to such circumstances. This shift in understanding allowed the researcher to play a 
key role to discuss what these organisations did better, worse, or different than Org. A. 
Once this was done, it allowed the researcher to discuss Tamkeen’s benefits and how 
Org. A can benefit from Tamkeen like Orgs. B-H. Taking a different route allowed Org. A 
to understand that for them to learn from other organisations and gain help from Tamkeen, 
they must first learn to accept that there is a ‘genuine’ problem within the organisation 
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and then take the appropriate steps to address the challenging situation. The researcher 
gained this experience by having worked as a commercial manager when in a difficult 
situation by applying the Identify, Measure and Implement (IMI) principles. 
 
This understanding allowed Org. A to realise the importance of participative and 
democratic actions. Org. A realised that to see a ‘change’ within Org. A, they must be 
involved in planning, observing, reflecting, and executing the actions towards Org. A’s 
change as shown through (3.4.1). When Org. A’s team realised that it is them who will 
take the lead in identifying actions and implement them with due support from the 
researcher as the change agent, the atmosphere was positive. Once this climate of 
positivity was built, Org. A’s actors reflected that any actions implemented and the change 
that comes along with it will be for its betterment, Org. A’s actors began to cooperate. 
This atmosphere allowed the researcher to discuss the findings relating to organisational 
and leadership challenges within Org. A and its leadership, and that the drop in oil prices 
and government’s austerity measures played a less significant role in Org. A’s revenue 
losses. After that, the discussions were smooth and free-flowing. This collaborative 
understanding allowed the researcher to play a key role in identifying jointly collaborated 
new actionable knowledge as discussed through (7.3.3) to resolve the challenging 
situation and those to whom the problem relates within the organisation (third-person). 
 
In a nutshell, as a participant and the primary researcher within the research, the 
researcher played three roles, first-, second-and third-person within the research. This 
section shows how this this knowledge was built. 
 
As shown through (3.4.1), as the primary researcher, the researcher’s role began with an 
observation leading to an inquiring approach to see “what was really going on” (first-
person). As discussed, the surprising facts generated through chapters (4), (5) and (6) 
allowed the researcher to discuss the findings with Org. A’s team and its leadership 
separately to have a jointly built understanding as to why Org. A was losing revenues 
(second-person). This shift in understanding allowed the researcher to discuss that the 
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drop in oil prices and the government-imposed austerity measures had no impact on Org. 
A’s revenue losses. Org. A also realised that Tamkeen helps the SME sector irrespective 
of their ownership and size. Once Org. A understood their involvement in identifying and 
implementing actions towards building Org. A allowed the researcher to identify jointly 
agreed actionable knowledge, as discussed through (7.3.3), to resolve the challenging 
situation and those to whom the problem relates within the organisation (third-person).  
 
The next section (7.3.2) addresses the researcher’s role from a second-person AR to 
uncover unseen roots below wrong traits. 
 
7.3.2. AR cycle 2 (planning action): second-person AR to uncover unseen roots 
below wrong traits 
One of the primary intentions of this DBA research, as shown through chapters (4) and 
(6) findings and discussed in (3.4.1), was to have a jointly built understanding as to why 
Org. A was losing revenues. Also, as shown in chapter (6), the aim was to identify actions 
(7.3.3) to resolve the situation together with whom the problem relates to within Org. A 
(actionable knowledge). Completing the action learning set meetings with the Org. A’s 
CEO and its team allowed findings to be shared and to be a ‘knowledge broker’ as well.  
 
In the meeting with Orgs. A-H attendees and shown through (Table 17) and (Figure 17) 
and (Table 14), it was discussed that the drop in oil prices were cyclical (5.5.3). After the 
meeting with Org. A’s CEO and its finance team, upon reflection, both parties (finance 
team and the researcher) agreed that the most recent drop in oil prices has not only 
impacted Org. A (75%), but Orgs. E and G (40%), B and H (20%), F (10%) and C (2.3%) 
respectively as shown through (4.1.1) findings. Reflecting further on action learning set 
findings, Org. A’s CEO then saw late payments appear to be related to cultural habits and 
did not significantly impact the entire action learning set as shown through (Error! R
eference source not found.). On reflection, Org. A’s CEO also realised that while in the 
general business culture there is a preference to deal with their own people, Org. A lacked 
such a connection, and this was shown through (4.1.4) findings.  
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Additionally, meetings with Orgs. B-H and external stakeholders allowed Org. A to realise 
that Tamkeen’s business development programme, irrespective of ownership and size, 
co-finances businesses to grow and develop (4.2.2). After these meetings, Org. A’s CEO 
and its operations team realised that Orgs. B, D, E, G and H have benefitted from 
Tamkeen’s business development and training and wage support programmes (4.2.2) 
and (4.2.3). Org. A’s CEO then understood that the allocation of loans was dependent on 
an organisation’s business needs regardless of the economic environment, size or 
ownership.  
 
On reflection, Org. A’s CEO further realised that Tamkeen’s Tamweel+ programme had 
helped Org. H to expand into four new business areas (4.2.4). The meeting with the 
operations department reflected that they thought being foreign-owned would mean 
neglecting to benefit from Tamkeen’s coaching and mentoring, through which Org. A 
would have benefitted and was shown through (5.3.1) and (5.3.2) findings. 
 
Likewise, meetings with Orgs. A-H and external actors showed that government projects 
were open to all, irrespective of an organisation’s ownership and size. After this meeting, 
discussions with Orgs. A’s CEO and its projects team were undertaken, and the two 
parties (projects team and the researcher) agreed that Orgs. A and G had benefitted from 
government projects; however, the withdrawal of government projects had not impacted 
Org. G, unlike Org. A. This was due to the type of project Org. G was awarded (essential) 
(4.3.1). Reflecting further on the findings with meetings with Orgs. A-H, Org. A’s CEO and 
projects team then saw Orgs. B-H had worked towards their growth by way of Orgs. B, G 
and H (expansion), Org. E (outsourcing) and (search engine optimisation), Org. F (back-
office support for new and forthcoming stock exchanges and analytics), Org. G (energy-
saving products and external contracting work) and Org. H (a new pharmacy and 
laboratory) (4.3.2). On reflection, Org. A’s CEO then realised Orgs. B, G and H had 
carefully focused on expansion plans before growth, whereas Org. A, being too eager to 
expand into Saudi Arabia, neglected to address this requirement in its business plan, and 
was shown through (5.4.2) and (5.4.3) findings. 
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Additionally, reflecting on additional findings with Orgs. A-H, both parties (CEO and the 
researcher) mutually agreed the absence of leader self-efficacy characteristics had been 
an additional challenge for Org. A. Reflecting on (6.2.3) findings, the CEO then realised 
this inability hindered seeking Tamkeen’s support. By mutually agreeing and reflecting on 
additional findings from Orgs. A-H, this allowed discussing why Org. A neglected to 
benefit from government tenders. These reflections permitted the CEO to realise that this 
inability was due to Org. A’s employees lacking in practical knowledge when dealing with 
government offices as shown through (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) findings. This meeting also 
allowed the researcher to share that the Tender Board has been accused of a few 
malpractices in some instances, but this has not been the actual reason for not benefitting 
from tender announcements. Additional reflections showed that Org. A’s team fell short 
on strategic and competency skills when drafting the business plan, and this inability 
hindered expanding its customer base beyond government customers as shown through 
(5.4.1) findings. The CEO subsequently realised this drawback resulted in not identifying 
the consequences of moving into Saudi Arabia in an economic crisis, and was shown 
through (5.2.3), (5.4.2), (5.4.3), (5.5.1) and (5.5.2) findings.  
 
After the group meeting with Org. A’s CEO and stakeholders from different departments, 
meeting the CEO separately allowed to discuss additional findings. This individual 
meeting allowed the researcher to act as a ‘knowledge broker’ and share “what was really 
going on”. This personal meeting also allowed the CEO to protect their image when 
discussing leadership challenges within the leadership. Additionally, this one-on-one 
meeting helped not to intimidate the organisation’s members when discussing the findings 
from an organisational perspective (7.3.1).  
 
This individual meeting allowed discussing why the CEO was never considered a ‘friend’ 
in the business circle (4.1.4). Reflecting on the findings, the researcher and the CEO 
agreed that this inability was due to the CEO’s lack of self-confidence (5.1.1) and poor 
competency skills (5.1.2). Additionally, this meeting also allowed sharing the findings from 
Orgs. C and H as to what they did differently to build relationships with the business circle 
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(5.1.1). On reflection, the CEO then realised that this lack of competency skills resulted 
in neglecting to seek support from the business circle as shown through (5.2.3) and (6.2.1) 
findings. Similarly, the CEO also realised a lack of knowledge when selecting its 
employees (5.1.3) resulted in failure to attract the right talent for Org. A (6.2.2).  
 
The next section (7.3.3) addresses the jointly built strategies within Org. A to resolve the 
situation together with whom the problem relates within Org. A. 
 
7.3.3. AR cycle 3 (taking action): third-person AR-building up organisational 
knowledge to avoid following wrong traits in the future  
Based on the emergent organisational knowledge presented in chapter (6), this DBA 
research allowed Org. A to recognise some of the problems presented in chapter (5) and 
as discussed in (7.3.2). Based on the various findings, several actionable frameworks as 
discussed in (7.3.3) were put in place for Org. A to address the uncovered traits and to 
avoid following wrong traits in the future. 
 
These actionable frameworks as shown through (Table 43), (Table 44), (Table 45), (Table 
46), (Table 47) and (Table 48) highlight the actions to change and improve practices 
within suitable timeframes. The actions proposed and agreed upon were contextual and 
seen in a specific context. These actions helped to support the efforts of this DBA 
research to create actionable knowledge through participant experiences who were 
involved in creating these actions. This helped to justify the PAR adopted in this DBA 
research. The objective was to capture insights to generate tacit knowledge to create new 
actionable knowledge, ensuring implementation to change and improve practice in areas 
that needed help. Column (2) shows the planned actions (7.3.2), column (3) highlights 
actions taken and column (4) reveals the results of action implementation. Time 
constraints hindered experiencing (AR cycle 4-action evaluation) generated within Org. 
A, and to measure Org. A’s actors’ practices and engage with them in the continual 
adaptation of new knowledge.  
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By reflecting on the purpose of this DBA research, the context and the literature reviewed 
allowed contributing actionable knowledge based on participant interpretations of the 
action learning set’s actions and the researcher’s reflections and observations. The data 
analysis process helped to create new actions and knowledge and show where the newly 
created knowledge can be used, as shown through the below sections. 
 
Improving networking behaviour 
A lack of organisational knowledge, competencies and self-efficacies as addressed in 
(5.1.1), (5.1.2) and (5.2.3) findings was caused by Org. A’s CEO finding it challenging to 
network strategically (6.2.1; Spencer and Spencer, 1993; Cooper, Folta and Woo, 1995; 
Cronin-Gilmore, 2012; Zheng, Ahsan and DeNoble, 2019). Therefore, as Org. A’s 
consultant, the researcher attempted to build up the networking behaviour based on the 
leader’s experience and analogue to the approach as shown in (Figure 30) and discussed 
in (6.2.1).  
 
Attracting the right talent for Org. A  
A lack of organisational knowledge, competencies and self-efficacies as addressed in 
(5.1.3) findings were caused by the CEO’s inability to attract the right talent for Org. A 
(6.2.2; Plumbley, 1985; Johnson and Scholes, 1999; Chanda, Bansal and Chanda 2010; 
Armstrong, 2012; CIPD, 2018). Towards bringing in a change to Org. A to attract the right 
talent, the researcher identified and agreed on a R&S framework set alongside 
organisational objectives to improve R&S strategies within Org. A as shown in (Figure 31) 
and discussed in (6.2.2).  
 
Measures to build a successful relationship with government offices  
A lack of organisational knowledge, competencies and self-efficacies as addressed in 
(5.2.1) and (5.2.2) findings was caused by Org. A’s actors lacking ‘inside’ information, 
finding it challenging to secure government tenders (6.1.3; Nolan, 1998; Dua, Heil and 
Wilkins (2011) and (6.2.3; Reich, 2004; Once Acre Fund, 2015). Therefore, as the 
researcher wanted to bring in a change, it was attempted to introduce effective steps to 
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build a successful relationship with the government offices as show in (Figure 29) (6.1.3) 
and (Table 39) and (6.2.3) respectively.   
 
Steps to benefit from Tamkeen’s support   
A lack of organisational knowledge, competencies and self-efficacies as discussed in 
(5.3.1) and (5.3.2) findings was caused by the CEO’s presumptions that Tamkeen 
discriminates foreign-owned organisations (6.1.2; Dua, Hail and Wilkins, 2010; Reich, 
2014; Oppenheimer, 2015; Ireland, 2019). On further attempts, as Org. A’s consultant, 
the researcher wanted to bring in jointly agreed strategies to Org. A, the ways an 
organisation can engage with government offices as shown through (Table 39) and was 
discussed in (6.2.3) findings.  
 
Amending business plan in line with the economic setting  
A lack of organisational knowledge, competencies and self-efficacies as discussed in 
(5.4.1), (5.4.2), (5.4.3), (5.5.1) and (5.5.2) findings was caused by neglecting to amend 
the business plan in line with the economic setting, addressing the underlying causes 
related to operating in an economic crisis (6.1.1; Berry, 1998; Ennis, 1998; Hrebiniak, 
2005; Čater and Pučko, 2010; Jabbar and Hussein, 2017). As Org. A’s consultant, the 
researcher wanted to bring in changes to Org. A’s key activities for effective tried and 
tested strategies, which were defined through (Table 35) as discussed in (6.1.1). 
 
The next and the last section of this chapter (7.4) discusses the limitations of undertaking 
this DBA research.  
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Table 45: Attracting the right talent 
 
  
S/No AR Cycle 2-Planning Action AR Cycle 3-Taking Action Result of implementation 
1
To formulate a Recruitment and 
Selection (R&S) framework set 
alongside organisational objectives as 
displayed in (Figure 28) and discussed in 
(6.2.2). 
CEO to formulate a R&S framework set alongside Org. A's 
objectives.
Formulated a R&S framework set alongside Org. A's objectives as displayed in (Appendix 
F.1).
2
To formulate Policies and Procedures 
manuals relating to:
• Recruitment and Selection (R&S) Policy 
• Harassment and Discrimination Policy 
• Compensation and Benefits Policy 
• Ethics and Conducts Policy 
• Disciplinary Policy 
Introduced Policies and Procedures manulas relating to:
• Recruitment and Selection (R&S) Policy 
• Harassment and Discrimination Policy 
• Compensation and Benefits Policy 
• Ethics and Conducts Policy 
• Disciplinary Policy 
Introduced Policies and Procedures manuals as displayed in (Appendix F.2).
3
To communicate Org. A’s corporate 
strategy to its employees as discussed 
in (6.2.2).
CEO communicated Org. A’s corporate strategy to its 
employees.
When submitting this DBA research, the CEO briefed its employees on Org. A's services 
and strategies. The CEO also decided that this meeting would be a bi-weekly event, and in 
the absence of the CEO, the OM is to chair the meeting. Minutes of the meeting to be 
recorded and shared with its employees.
4
To align Org. A's employees’ goals 
with Org. A's strategic goals as 
discussed in (6.2.2). 
To align Org. A's employees’ goals with its strategic goals by 
way of training and achieving quality standard certificates in:
• ISO 27001 - IT Security
• ISO 22301 - Business Continuity
• ISO 9001 - Quality Management System
Apart from the CEO, the CEO also selected two Senior 
Consultants to undergo quality standard certification training. 
Funds for Bahraini employees is through Tamkeen's 
Certification programme.
When submitting this DBA research, the CEO and two Senior Consultants obtained the 
following certifications as displayed in (Appendix F.3):
• ISO 22301 - Business Continuity
• ISO 27001 - IT Security
• ISO 9001 - Quality Management System - is in progress
Tamkeen, through its Certification Programme approved funds for Bahraini employees. 
5
To create an incentive programme to 
motivate Org. A's employees as 
discussed in (5.1.3) and and (6.2.2). 
To motivate Org. A's employees; the CEO is to introduce an 
incentive programme across Org. A. Introducing a 
performance bonus policy and not an incentive policy that 
applies only to the sales force will not discriminate its back-
office staff (administrative). 
Introduced a Performance Appraisal Policy addressing all its employees as displayed in 
(Appendix F.4). 
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Table 47: Benefit from external financial support 
 
 
S/No AR Cycle 2-Planning Action AR Cycle 3-Taking Action AR Cycle 4-Evaluating Action
• To register Org. A under Tamkeen's Business Development 
Programme as discussed in (4.2.2).
Registered Org. A under Tamkeen's Business Development 
Programme as displayed in (Appendix H.1).
• To register Org. A under Tamkeen's Wage Subsidy Support 
Programme as discussed in (4.2.3).
Registered Org. A under Tamkeen's Wage Support 
Programme as displayed in (Appendix H.2).
2
To register Org. A with Tamkeen 
Bahrain to receive invitations for coaching 
and mentoring events as displayed in 
(Table 36) and discussed in (6.2.3).
• To register Org. A with Tamkeen Bahrain to receive invitations 
for coaching and mentoring events as discussed in (4.2.6).
Registered Org. A with Tamkeen's coaching and mentoring 
events as displayed in (Appendix H.3).
3
To appoint a dedicated person who can 
regularly visit government offices as 
displayed in (Table 36) and discussed in 
(6.2.3). 
CEO to appoint a dedicated person who can regularly visit 
government offices (weekly basis), and upon return, this 
person must provide a report outlining: 
1. Government tender announcements and Org. A's ability to 
participate in them. 
2. Tamkeen's updated funding programmes and Org. A's 
ability to benefit from these programmes.
When submitting this DBA research, the CEO advised the OM 
to weekly visit government offices and, upon return, to submit 
the following reports. 
1. Government tender announcements and Org. A's ability to 
participate in them. 
2. Tamkeen's updated funding programmes and Org. A's 
ability to benefit from these programmes.
4
To appoint a dedicated person who can 
regularly visit networking events.
CEO to appoint a dedicated person who will regularly visit 
networking events. This is in addition to the CEO attending 
networking events where elites gather. Upon return, this 
appointee is to provide a report as follows: 
• Number of events attended, and its benefits to Org. A. 
• To identify competitor reactive strategies and what Org. A 
must do to curtail these measures.
• New entrants to the market and how competitive they can be 
towards Org. A. 
• To contact potential clients and explain Org. A's services - 
how many clients were contacted and the client feedback. 
• To conduct presentations on Org. A's services and plan proof 
of concept - how many client presentations were carried out 
and what was the audience response. 
In addition to the CEO attending networking events where 
elites gather, the CEO appoints a dedicated person who will 
regularly visit other networking events. Upon return, this person 
is to provide a report:
• Number of networking events attended and its benefits to 
Org. A. 
• To identify competitor strategies and what Org. A must do to 
curtail these measures.
• New entrants in the market and how competitive they can be 
towards Org. A. 
• To contact potential clients and explain Org. A's services, how 
many of them were contacted, and the feedback. 
• To conduct presentations on Org. A's services and plan proof 
of concept - how many client presentations were carried out 
and the audience response. 
To register Org. A with Tamkeen and 
be familiar with its funding programmes 
as displayed in (Table 36) and discussed 
in (6.2.3). 
1
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Table 48: Amending the business plan 
 
S/No AR Cycle 2-Planning Action AR Cycle 3-Taking Action Result of implementation 
Org. A is to participate in the following major IT exhibitions 
yearly:
• International IT and Telecommunication Exhibition (COMEX) 
Technology Show – April (year), Muscat, Sultanate of Oman.
• International Data Corporation (IDC) Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) Summit – September (year), Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.
• Gulf Information Technology Exhibition (GITEX) – October 
(year), Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 
When submitting this DBA research, Org. A participated in two 
major IT exhibitions, as displayed in (Appendix I.1). 
• International Data Corporation (IDC) Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) Summit – September (2018 and 2019), Jeddah, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
• Gulf Information Technology Exhibition (GITEX) – October 
(2017 and 2017 and 2018), Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 
Plans were underway to participate in the COMEX exhibition in 
the following year.
Org. A to organise breakfast mornings targeting CXOs and 
business leaders to share thoughts and guidance on emerging 
technologies and case studies. The purpose is to educate 
CXOs on technologies aligned with Org. A’s consulting 
services and educate the market. 
When submitting this DBA research, Org. A held four 
breakfast mornings for CXOs and business leaders to share 
thoughts and guidance on emerging technologies and case 
studies. Org. A sought help from an event management 
company to organise these events as displayed in (Appendix 
I.2).
Org. A is to organise a wide range of community outreach 
activities aligned with its business model to reach a wider 
audience by focusing on the community's challenges. This 
awareness should provide details on the cybersecurity services 
and link to the security incidents within Bahrain to raise 
awareness. 
When submitting this DBA research, Org. A had conducted 20 
presentations on 'minimising cybersecurity risks through 
employee awareness'. These presentations provided details on 
the cybersecurity services and linked them to the security 
incidents within Bahrain, demonstrating how awareness can 
minimise risks, as displayed through (Appendix I.3). These 
awareness sessions are to continue. 
To re-define Org. A’s business plan 
focussing on short- and medium-term 
activities including:  
1b. To appoint an advertising and 
marketing agency to maximise Org. 
A's brand visibility 
To maximise Org. A's brand visibility, to appoint an advertising 
and marketing agency to address:
• Website design and implementation by way of providing a 
new look
• To advertise Org. A's services through multiple social media 
channels
• To give a new look for the company profile
• To design and print brochures
• To select a concept and design artwork for press releases 
(English and Arabic)
• Media buying - social media, Eastern province, Riyadh and 
Jeddah in Saudi Arabia
When submitting this DBA research, as displayed in (Appendix 
I.4), Org. A had taken the following actions: 
• Appointed an advertising and marketing agency
• Website re-designed, giving it a new look
• Advertised Org. A's services through multiple social medial 
channels - Facebook, Instagram and Twitter
2
To re-define Org. A’s business plan on 
the short- and medium-term activities to 
reach out to many potential 
customers. 
To reach out to many potential customers, Org. A must re-
define its business plan focussing on short- and medium-term 
activities, and it must be a jointly collaborated activity among its 
team focussing on the following:
• To review and reverse the market and the competitor 
strategies.
• To perform a SWOT analysis to identify market pricing.
• To expand the marketing strategies to reach many potential 
customers. 
When submitting this DBA research, the CEO, OM, SM and 
MM had two brainstorming sessions on:
• Reviewing the market and competitor strategies and identified 
actions to be taken.
• Performing a SWOT analysis to identify market pricing. 
• Discussing expanding the marketing strategies to reach 
many potential customers. 
However, implementing and measuring these activities take a 
longer period. 
To re-define Org. A’s business plan on 
the short- and medium-term activities, 
including:  
1a. To focus on enhancing brand 
visibility 
1






S/No AR Cycle 2-Planning Action AR Cycle 3-Taking Action AR Cycle 4-Evaluating Action
3
To re-define Org. A’s business plan on 
the short- and medium-term activities to 
turn strategy into action.
To re-define Org. A’s business plan on the short- and medium-
term activities, the CEO to implement a jointly collaborated 
Action Plan (quarterly, bi-yearly and yearly) focusing on:
• Specific responsibilities and accountabilities on strategy 
implementation. 
• To adopt metrics to monitor the strategy implementation. 
• To appoint a committee consisting of senior leadership and 
senior consultants to drive and monitor strategies. 
When submitting this DBA research, the CEO, OM, SM and 
MM had one brainstorming session outlining a detailed Action 
Plan (quarterly, bi-yearly and yearly) focussing on:
• Specific responsibilities and accountabilities on strategy 
implementation. 
• To adopt metrics to monitor the strategy implementation. 
• To appoint a committee consisting of senior leadership and 
senior consultants to drive and monitor strategies. 
However, implementing and measuring these activities take an 
extended period. 
4
To re-define Org. A’s business plan on 
the short- and medium-term activities to 
include new services targeting the oil 
and gas sector in Saudi Arabia.
To re-define Org. A’s business plan on the short- and medium-
term activities; the CEO is to identify a collaborative exercise to 
identify new services targeting the oil and gas sector in Saudi 
Arabia focusing on:
• To conduct a market survey to identify the demand for new 
services in line with Org. A's business model. The new areas 
are to focus on cost-saving and automation. 
• To further enhance the IT Security Governance consulting 
services. Studies have shown that information technology plays 
a pivotal role and that there is an increasing need for IT 
Governance in the region. Executing a holistic IT governance 
model facilitates IT to deliver business value and increases 
confidence with business.
When submitting this DBA research, the CEO, OM, SM and 
MM had one brainstorming session to identify new services 
targeting the oil and gas sector in Saudi Arabia. 
• To conduct a market survey to identify the demand for new 
services in line with Org. A's business model. The new areas 
are to focus on cost-saving and automation. A comparison 
between the previous market research and industry directions 
focussing on cost-saving and automation was in progress. 
• Added new services to Org. A's portfolio is displayed in 
(Appendix I.5). 
* Robotic Process Automation (RPA)
* ISO27001 - Information Security Management
* ISO22301 - Business Continuity Planning  
* ISO9001 - Quality Management System 
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 Limitations of undertaking this DBA research   
Implementing the AR stages in this DBA research contained overlapping stages of going 
back and forth in inquiring, acting, and reflecting. This process evolved a participatory 
paradigmatic approach where participants jointly built strategies and reviewed the 
implemented steps. To sustain the relevance of this DBA research to create new 
actionable knowledge, engaging within the local context was based on facts gathered 
from participant experiences. In doing so, it was necessary to impose several limitations 
in selecting action learning set participants. The primary limit was selecting comparable, 
independent and diversified small and medium organisations that might have experienced 
the drop in oil prices. The next limit was selecting those organisations who had 
experienced a similar crisis in the past. The next step focused on participants’ decision-
making capabilities who could argue or challenge one’s thoughts. An added limitation was 
that participants must know how much the current drop in oil prices impacts their 
organisation and the economy in general. The rest of the participants who did not fit into 
these criteria were excluded. 
 
The PAR process engaged in learning by doing. In this aspect, leaving out participants 
with limited or no experience when the engagement was aimed at all stakeholders to 
design and implement actions is a regret. This DBA research recognised the importance 
of collaborative knowledge building to turn information and practical knowledge through 
practice. However, given another opportunity to reflect on the practical change being the 
core requirement of this DBA research, the focus will be on a collegiate participatory 
approach. This focus allows stakeholders to reach deeper to identify the problem, design 
solutions, and act and reflect on implementation that contributes to developing loop 
learning. 
 
Another critical limitation of this DBA research is that it does not generate knowledge for 
general applications. The knowledge created is for direct implementation limited to a 
specific context within Org. A that required involving actors within one particular and 
practical context. However, it can apply in a different context, but this will require careful 
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adaptation. Some researchers might see this as a limitation; however, AR is a critical 
feature as a research strategy. 
 
An added limitation was time constraints to experience the implementation of all 
actionable cycles and to measure Org. A’s actors’ practices and engage with them in the 
continual adaptation of new knowledge. In reality, PAR has no end date and a clear 
timeline for stopping the research; research stops upon resolving the problem. Another 
limitation is the inability to compel knowledge through a broader organisational 
perspective in other organisations that value advice from their in-house consultants.  
 
Subjectivity was another limitation. When left unchecked, there is a tendency for the 
researcher to be over-involved to the extent of exposing personal biases to play an active 
role in analysis and findings. This was solved by seeking opinions and thoughts from 
comparable, diversified and independent action learning sets. Also, frameworks as in 
(Table 21) and some key literature strengthened the findings. Also, the collective research 
strategies (3.4) and a narrative analysis (3.4.4) helped reproduce the participants’ and 
the researcher’s stories into a readable format to create a joint statement.  
 
Another limitation is being vulnerable to pressure when the researcher is an ‘insider’ in 
the organisation, which can compel the researcher to fabricate or alter the findings to suit 
organisational objectives. This was solved by integrating four previously tried and tested 
frameworks as shown through (Table 21) to interpret chapters (4), (5) and (6) findings. 
Also, the AR process used in the DBA research was a robust methodology to collect and 
deal with the data, and so were the carefully selected other research methods to 
strengthen findings.  
 
The next and the last chapter in this DBA research reflects on the learning journey.
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Chapter 8: Reflections on the learning journey 
This chapter is divided into eight sections. (8.1) reflects on the implications of the 
researcher as an ‘insider’ and a participant immersed in the actual crisis. This is followed 
by (8.2) discussing the impact of the work on Org. A’s behaviour since concluding this 
DBA research. (8.3) discusses the implications for the broader community or to whom 
this DBA research is relevant and is followed by exploring the extent to which this DBA 
research represents actionable knowledge when addressing similar challenges in the 
future (8.4). This chapter also confirms or extends the theory based as a result of the 
revised literature as shown through (8.5), followed by discussing the researcher’s 
development as a scholar-practitioner and the learning journey (8.6). The next section 
(8.7) addresses the challenges encountered when compiling this DBA research and ends 
with recommendations for future research (8.8). 
 
 Researcher as an insider and a participant immersed in the actual crisis 
When the journey began, the initial presumptions were that the vast amount of the 
researcher’s professional experience having worked as a consultant would help to 
improve SME challenges. It was also assumed that having experience working as a 
commercial manager would help get things done in the industry. However, these thoughts 
were often challenging given the opinions and presumptions held on the research topic.  
 
Initially, Org. A presumed its revenue losses since June 2014 were due to the drop in oil 
prices leading to an economic crisis, which generated a considerable budget deficit in the 
government coffers. Another presumption was that Tamkeen had ceased financial and 
advisory support to foreign-owned organisations. These initial presumptions allowed the 
problem to be looked at from a managerial perspective (consultant). Koontz (1961, p. 
186) finds “management is the art of getting things done through and with people in 
formally organised groups, the art of creating an environment in such an organised group 
where people can perform as individuals and yet cooperate toward attainment of group 
goals, the art of removing blocks to such performance, the art of optimising efficiency in 
effectively reaching goals.” Similarly, drawing on the Taylorist approach, Uddin and 
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Hossain (2015) see management as an art of knowing what to do, when to do it and the 
best way to address the pre-determined goals. Comparing these two approaches with AR 
and Action Learning (AL), these approaches seem quite closely knit. It was not intended 
to say that these two approaches do not work towards an organisation’s change. They 
do, but these approaches depend on pre-designed processes to fix plans and implement 
them. This shift in understanding was allowed to play an active role in looking into any 
possible causes within Org. A and engage with it to adopt a jointly built understanding 
(7.3.2) of why it was losing revenues. This understanding generated a new experience 
that being an ‘insider’ and a participant and immersed in the actual crisis (inquiry from the 
inside) (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014; Raelin, 2015) generates new actionable knowledge 
(double-loop learning) (Argyris and Schon, 1978). Cooperrider (2017) says being critically 
reflective of one’s practices and learning through it brings progress.  
 
The following section (8.2) discusses the impact of the work of Org. A’s behaviour since 
concluding this DBA research.  
 
 Impact of the work on Org. A’s behaviour since concluding this DBA 
research 
This section reflects on insights into the actionability of the knowledge generated from 
this DBA research. Hordijk and Baud (2006) say that the newly created knowledge will 
remain static if researchers neglect to build suitable channels to link with a broader 
community that could benefit from findings, including the participants who helped to build 
this DBA research (Nolan and Varey, 2003). One crucial achievement through this DBA 
research was the collaborative involvement of various stakeholders, not limited to the 
action learning set but the government actors who helped shape the findings. This 
involvement allowed understanding how collective participation helped produce a 
successful outcome towards the benefit of multiple stakeholders. 
 
The AR strategies presented through the first-, second- and third-person perspectives, as 
shown in (3.4.1) and discussed in (7.3.1), show that the primary intention of this DBA 
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research was to have a jointly built understanding of why Org. A was losing revenues. 
Secondly, as discussed through chapter (6) and (7.3.1), the findings showed that first-
person AR and the researcher multiple roles in the research process take actions to 
resolve the challenging situation together and with whom the problem relates within Org. 
A. Similarly, (7.3.2) findings showed the second-person AR and the researcher’s multiple 
roles in this DBA research exploring “what was really going on?". Lastly, the third-person 
AR addressed through (7.3.3) showed jointly built strategies (actionable frameworks) 
within Org. A and how to resolve the situation together with whom the problem relates 
within Org. A as discovered through chapters (5) and (6).  
 
These actionable frameworks as shown through (Table 43), (Table 44), (Table 45), (Table 
46), (Table 47) and (Table 48) highlight the actions to change and improve practices 
within suitable timeframes. The 4th column of these frameworks show the result of 
implementations. This column shows the researcher as a change agent having managed 
to embed a of climate of positivity within Org. A that the change is for its betterment. This 
has resulted in bringing concrete improvements for Org. A, and it is in a better position 
post-2014. This evidences that the new knowledge improves practices. The challenge is 
to ensure that the newly generated knowledge is continuous for further improvements, 
which is achieved through periodical reflections before the next crisis. A collective 
ownership helps to mitigate any future challenges.  
 
The following section (8.3) discusses implications for the broader community that could 
benefit from this DBA research. 
 
 Implications for the broader community  
This section discusses the implications of the findings for the broader community that 
could benefit from this DBA research. 
 
8.3.1. Small and medium organisations  
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The actionable frameworks as shown through (Table 43), (Table 44), (Table 45), (Table 
46), (Table 47) and (Table 48) serve as platform of actionable frameworks for small and 
medium organisations to deal with complex situations operating under similar economic 
crises. Knowledge gained through this DBA research can help stakeholders build their 
skills and competencies, helping to address complex organisational and leadership 
challenges. However, these organisations must remember that the knowledge generated 
through this DBA research is not a one-stop solution for all the challenges; it can apply in 
a different context, but this will require careful adaptation.  
 
An additional implication of this DBA research is to remind small and medium 
organisations to re-work existing diffused and undiffused knowledge to form collaborative 
understanding. Another implication is that for organisations that operate under similar 
economic crises, internal adjustments and flexibility prepare these organisations to 
address multiple challenges across all industries. 
 
8.3.2. Management practice 
Understanding the consequences of presuming that only ‘outside causes’ lead to 
organisations’ revenue or profit losses prevents exploring possible ‘inside causes’ that 
could be mostly responsible for an organisation’s revenue losses. Furthermore, it is also 
essential to understand the importance of implementing a top-down AR implementation 
stage and the importance of a collaborative action design. 
 
8.3.3. For policymakers 
To raise awareness that support systems are working transparently and coherently with 
no external biases, policymakers should implement policies and procedures advocated 
by the government to provide opportunities for existing SMEs to sustain and grow (INNO-
Grips, 2011), and these policies should also support and grow SMEs. Similarly, these 
policymakers should encourage sustainable growth and provide a broader range of target 
business sectors not limited to a single market seeing beyond Bahrain. Additionally, these 
policymakers should also compile a robust financial structure, considering the size and 
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earning capacity of the SMEs, not having a flat system applicable to all the SMEs, and 
advance SMEs’ knowledge through coaching and mentoring. 
 
8.3.4. To the local community 
Raising awareness that a drop in oil prices will result in a higher government deficit and 
lower government spending, significantly impacting job creation within the country, as 
most of the available private sector jobs are based on government contracts. A drop in oil 
prices means less drilling and exploration activities. This means fewer actions, and that 
can lead to layoffs, hurting local businesses.  
 
8.3.5. Recent major developments 
However, the Bahrain government recently imposed a few measures to boost the 
economy to mitigate the challenges associated with the drop in oil prices following the 
economic crisis.  
 
Vision 2030 
The most important policy document for economic evolution in Bahrain is Vision 2030, 
organised around three guiding principles: sustainability, competitiveness and fairness. It 
discusses a series of economic and institutional reforms to shift Bahrain from an economy 
built on oil to an economy driven by the private sector (EDB, 2018). Sustainability: with a 
significant strain on government coffers, this policy document discusses that by 2030, the 
private sector should be the primary economic driver of Bahrain. Competitiveness: this 
sector focuses on driving economic growth; increasing productivity should be in a 
competitive environment and can only achieve this through employees having the right 
skills and attitudes. This document also states that Bahrain can achieve this by going to 
great lengths to educate and train its workforce. Fairness: this policy discusses a free and 
fair competitive environment for both public and private sectors relating to employment, 
land or government tenders.  
 
Growing the non-oil sectors 
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Several other sectors drive Bahrain’s growth, tourism being the biggest one, followed by 
the hotel and restaurant sectors. The government decided to expand these business 
sectors by 5% (EDB, 2018). 
 
Economic aid packages 
In October 2018, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced a US$10 billion economic 
aid package for Bahrain (Mogielnicki, 2018). With the support of these aid packages, the 
Bahrain government expects to address the budget deficit and mitigate the negative 
impacts of the austerity steps it has on the economy. Mogielnicki (2018) further adds that 
the drop in oil prices impacted Bahrain’s public finances, as nearly 75% of government 
revenues depend on hydrocarbons. This economic aid package has helped boost 
Bahrain’s economic outlook from negative to stable (Oxford Business Group, 2018).  
  
Quota system for government tenders 
In 2018, Bahrain’s government decided that 10% of all government tenders must be 
awarded to the SME sector. This move encourages the government’s effort to promote 
and expedite entrepreneurship (Al-Mukharriq, 2019). This new move allows the SME 
sector to have greater access to all government tenders irrespective of the ownership and 
size.  
 
The following section (8.4) discusses the extent to which this DBA research represents 
actionable knowledge when addressing similar challenges in the future. 
 
 Actionable knowledge when addressing similar challenges in the future  
This DBA research explored several findings when addressing similar challenges in the 
future.  
 
As indicated through (1.2), Org. A presumed ‘outside causes’ associated with the drop in 
oil prices and the economic crisis were the core causes behind its revenue losses. This 
prevented it from investigating possible ‘inside causes’ within Org. A that could have been 
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mostly responsible for its revenue losses. Analogous to the ‘dot-com bubble’ findings, as 
shown through chapters (4) and (5), unseen causes were more profound than what was 
visible and showed how Org. A’s actors neglected to understand the common market 
rules, which has led to hidden roots behind its revenue losses. 
 
This DBA research also showed the importance of networking for advice and support, 
and the consequences of neglecting this important activity and how it can adversely 
impact an organisation. Due to their inability to link entrepreneurially in the organisation’s 
early days, business leaders lose crucial resources flown through the network. To be 
productive, the leader must be proactive, grow and reach a broader business circle. 
 
This DBA research also showed that to improve practices in areas that needed help, it is 
important to implement a top-down AR implementation stage and a collaborative action 
design through participant experiences. The focus should be on resolving the challenging 
situation together with whom the problem relates to within the organisation. Also, the 
actions used to improve practices must have suitable timeframes. Additionally, measuring 
participants’ practices and engaging with them in the continual adaptation generates new 
actionable knowledge.  
 
The following section (8.5) addresses the impact on research confirmation on theory 
base.  
 
 Impact on research confirmation on theory base and contribution to 
literature 
This section shows the revised literature set alongside findings from this DBA research 
and whether the findings were confirmed or extended, contrasted or were unexpected.  
 
The findings of this DBA research following the revised literature, as discussed in chapter 
(2), showed that (2.3.1), (2.3.2), (2.3.3) and (2.3.4) findings were largely or somewhat 
related to but were not directly impacting foreign-owned organisations in Bahrain. 
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However, there were no findings alongside (2.3.5), (2.3.6), (2.3.7) and (2.3.8) that directly 
impacted small or medium organisations in Bahrain irrespective of the ownership or size. 
 
This DBA research began by seeing the current economic crisis through similar past 
economic crises. Observing the current economic crisis through the ‘dot-com bubble’ 
crisis, as told by Elliot (2004), Lewis (2020) and Smith (2012), the initial findings showed 
that Org. A was mesmerised by new and unproven business ideas, neglected to adhere 
to standard market rules, and ignored the unseen roots below wrong traits. Agreeing with 
Smith (2012), additional findings were that Org. A neglected to amend its business plan 
to respond in a timely manner to market warnings and market pulling drives, which lead 
to poorly informed decisions.  
 
An additional observation was that Org. A, to some extent, felt government regulatory 
practices, as told by Injaz (2013), were hindering them from benefitting from Tamkeen’s 
loans. However, they were not the actual reasons that they were not benefitting from 
government help. Findings from this DBA research also confirmed that foreign 
organisations could not secure sub-contracted offers because the poor-quality market 
infrastructure placed these organisations in a weaker position than larger organisations 
(Nixon, 2000; JETRO, 2015). Another observation was finding the right workforce with 
the right skills and attitudes (Terentyev, 2014; Ershova, 2017). Additionally, discriminatory 
treatment favouring the local organisations over foreign organisations, as seen by BBC 
(2011), was observed in some sectors.  
 
This DBA research also showed the importance of networking for advice and emotional 
support; the consequences of neglecting this vital activity can adversely impact an 
organisation (Bruderl and Preisendorfer, 1998; Freeman, 1999). Hite and Hesterly (2001) 
and Slotte-Kock and Coviello (2009) say that new organisations in the early stage of their 
business can benefit from a network. Das and Teng (1998) noted that networking is an 
excellent way to tap into the vital talent and market information and should be a 
continuous effort and should not stop at any stage, even when the organisation is stable. 
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Singh et al. (1999) also said networking is an excellent platform for business leaders who 
hail from the information technology sector with weak ties to improve. Interestingly, 
Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) said that solid relations could not measure 
entrepreneurial success if its leader neglects to implement the right action at the right 
time. Similarly, findings from this DBA research observed that GCC business leaders, due 
to mutual religious and cultural beliefs, shy away from forming business relations with 
foreigners and restrict their network among GCC nationals (Ghauri and Fang 2001; 
Ourfali, 2015; Najm, 2015).  
 
This section also shows, as a result, that the revised literature confirmed some findings 
of this DBA research.  
 
Through this DBA research’s findings and as told by Arditi and Chotibhongs (2005), 
Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2011) and Young (2018), the observations were that 
late payment was a norm, but informal agreements among the contractors were standard 
to get paid.  
 
Additionally, agreeing with Doz and Kosonen (2010), the findings of this DBA research 
confirmed that organisations collapse not because they do something wrong but because 
they were continuously following the same old strategies for a long time. However, Quinn 
(1999) and Crawford and Nahmias (2010) say constantly acquiring new knowledge is vital 
for incremental improvements. However, this depends on, as told by Bertoldi et al. (2018), 
the knowledge leader’s readiness once it comes to a changing organisational 
environment. This readiness leads to deliberate reforms, maintaining the strategic 
advantage to generate value on an organisation’s business model (Doz and Kosonen, 
2010).  
 
Additionally, this DBA research addressed the significance of planning and how it links to 
growth, as Blackburn, Hart and Wainwright (2013) explained. Planning should be a 
continuous cycle, and as this DBA research’s findings showed, planning comes with 
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experience working in different working environments, as seen by Jabbar and Hussein 
(2017). Having strategies only will not meet an organisation’s needs if the organisation 
neglects to implement them. Farsight Leadership Organisation (2007) said that 80% of 
organisations have the right strategies, yet only 14% implement them, and Al-Ghamdi 
(1998) says this is due to a lack of coordination.  
 
This DBA research also discovered an absence of leadership competencies within Org. 
A’s leadership as a significant challenge for Org. A. Kiggundu (2002) and Sarwoko et al. 
(2013) saw the importance of robust entrepreneurial characteristics to improve business 
performance. However, Westerberg et al. (1997), Markman (2007) and Ahmad et al. 
(2010) say having all these characteristics will not guarantee running a business 
successfully but having one or more helps to know the future. Interestingly, Osborne 
(1993) says leader competency is not essential to running a business, but what is 
important is the leader’s personality underlying the business model. As observed through 
findings from this DBA research, Bandura (1977) said that leaders high in self-efficacy 
undertake challenging tasks and complete them well.  
 
Even though the revised literature confirmed or extended some findings, this DBA 
research also generated some unexpected findings.  
 
Initially, Org. A presumed its revenue losses since June 2014 were due to the drop in oil 
prices leading to an economic crisis, but Basha (2014) said changing oil prices negatively 
impacts an organisation’s performance. However, UlHaq (2017) said, even with a drop in 
oil prices, an organisation’s revenue could still grow; however, high operating costs 
reduce the profit margins, resulting in losing investor and customer trust (Pindyck, 1991; 
Killian and Lee, 2014). 
 
Even though the revised literature confirmed or extended some findings, this DBA 
research also explored some contrasting findings as well.  
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Findings from this DBA research also showed that Org. A neglecting to carry out a 
feasibility study before moving into Saudi Arabia did not generate the expected results. 
Burke, Fraser and Green (2010) and Delmar and Shane (2003) say that to improve 
decision making, it is important to have a written business plan at the initial stage of a 
new product or service launch, but Bhide (2000) says that this has been unsuccessful in 
weak markets.  
 
This DBA research also showed how government actions could impact an organisation’s 
economic value, not limited to enforcing laws. Dua, Hail and Wilkins (2010) argue 
government actions will not be as effective as other actions but play an influential role in 
an organisation’s finances. However, to reap the maximum benefits from the government, 
as Blount (2015) said, an organisation must build a good relationship with the government 
to be aware of its benefits extended to the organisations. 
 
The revised literature also incorporated the networking approach (2.6.1) and outlined its 
relevance to this DBA research. Where Org. A’s challenges were concerned; findings 
from this DBA research showed higher applicability of the networking approach (2.6.1).  
 
The following section (8.6) shows the researcher’s development as a scholar-practitioner 
and the learning journey.  
 
 The researcher’s development as a scholar-practitioner and the learning 
journey  
This section shows the researchers’ achievements, developments and milestones 
reached when developing this DBA research. 
 
The proudest moment was the ability to construct organic research based on original 
data. The next achievement was the ability to involve stakeholders as full partners in a 
mutual learning process and collaborative knowledge development and action design that 
can be put into practice.  
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As the primary researcher and participant, constructing this DBA research allowed 
learning in new areas. Coghlan and Brannick (2014) say that encouraging active 
stakeholder participation requires multiple research modalities, including dialogue skills 
and inquiry typology. As the primary researcher, these skills facilitated the action learning 
set and other stakeholders to share their experiences to generate actionable knowledge 
(March, Sproull and Tamuz, 1991). Attending two workshops in the UAE helped to build 
these skills. Additionally, maturity in engaging in collaborative dialogues in this action-
oriented DBA research allowed openness to work with critical feedback (Rigg, Ellwood 
and Anderson, 2021). Examining this knowledge through collaborative discussions 
created a solid foundation to identify and implement practical interventions. Another skill 
was learning to manage the time well, ensuring work is done on time, prioritising essential 
tasks, and identifying different styles that suit best. Also, completing this DBA research 
helped in learning presentation skills and to overcome the fear of public speaking. Staying 
motivated throughout this DBA research was a significant challenge, especially when 
pushing through emotions to meet goals.  
 
Even though doing DBA research was primarily an independent undertaking, this journey 
allowed working with others. This means learning to listen to others and compromise with 
the external stakeholders. Writing effectively, ensuring accuracy, conciseness, and 
engagement, was an added skill developed during this DBA research. Working on a new 
research topic allowed the researcher to be creative, an underrated skill often 
underreported. An added skill discovered when building this DBA research was exploring 
and learning new data analysis and coding methods. Likewise, the ability to strengthen 
fact-gathering and research abilities allowed research skills to be improved. All these 
skills learned during building this DBA research were of help to develop publishing skills. 
 
Similarly, learning a new form of research was another milestone in constructing this DBA 
research. Being accustomed to traditional research as an outsider, seeking to generate 
knowledge without influence did not cause the vital force. Learning to accept criticism and 
being professionally responsive to this group of knowledgeable people (peers) who were 
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often critical and challenging was an added milestone attained in constructing this DBA 
research. However, it was surprising that this group of people later led the research and 
became active participants.  
 
An added achievement was the action learning set participants seeing the positive 
changes within Org. A post-2014. They saw that the new knowledge has improved 
practices and allowed enabled two contracts from two action learning set participant 
organisations to be secured. Additionally, sharing emerging actionable knowledge built 
on Bahraini SMEs with the BCCI led to being selected for one of their executive 
committees. Lastly, completing this DBA research in a niche research field in a small 
country was not an easy feat. However, the findings will help all SMEs understand how 
to deal with crisis periods in Bahrain towards their survival and sustainability. While 
developing as a scholar-practitioner, the ability to undertake novel research and help 
Bahrain, the researcher’s place of residence 25 years, has been a great achievement. 
Also, the knowledge generated through the DBA research qualifies for participating in 
similar government tenders (Figure 32). Conducting novel research was not an easy task 
without encountering challenges. These are addressed through (8.7).  
 
Figure 32: BCCI tender invitation 
 
Source: GDN (2021, p.12) 
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 Challenges encountered when compiling this DBA research  
As with any DBA research, there were several challenges when compiling this DBA 
research. As this DBA research showed, the initial presumptions led the research to a 
dead-end which later changed to identify that those unseen causes were more profound 
than initially visible. 
 
Additionally, AR was a new research strategy for the action learning set. Some 
participants were sometimes reluctant to share information and saw AR as time-wasting, 
and in several instances, treated the researcher as a fault finder. Even though the SMEs’ 
HoD’s extended their best support to select participants who could add value to this DBA 
research, the HoDs’ lack of knowledge of AR meant that they neglected to brief the 
participants in advance, resulting in several visits. Even as a preparatory measure, 
sharing the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix B) in advance did not prepare 
participants for the discussions.  
 
Chapters (5) and (6) used three frameworks to interpret findings, and presenting the 
findings through one framework was challenging. This applies to the data coding process 
as well. To interpret chapters (4), (5) and (6) findings into a readable format, employing a 
three-step coding process (Table 21) was laborious and time-consuming. Additionally, 
generating sensible data through numerous pages of action learning set and government 
office discussions was an added challenge. A significant challenge was a lack of sources 
from a GCC perspective on similar challenges, which compelled analysing the design and 
implementation from a global perspective. Additionally, this group of knowledgeable 
people (peers) was often challenging and it’s doubtful if they had a genuine interest in 
Org. A. The following section (8.8) ends this chapter and the DBA research by discussing 
recommendations for future research.  
 
 Recommendations for future research  
When this DBA journey began, except for two studies on SMEs with female entrepreneurs 
(Al-Ghazali, Yusoff, and Sadi 2013) and business support schemes (Alrabeei and Kasi, 
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2014), there was a lack of past research relating to the research topic. However, this 
challenge allowed new research to be undertaken to address challenges that SMEs in 
Bahrain are experiencing in this economic crisis. This DBA research provided empirical 
evidence of SMEs in Bahrain and should help other researchers as a foundation to 
undertake similar research in the future.  
  
This DBA research identified organisational and leadership challenges that prevented 
organisations from responding to an economic crisis. Findings from (8.3) showed the 
implications for the broader community that could benefit from this DBA research. The 
findings will help other practitioners to understand the consequences of presuming that 
only ‘outside causes’ lead to organisations’ revenue or profit losses, preventing exploring 
possible ‘inside causes’ that could have been primarily responsible for an organisation’s 
revenue losses. 
  
Additionally, this DBA research showed that the drop in oil prices and the economic crisis 
impacted SMEs in Bahrain. The action learning set realised that SMEs must seriously 
explore and implement remedial steps to ensure a lesser impact from the drop in oil 
prices. In an economic crisis, this DBA research also showed how helpful Tamkeen is 
irrespective of ownership and size and how it adapts its support schemes to help the SME 
sector. Additionally, findings from this DBA research showed that weaker and vulnerable 
SMEs could go out of business, and the forward-looking and efficient SMEs would 
emerge stronger in the future. Perhaps the drop in oil prices and the economic crisis can 
weed out the less adaptable SMEs from the market. In this context, it is advisable to 
launch a follow-up survey when the oil prices resume to an acceptable level to measure 
the extent of the drop in the oil prices on the overall economy. This should provide an 
insight into the economic damage that the drop in oil prices had on SMEs. In addition, this 
should allow policymakers to prepare relevant policies to cope better with a similar crisis 
in the future.  
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Additionally, in future research, it is advisable to look at similar studies from a GCC 
perspective to realise how these SMEs have adapted to the economic crisis due to the 
drop in oil prices. Another aspect is, Bahrain is a developing country; it is also advisable 
to conduct comparison research from a south Asian country’s angle. 
 
Figure 33: What we see and do not see 
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Appendix A DBA ethics committee approval 
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Appendix B The questionnaire  
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Appendix C Action proposal letter to Org. A 
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Appendix D Action acceptance letter from Org. A 
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Appendix E Action implementation stages of Org. A 
Appendix E.1 Forming business partnerships  
Fluxicon, The Netherlands  
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Professional Evaluation and Certification Board, Canada 
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Arabian Al Kanar Co Ltd, Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia 
273 | P a g e  
 
 
ThreatMark s.r.o, Czech Republic  
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Appendix E.2 Improving networking behaviour   
CEO appointed to the BCCI technology committee  
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Obtained mail-chimp subscription 
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Appendix F Attracting the right talent  
Appendix F.1 Formulated a R&S framework 






























GOVERNMENT RELATIONS - ISSUE EMPLOYEE RESIDENCY PERMIT IN PASSPORT   
  
  
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS - FAMILY NATIONAL ID CARDS (CPR)   
  
Signature Date
FOR HR USE ONLY




WITHIN 1ST MONTH OF EMPLOYMENT






ORIENTATION : INFORMATION ON COMPANY POLICIES & THEIR LOCATION
ORIENTATION : TOUR OF PREMISES AND HEALTH & SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS
ORIENTATION : PRESENTATION TO COLLEAGUES
HANDOVER OF COMPANY PROPERTY & SIGN FORM






























A1 EMPLOYMENT OFFER CONFIRMATION
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS - FAMILY RESIDENCY PERMIT IN PASSPORT
ISSUE EMPLOYEE BUSINESS CARD
ISSUE MEDICAL INSURANCE FOR EMPLOYEE
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS - ISSUE EMPLOYEE NATIONAL ID CARD (CPR)
ORIENTATION : REVIEW CODE OF CONDUCT & SIGN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
IT ARRANGEMENTS: PRINTER ACCESS FROM COMPUTER & EMAIL
IT ARRANGEMENTS:  EMAIL & UPDATE EMAIL DISTRIBUTION LISTS
IT ARRANGEMENTS: PHONE LINE & UPDATE EMPLOYEE CONTACT LIST
ASSIGN EMPLOYEE OFFICE SEAT LOCATION
ASSIGN EMPLOYEE ID NUMBER 
TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS / ISSUE FLIGHT TICKET 
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS - TRANSFER SPONSORSHIP
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS - ISSUE WORK VISA
START DATE CONFIRMATION
COMPLETE EMPLOYEE INFORMATION FORM & SIGN
EMPLOYEE SIGNS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
EMPLOYEE SIGNS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
EMPLOYEE PROVIDES DOCUMENTS FOR EMPLOYEE FILE
AIRPORT PICK-UP 
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Appendix F.2 Introduced policies and procedures manuals 
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Appendix F.3 Obtained ISO qualifications 
Lead auditor training course ISO22301:2012 
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Lead auditor training course ISO27001:2013 
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Appendix F.4 Introduced an employee performance appraisal policy 
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Appendix G Registered with government offices  
Appendix G.1 Obtained the BCCI membership            
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Appendix G.2 Registered as a potential tenderer with Bahrain Tender Board            
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Appendix H Registered with Tamkeen 
Appendix H.1 Business development programme           
 
Appendix H.2 Training and wage support programme  
 
288 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendix H.3 Coaching and mentoring programme       
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Appendix I Amendments to the business plan  
Appendix I.1 Participated in major IT exhibitions    
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Participated in IDC CIO summit 2018 exhibition in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia   
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Participated in IDC CIO summit 2019 exhibition in Saudi Arabia    
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Participated in GITEX 2018 exhibition in Dubai, UAE14     
     
 
 
14 Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, and Fujairah 
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Appendix I.2 Organised breakfast mornings for CXOs         
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Appendix I.3 Participated in community outreach activities 
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Summary of community outreach activities  
 
 
S/No Date Delivered to Subject Venue
1 04-Aug-17 Sacred Heart Catholic Church Protecting children from cyber threats
Sacred Heart Church 
community hall (OLAA)
2 04-Sep-17 Rotary Club of Manama
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for individuals and families
The Gulf Hotel, Awal ballroom
3 09-Sep-17 The Asian School, Manama (students)
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for professionals
The school auditorium
4 21-Oct-17 The Asian School, Manama (parents)
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for individuals and families
The school auditorium
5 28-Nov-17 The Sacred Heart School, Isa Town
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
Cyber Safety for individuals and families
The school auditorium
6 09-Jan-18 Quantity Surveyors Associations, UAE
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for professionals
Al Futtaim Training Center, 
Dubai, UAE
7 15-Jan-18 Sacred Heart School (teachers) Protecting children from cyber threats Sacred Heart school hall
8 16-Jan-18 Sacred Heart School (parents) Protecting children from cyber threats Sacred Heart school hall
9 17-Jan-18 Sacred Heart School (students) Being safe from cyberthreats Sacred Heart school hall
10 20-Mar-18 ISACA, Sri Lanka chapter
Defining and information security incident 
response procedure
Royal College Union Skills 
Centre
11 09-Mar-18
Bahrain British Business Forum 
(BBBF) Bahrain
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for professionals
Capital Club, Bahrain
12 03-Apr-18 Dhahran Techno Valley
Are you protected? Practical guidelines for 
legal professionals
Dhahran Techno Valley, King 
Fahad
13 08-May-18 Rotary Club of Salmaniya
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for professionals
Diplomat Hotel, Manama
14 28-May-18 Rotary Club of Adliya
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for professionals
Diplomat Hotel, Manama
15 31-May-18 Multi National School (MNS) Protecting children from cyber threats School Hall, Bahrain
16 07-Jun-18 Nadeen International School Protecting children from cyber threats School Hall, Bahrain
17 09-Jun-18 Newton Legal
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for professionals
New legal office
18 14-Jun-18 US Embassy (wardens) Protecting children from cyber threats
US Embassy Saudi Arabia, 
Dhahran consulate
19 06-Sep-18
US Embassy, Dhahran consulate 
(Staff)
Protecting children from cyber threats
US Embassy Saudi Arabia, 
Dhahran consulate
20 07-Sep-18
THMC (Thattai Hindu Merchants 
Community)
Are you protected? Practical guidelines on 
cyber safety for professionals
Kovil community hall
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Appendix I.4 Improved brand visibility 
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Social media coverage  
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Re-designed the company profile  
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Appendix I.5 Added new services to Org. A’s portfolio 
Robotic Process Automation (RPA) 
 
 
ISO22301 Business Continuing Planning 
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ISO27001 Information Security Goverance  
 
ISO9001 Quality Management System 
 
